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 Abstract 
 
This thesis researches EU private international law rules relating to contracts, including its 
historical development, its rules and its policy objectives. In order to evaluate EU private 
international law and its policy objectives, English and Belgian private international law 
rules are investigated as exemplars of domestic law systems within the EU.  
In this approach lies one of the unique contributions to knowledge of the project. In particular 
the research takes an original and unique approach by investigating issues from an EU as 
well as a comparative national perspective. English and Belgian law represent different legal 
histories and systems (common law and civil law) and are therefore representative of the 
types of compromises that have to be made at an EU level. 
Moreover, the relevant legal instruments in the area of research have undergone some 
changes, some of which are significant and very recent. Particular reference must be made 
here to the Brussels I Regulation recast 2012. Due to its recent nature, very little publications 
are available, a gap the research wants to help fill by a detailed textual analysis of the relevant 
provisions. 
Finally, there is as of yet little detailed research on the EU’s policy objectives in the area of 
private international law. To some extent this holds true for English and Belgian law as well. 
The research aims to help fill that gap.    
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 Introduction 
1. Area of research 
 
The area of private international law, or the conflict of laws, is the area of law which is 
concerned with situations in which there is an international element, i.e. a connection with 
more than one country, or, a foreign element.1 In this thesis the term “private international 
law” will be used, rather than “conflict of laws”. The reason for this is that the term “conflict 
of laws” seems to suggest that the area covers situations in which there is a conflict between 
one or more substantive laws.2 Although this is one of the problems private international law 
seeks to address, the area covers more than that. 
Firstly, private international law determines the country whose courts have jurisdiction to 
hear claim with an international element. Secondly, private international law determines 
which law is to be applied by the competent court, i.e. the court with jurisdiction, because it 
will not necessarily have to apply its own national law to the dispute before it. Thirdly, 
private international law determines whether and how foreign decisions can be recognised 
and enforced.3  
This research project investigates EU private international law relating to contracts, 
including its historical development, its rules and its policy objectives. In order to evaluate 
EU private international law and its policy objectives, English and Belgian private 
international law and policy objectives are investigated as exemplars of domestic law 
systems within the EU. 
The choice of these particular national legal systems was made in order to compare both a 
civil law system with a common law system, and a founder Member State with a Member 
State which joined years later when the private international law system of the EU was 
already underway. Furthermore, from a political and policy point of view, the United 
1 McClean, D. and Ruiz Abou-Nigm, V., 2012. Morris. The Conflict of Laws. 8th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
p. 2. 
2 Briggs, A., 2013. The Conflict of Laws. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 1-2. 
3 Van Calster, G., 2013. European Private International Law.  Oxford: Hart Publishing. p. 1 
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Kingdom has tended to be in favour of a broader Europe, supporting for example the 
accession of Turkey to the EU, whereas Belgium has always been in favour of a deeper 
Europe, supporting more European integration.4 
The researcher chose to focus on two aspects of private international law, namely jurisdiction 
and applicable law, because the scope of the project did not allow for an in-depth study of 
all three areas of private international law. In one of the two areas chosen, there have been 
developments, some of which significant, since the research project was started. 
The EU instruments key to the research are the Brussels I Regulation on jurisdiction and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and the Rome I Regulation on 
the law applicable to contractual obligations. Brussels I was revised recently and this 
revision has of course formed part of the focus of the research project. 
The two relevant instruments are part of wider historical and legal developments in the EU 
and must be seen as instruments facilitating and contributing to the single European market 
which is aimed at establishing fair competition between undertakings and is based on four 
freedoms: free movement of persons, goods, services and capital.5 In particular Brussels I 
and Rome I state as their general objective the maintenance and development of an area of 
freedom, security and justice in which the free movement of persons is ensured through 
measures which are necessary for the sound operation of the internal market. 
Against this background it is investigated what the EU policy objectives underlying the rules 
in these instruments are. Bearing these policy objectives in mind, an in-depth analysis of 
several provisions is conducted in order to assess whether, and to what extent, the rules in 
them achieve their underlying objective. This approach was inspired by the fact that, when 
interpreting and applying EU legislation the CJEU has traditionally applied a teleological 
method i.e. a method whereby legislation is interpreted in accordance with its purpose.6  
An investigation of English and Belgian law is also conducted as a basis for assessing 
whether and to what extent EU law has been influenced by national law and vice versa. 
Furthermore, insofar as elements of the national law and policy examined in this thesis have 
4 See also: Dinan, D. (ed.), 2006. Origins and Evolution of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. p. 110, 155, 174. 
5 Art. 26 TFEU. 
6  Oren, J., 2003. International Jurisdiction over Consumer Contracts in E-Europe. International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly [online], 52(3), 668. Available via: Westlaw. 
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not apparently influenced EU law, they may provide some insight in the feasibility and 
desirability of possible solutions for problems identified in EU law.  
 
2. Methodology 
 
A legal doctrinal study is being carried out, which is historically and currently the method 
expected and required by legislators, lawyers and other legal interest groups in this area of 
law. Legal doctrinal research provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing a 
certain area of law and it analyses the relationship between rules. Furthermore areas of 
difficulty are identified and future developments are predicted. The research is also reform-
oriented because it intensively evaluates the adequacy of current legal rules and seeks to 
recommend changes to those current rules which are considered inadequate or only partly 
adequate, meaning that there is room for improvement.7 
For this doctrinal study several resources are being used. Firstly a detailed textual analysis 
of the legal rules themselves is conducted. For EU law and English law these are contained 
in the relevant legislation as well as the case law relating to it. For Belgian law the legal rules 
are solely contained in legislation as Belgium does not recognise case law as actual law but 
rather as an application and interpretation of the law. This of course does not make case law 
irrelevant or unimportant; it is just a matter of attaching the correct level of authority to the 
source. 
Secondary resources used are diverse. Textbooks, journal articles, case comments etc. are 
used to research EU, English and Belgian law and policy although they are not equally 
numerous for all these research subjects. More specifically there are less of these types of 
resources available on the Brussels I recast and on Belgian law. For EU law and Belgian law 
in particular, important secondary resources consist of preparatory works such as 
parliamentary documents containing debates, explanations and amendments, responses to 
consultation papers and proposals of legislation.8 
7 Pearce, D., Campbell, E. and Harding, D., 1987. Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing. 
8 The Belgian documents used are in Dutch and French. They were translated into English by the author of the 
thesis. 
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EU resources have been examined first because this has enabled an analysis of EU law, and 
an identification and evaluation of EU policies, to be made. The focus has been on the most 
relevant documents for the project, with particular attention to the relevant official 
documents. With these secondary resources and commentaries taken into account, current 
problems with, as well as possible issues for, the future development of EU law were 
identified. These provided the focus for the investigation and analysis of national law and 
policy. English private international law has been widely documented although the Civil 
Procedure Rules, which form a part of this law, pose a particular challenge because, although 
they are essential in private international law, they change very often and changes and 
amendments are not always documented very transparently. Therefore any research relating 
to them has been double checked from time to time. Regarding Belgian law a lot of the 
resources investigated consisted of very lengthy parliamentary documents as doctrine is 
somewhat scarce. 
 
3. Aims of the Research 
 
1) To critique the development and current state of EU private international law relating 
to contracts. 
 
2) To critique the policy objectives of the EU in this area of law. 
 
3) To evaluate the impact of the interrelationship of EU law and policy, and that of the 
Member States, with particular reference to the domestic law of England and Wales 
and Belgium. 
 
4. Objectives of the Research 
 
1) Investigate EU private international law relating to contracts, including its historical 
development. 
2) Investigate EU policy objectives in this area. 
11 
 
3) Research English and Belgian private international law relating to contracts, and the 
policy objectives underlying these laws, as exemplars of Member State law and 
policy in this area. 
4) Investigate the impact of EU law and policy on these two national laws and vice 
versa. 
5) Identify and evaluate problems with current law and those likely to arise in its future 
development. 
6) Suggest solutions to these problems and assess their feasibility. 
 
5. Research Questions 
 
1) What is the current state of EU law in the area of private international law relating to 
contracts? 
2) What are the EU’s policy objectives in this area? 
3) Taking into account the answers to question 2 and 3, to what extent does EU private 
international law achieve its own policy objectives and what other criticisms may be 
made of it? 
4) To what extent are the policy objectives and achievements of EU law influenced by 
national law? 
5) What is the impact of EU developments on English and Belgian law in this area, and 
does any difference in impact relate to the dichotomy between civil law and common 
law or the different history of those countries’ relationship with the EU? 
6) What solutions may address the criticisms identified and, given the interrelationship 
of EU law and national law, to what extent are these feasible and desirable? 
 
6. Original Contribution to Knowledge 
12 
 
 In the application for project approval it was pointed out that there was a lack of specialised 
analysis of many of the provisions of Rome I and the resulting legal and policy issues since 
it was relatively new then. Since project approval and transfer to PhD there have been 
publications on this Regulation but several of these lack depth. Furthermore, publications on 
both the Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation generally lack a combined EU law 
and comparative private international law perspective. This research will thus still provide 
an original contribution to knowledge in this area with its detailed textual analysis of the 
relevant provisions. 
Furthermore there is as yet little detailed research on the EU’s policy objectives and approach 
regarding private international law. If addressed, authors usually limit their analysis to a 
mentioning of one particular objective relating to a specific rule. Hardly ever are the policy 
objectives underlying the rules the red thread in the analysis, let alone the interplay between 
those objectives. The same holds true for Belgian policy objectives and even English policy 
objectives to some extent. The identification and evaluation of these policy objectives 
therefore constitutes a considerable contribution to knowledge, particularly in relation to EU 
private international law where particular attention is paid to the interaction between these 
objectives and how that impacts, not just on the rules, but also on the possible solutions for 
problems identified. 
Furthermore, due to its recent nature, only very limited publications on the Brussels I 
Regulation recast are available. As such, the in-depth analysis and evaluation of several of 
its provisions will aid in filling that gap.  
A very particular contribution to knowledge is that this research takes an original and unique 
approach by investigating issues from an EU as well as a comparative national perspective. 
English and Belgian law represent different legal histories and systems (common law and 
civil law) as well as differences in opinion on EU integration. These two countries will 
therefore provide a particular insight in the type of compromises that have to be made on an 
EU level, not just or not necessarily from a political point of view, but in terms of designing 
private international law rules for the EU which are sensible, feasible and desirable in such 
a diverse organisation. 
7. Structure of the Thesis 
13 
 
 Chapter 1 discusses the historical development of EU private international law against the 
background of the historical development of the EU, after which the key policy objectives 
underlying EU private international law are identified and described. 
Chapter 2 outlines the EU private international law instruments subject to this research, with 
a particular emphasis on those provisions that will form part of the in-depth discussion, 
analysis and evaluation in chapters 5 to 8. 
Chapter 3 introduces English private international law rules with attention for its underlying 
policy objectives. 
Chapter 4 discusses Belgian private international law, again, with attention for its underlying 
policy objectives. 
Chapter 5 identifies and discusses EU private international law rules relevant to the policy 
objective of access to justice, after which an assessment is carried out. 
Chapter 6 focuses on several EU private international law provisions and assesses these in 
view of the overall underlying policy objective of legal certainty and predictability. 
Chapter 7 centres around party autonomy and in how far this policy objective is enhanced 
through the relevant EU private international law provisions. Suggestions for improvement 
are made, taking into account the conclusions reached in the previous two chapters. 
Chapter 8 researches in how far weaker parties are protected by EU private international law 
provisions and, if so, whether this protection is detrimental to the other policy objectives 
pursued.  
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Chapter 1. EU Private International Law History and 
Policies 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to investigate the historical development of EU private international law, 
with an emphasis on EU private international law relating to contracts, as well as the EU’s 
policies in this area. The focus will be on those historical events particularly relevant for the 
purposes of this thesis.  
The policies underlying EU private international law rules are not always easily identifiable. 
There is no exhaustive list of ‘policies’, or ‘aims’, or ‘goals’, or a document from any EU 
institution which clearly sets out what the relevant rules aim to achieve or remedy. The 
relevant literature in the field often touches on one or more of the underlying policy 
objectives but has not given a clear overview of the underlying policy objectives identified. 
This chapter aims to do just that, supported by research from a diverse range of sources.      
 
2. EU Private International Law History 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The history of the EU has been widely discussed in several academic fields because it has 
an impact in many areas and is therefore relevant to a range of academic disciplines. This 
thesis does not aim to provide an extensive overview and in-depth discussion and analysis 
of European and EU history as this is an endeavour better left to historians. It is, however, 
impossible to discuss the historical development of EU private international law without 
discussing how the EU came into existence and how it developed. Similarly the roots of the 
EU as well as its development must be discussed in the wider context of European history. 
The focus in this section will be on the key historical events leading to the foundation of the 
EU (originally the EEC) and the elements in its development which are believed to be 
15 
 
particularly relevant for the discussion of the inception of EU-wide private international law 
and its subsequent development. The creation, development and evolution of the relevant 
legal instruments will form part of this discussion.   
 
2.2 The events leading to the foundation of the EU 
 
Modern European history, and in particular the two World Wars and the subsequent Cold 
War, played a crucial role in the EU’s conception and political reality has dictated its growth, 
in terms of vertical as well as horizontal integration. 
The history of Europe was a violent one, characterised by nation states fighting each other 
in pursuit of power over the continent and beyond. The roots of the European Union date 
back principally to the years immediately after the Second World War in 1945, which left 
the continent in ruins and its population devastated. It is estimated that about 50 million 
people lost their lives during the Second World War, around 45 million became homeless 
and even more were displaced.9 The resulting strong political spirit of “never again” in 
Europe gave rise to discussions between politicians on how to take steps towards integration 
on a supra-national level.10 This is illustrated by the goal of the 1948 Hague Congress, as 
formulated by President Kerstens, “to promote a freely and democratically united Europe”.11 
At this Congress Winston Churchill captured the spirit in the following words: 
 
“The movement for European unity must be a positive force deriving its strength from our 
sense of common spiritual values, it is a dynamic expression of democratic faith based upon 
moral conceptions and inspired by a sense of mission. At the centre of our movement stands 
a charter of human rights, guarded by freedom and sustained by law. It is impossible to 
separate economics and defence from general political structure. Mutual aid in the economic 
field and a joint military defence must inevitably be accompanied, step by step, with a 
parallel policy of closer political unity.”12 
 
9 Kaczorowska, A., 2009. European Union Law. 2nd ed. Oxon: Routledge. p. 3.  
10 George, S. and Bache, I., 2001. Politics in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p 46-47. 
11  Congress of Europe Report, The Hague May 1948,  p. X. Available via: 
http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/congress-of-europe-the-hague-7-to-11-may-1948-pbAX1998669/. 
12 Ibid. 
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As pointed out by the President of the European Parliament in the preface for the new edition 
of the resolutions adopted at the Hague Congress, Churchill was making these 
pronouncements for the Continent only at the time.13 That does not take anything away from 
the fact, however, that he played a crucial role in the establishment of the first steps towards 
the European Union. Furthermore his speech illustrates that political cooperation and 
integration was to be pursued through economic cooperation and integration.  
 
The fact that the emphasis was on economic cooperation can be explained by the Marshall 
Plan, which offered American financial support to European countries provided that they 
would work together towards economic reconstruction.14 However, given the division which 
existed between Western Europe, and the Soviet Union which influenced Eastern Europe, 
only Western Europe took steps in order to achieve such cooperation.15 Although the USA 
had initially intended economic cooperation and integration for the whole of Europe, the 
attitude of the Soviet Union changed the approach and made the USA believe that economic 
integration and cooperation in Western Europe would strengthen this part of the continent 
against a further spreading of communism.16 
 
2.3 The Foundation of the EEC  
 
Some initial clarification of certain concepts is needed before further discussion of the EU 
and its development. For the purposes of EU law and history vertical integration (the 
‘deepening’ of the EU) refers to the process whereby competencies are increasingly shared 
across EU Member States or delegated to autonomous supra-national EU institutions. It can 
therefore be defined as “the distribution of competencies between EU institutions in 
integrated policy sectors”.17 Horizontal integration (the ‘widening’ of the EU) refers to the 
process whereby the EU expands territorially by accepting new Member States. It can be 
defined as “the territorial extension of [...] vertical integration”.18 As this research focuses 
on a particular area of EU law, vertical integration is more important in discussing its 
13 Ibid. 
14 Kaczorowska, A., 2009. European Union Law. 2nd ed. Oxon: Routledge. p. 4. 
15 Dinan, D. (ed.), 2006. Origins and Evolution of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p 37.  
16 George, S. and Bache, I., 2001. Politics in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 49-51. 
17 Richardson, J.J., ed., 2006. European Union: Power and Policy-Making. 3rd ed. Abingdon: Routledge. p. 75.  
18 Op.cit. p. 76. 
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development. For the purpose of comprehensiveness however, reference will also be made 
to horizontal integration in this chapter. 
The first attempt towards European economic integration consisted of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC), which was described by its architect, the French Foreign 
Minister at the time, Robert Schuman, as “the first concrete foundation of a European 
federation indispensable to the preservation of peace”.19 He was clearly inspired by Winston 
Churchill’s20 speech in Zürich in 1946, to the effect that the European family should be re-
created and should be provided with a structure under which it could dwell in peace, safety 
and freedom.21 The ECSC tied together the coal industries of Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Italy and, importantly, France and Germany and put them under the control of 
a supranational body, the High Authority. The aim was to aid economic recovery but also to 
make future war politically and practically impossible.22  
It has been said that the ECSC only knew limited success because it appeared that the 
national authorities remained reluctant to transfer part of their sovereign powers to a 
supranational entity.23 In terms of political powers and against the background of distrust 
which still existed between France and Germany in particular, this is probably true, at least 
if the ECSC is viewed as a step towards an immediate European federation. The failed 
attempt at establishing the European Defence Community further illustrates this. Where the 
ECSC was aimed at preventing Germany from taking up arms again, the EDC would result 
in its rearmament, which was still feared. 24 After a change of government, the French 
Parliament voted against the EDC, probably due to an easing of tension between the East 
and the West.25 Although this was a setback in terms of creating a European federation, the 
six ECSC Members, remained determined that there was a need for further vertical 
integration, first of all in the economic field.26 This was achieved through the establishment 
of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) for the development of atomic 
energy for peaceful purposes, and through the establishment of a European common market. 
19 Schuman Declaration 9 May 1950. To be consulted at: http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm. 
20 Who was the British Prime Minister from 1940-1945 and 1951-1955. 
21 Churchill, W., 1946. Speech to the Academic Youth at the University of Zürich 19 September 1946. To be 
consulted at: http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/astonish.html. 
22 Foster, N., 2011. Foster on EU Law. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 7. 
23 George, S. and Bache, I., 2001. Politics in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p 80. 
24 Foster, N., 2011. Foster on EU Law. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 8. 
25 Dashwood, A. et al., 2011. Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law. 6th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
p. 5. 
26Dashwood, A. et al., 2011. Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law. 6th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
p. 7; Kaczorowska, A., 2009. European Union Law. 2nd ed. Oxon: Routledge. p. 9. 
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Since EURATOM is not relevant for the purposes of this thesis and is only of marginal 
importance compared to the common market, it will not be discussed further. 
The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, signed in Rome on 25 March 
1957,27 was a milestone regarding European economic integration because it recognised that, 
in order to remove existing obstacles, concerted action was needed to guarantee steady 
expansion, balanced trade and fair competition28. In its first Article the Treaty therefore set 
the Community of the then six Member States, the same six who founded the ECSC,29 the 
task to establish a common market through several activities and measures to be undertaken, 
which were specified further in the Treaty.30 The common market created a single economic 
area establishing fair competition between undertakings and was based on four freedoms, 
namely the free movement of persons, services, goods and capital.31  
No extensive references were made to private international law in the Treaty as the emphasis 
was mainly on essential measures which had to be taken first and foremost in order to remove 
obstacles and achieve a common market such as prohibition of duties32 or quantitative 
restrictions on the free movement of goods across borders,33 the abolition of work permits 
for Member State nationals seeking to work in another Member State34, the prohibition of 
anti-competitive behaviour35 etc.36   
The issue of private international law was touched upon by Article 220 of the Treaty, which 
stated that “Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each 
other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals […] the simplification of 
formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or 
tribunals and of arbitration awards.” From this provision it is clear that legislation 
harmonising or unifying rules of private international law was not to be made by the 
27  Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), signed in Rome on 25 March 1957. 
Hereinafter called the EEC Treaty. 
28 Preamble EEC Treaty. 
29 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands. 
30 Art. 2 and 3 EEC Treaty. 
31 Art. 14 (2) EC ; Part Three, “Community Policies”, title I and III EEC Treaty. 
32 Part Three, title I, chapter 1 EEC Treaty. 
33 Part Three, title I, chapter 2 EEC Treaty. 
34 Part Three, title III, chapter 1 EEC Treaty. 
35 Part Three, title VI, chapter 1 EEC Treaty. 
36 See also: Bogdan, M., 2006. Concise Introduction to EU Private Internaional Law. Groningen: Europe Law 
Publishing. p 6. 
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Community through its own institutions, but through intergovernmental negotiations 
between the Member States in the form of international conventions37.  
The first step taken by the then six and original Member States of the Community, including 
Belgium, was the Brussels Convention in 1968,38 which expressly stated that it implemented 
Article 220 by securing the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition 
and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals;39 thus affirming the impact of the 
Community on private international law despite the fact that this area of law was only 
marginally mentioned in the Treaty40 and had attracted very little attention in literature.41 
The Convention laid down uniform rules regarding jurisdiction of Member State courts as 
well as enforcement of their judgments. By acceding to the Convention the Member States 
went further than the Treaty had prescribed as jurisdiction was also regulated by the 
Convention, despite the fact that it was only recognition and enforcement which were 
mentioned in Article 220 of the Treaty. 
 
 
2.4 Development of the Community 
 
The Community (now the EU) expanded substantially over the years from its six Founding 
Members to its currents twenty-eight Members.42 Particularly noteworthy in the context of 
this thesis is the accession of the United Kingdom, in 1973, to the Community and, in 1978, 
to the Brussels Convention.43 
37 Basedow, J., 2000. The Communitarization of the Conflict of Laws under the Treaty of Amsterdam. Common 
Market Law Review, 37, 687.  
38 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, O.J. L 299, 31.12.1972, 32. Hereinafter called the Brussels Convention. 
39 Preamble of the Brussels Convention. 
40 Drobnig, U., 1966-67. Conflict of Laws and the European Economic Community. American Journal of 
Comparative Law [online], 15, 204. Available via: HeinOnline. 
41 A contrario: Drobnig, U., 1966-1967. Conflict of Laws and the European Economic Community. American 
Journal of Comparative Law [online], 15, 204. Available via: HeinOnline.  
42 In chronological order: the six Founding Members and Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (1973), 
Greece (1981), Portugal and Spain (1986), Austria, Finland and Sweden ( 1995), Cyprus, Czech republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (2004), Bulgaria and Romania 
(2007) and Croatia (2013). 
43 Council Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
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In 1980 the then nine Member States, including the United Kingdom which joined in 1973, 
signed the Rome Convention, which contained uniform rules regarding the law applicable 
to contractual obligations in the Community. 44 No express reference was made in this 
instrument to article 220 of the EEC Treaty. It was said in the Preamble however that the 
Contracting Parties were anxious to continue in the field of private international law the 
work of unification of law which had already begun within the Community by the accession 
of Member States to the Brussels Convention.45 
Because these private international law rules were in the form of conventions they were not 
directly applicable in the Member States in the sense of automatically becoming part of 
national law, but had to be ratified first by each Member State, which sometimes lead to 
severe administrative or bureaucratic delays delaying or preventing their entry into force.46 
Furthermore, because they were not part of Community law, with the accession of new 
Member States to the Community, accession conventions to the initial conventions had to 
be signed after detailed negotiations to accommodate the wishes and demands of these new 
Member States.47 These negotiations resulted in several changes to the original instruments 
such as, for example, the insertion of jurisdiction rules regarding trusts upon the accession 
of the UK, Ireland and Denmark to the Brussels Convention in 1978.48 With regards to the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice49 it must also be noted that both for the Brussels 
Commercial Matters and to the Protocol on its Interpretation by the Court of Justice (78/884/EEC), OJ L 304, 
30.10.1978, 1. 
44 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, O.J. L266, 09.10.1980, 1. 
Hereinafter called the Rome Convention. 
45 Preamble Rome Convention.  
46 Green Paper on the Conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations into a Community Instrument and its Modernisation, COM (2002) 654 final, 15. Belgium seems 
to have a particularly bad reputation in this respect. See e.g. Plender, R. and Wilderspin, M., 2009. The 
European Private International Law of Obligations. 3rd ed. London: Sweet&Maxwell. p 4. 
47 Regarding the Brussels regime an overview of commencement dates for each Member State and each version 
can be found in: Stone, P., 2010. EU Private International Law. 2nd ed. Cheltenham: Elgar European Law. p. 
18-19 juncto p. 50-51. The preparatory work on the Rome Convention and the Rome I Regulation is discussed 
in-depth by Plender, R. and Wilderspin, M., 2009. The European Private International Law of Obligations. 3rd 
ed. Thomson Reuters: London. p. 6-13.  
48 Council Convention of Accession of 9 October 1978 of the United Kingdom of Denmark, of Ireland and of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and to the Protocol on its Interpretation by the Court of Justice 
(78/884/EEC), O.J. L304, 30.10.1978,  art. 5, 11 and 23.  
49 Since the Treaty of Lisbon this court has been named the Court of Justice of the European Union, and it will 
further be referred to as such; article 9 (1) Treaty on EU as amended by the Lisbon Treaty. 
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Convention and the Rome Convention protocols were signed to give that court jurisdiction 
in order to ensure a uniform application of their provisions.50  
For the purpose of comprehensiveness a brief mention and outline of the Single European 
Act51 is necessary. It revised the Treaties of Rome to add new momentum to European 
integration, with a clear aim and associated deadlines to complete the internal market by the 
end of 1992, as well as European Political Cooperation. The Act amended the rules 
governing the operation of the European institutions and expanded Community powers. 
Although not of specific importance for EU private international law, the SEA was the first 
Treaty to amend the EEC Treaty and illustrated that the Member States aimed for further 
integration.  
The Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht in 1992,52 changed the name of the 
European Economic Community to simply the “European Community” and created the 
European Union which consisted of three pillars: 1) the European Communities, 2) common 
foreign and security policy (CFSP) and 3) justice and home affairs (JHA). The first pillar, 
the European Communities, consisted of the European Community (EC), the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) and EURATOM. Matters residing under this first pillar were 
to be administered by the Community institutions, whereas matters residing under the second 
and third pillars, such as private international law, were to be administered by means of an 
intergovernmental decision-making process, giving the Community institutions only very 
limited competence in these areas.53    
Because of the limited scope of the previous European Treaties in relation to private 
international law, the Treaty of Amsterdam 199754 was a milestone with regards to European 
private international law. It not only renumbered the EU and EC Treaties but it introduced 
50 Protocol Concerning the Interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters – Signed in Luxembourg on 
3 June 1971, O.J. C189, 28.07.1990, 25; 89/128/EEC: First protocol on the Interpretation by the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 
Opened for Signature in Rome on 19 June 1980, O.J. L48, 20.02.1989, 1; 89/129/EEC: Second Protocol 
Conferring on the Court of Justice of the European Communities Certain Powers to Interpret the Convention 
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, Opened for Signature in Rome on 19 June 1980, O.J. L48, 
20.02.1989, 17. 
51 Single European Act, OJ L169, 29.6.1987, 1.  
52 Treaty on European Union, OJ C 191, 29.07.1992, 1. 
53http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_economic_frame
work/treaties_maastricht_en.htm 
54 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and Certain related Acts, O.J. C340, 10.11.1997, 1. 
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into the EC Treaty a Title IV on Visas, Asylum, Immigration and other Policies related to 
Free Movement of Persons, requiring that “in order to establish progressively an area of 
freedom, security and justice, the Council shall adopt…measures in the field of judicial 
cooperation in civil matters.”55 This meant that private international law was transferred 
from the third pillar to the first pillar, giving the Community, as opposed to the Member 
States, competence in the area. This meant future rules, if legislated in the form of 
Regulations, could be directly applicable in the Member States regardless of their national 
legislation and without the need for prior ratification or subsequent transposition. 56 
Furthermore the European Court of Justice would automatically have jurisdiction regarding 
these instruments so that protocols explicitly giving this court jurisdiction would no longer 
be necessary57.  
Important to note here is that, through a protocol attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam58, the 
United Kingdom took the position that it would opt out of measures taken pursuant to the 
aforementioned Title IV (ex Title IIIa)59 unless it expressly chose to opt in to a particular 
measure60. It seems, however, that the United Kingdom negotiated this opt out primarily 
with a view to avoid being bound by European measures in areas other than private 
international law covered by this title, for they have so far participated strongly in the 
negotiations of new instruments in the area of private international law61 and they have also 
decided to opt in to most such instruments. Furthermore it has been reported that certain last 
minute changes were made by then UK Head of Government, Tony Blair, to those provisions 
of the Treaty providing the legal basis for European competence in the area of private 
international law.62 It is hard to see why these last minute restrictions were negotiated if the 
UK had no intention to opt in to these measures from the outset. 
The Treaty of Nice reformed the EU institutions but was technical rather than substantive. 
The Treaty of Lisbon, on the other hand, entailed more drastic changes, in general as well as 
55 Art. 61 (c) EC Treaty (as revised by the Treaty of Amsterdam). 
56 Art. 288 TFEU 
57 Art. 267 and 263 TFEU. 
58 Protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam on the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland; a different Protocol 
regarding the opt outs of Denmark is also attached to the Treaty.  
59 Art. 1 and 2 Protocol on the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland. 
60 Art. 3 and 4 Protocol on the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland. 
61 Fiorini, A., 2008. The Evolution of European Private International Law. International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly [online], 57 (4), 979.  Available via: Westlaw.  
62 Betlem, G. and Hondius, E., 2001. European Private Law after the Treaty of Amsterdam. European Review 
of Private Law, 1, 10. 
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relating to private international law. It renamed the EC Treaty the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the EU63 and renumbered the EU and EC Treaties. Furthermore the EC was renamed the 
EU and the Court of Justice was renamed the Court of Justice of the EU. The TFEU contains 
a chapter, although consisting of just one article, entirely devoted to private international 
law. This means that, rather than a fraction of the Title on ‘Visas, Asylum, Immigration and 
other Policies related to Free Movement of Persons’, private international law is now a 
separate field of focus of the EU. Or so it seems. It has been argued that the new title of the 
chapter dedicated to private international law is really a missed opportunity as it refers to 
‘Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters’64, which is not very reflective of the area covered. 
This is illustrated by the developments in the area since the Treaty of Amsterdam, which 
gave a new impetus to EU private international law. After that Treaty, the EU was and has 
been particularly active in the field with two developments at the heart of this thesis.  
The first development to be noted is the Brussels I Regulation which contains rules on 
jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.65 A 
few years later the Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations was 
adopted.66 These two instruments are the EU mirror of the Brussels Convention 1968 and 
the Rome Convention 1980 respectively. That is not to say nothing has changed however. 
Where relevant, the differences between each instrument and its predecessor will be 
discussed in this thesis for two main reasons. First, as the Regulations are fairly recent, case 
law on their application is so far limited. An investigation of the available case law on their 
predecessors can therefore be helpful in interpreting and assessing them. Second, changes 
made to certain rules may indicate that the old rules did not achieve the policy objectives 
underlying them. As such it is interesting to see why the old rules did or did not work and 
whether the changes made have remedied the problems experienced or whether further 
change is needed. 
Finally it is important to note that the Brussels I Regulation has been reviewed recently. 
Although not yet applicable,67 the recast Regulation will be discussed with a particular 
63 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C83, 30.3.2010, 47. 
64 Chapter 3 TFEU, containing Article 81. 
65  Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, O.J. L12, 16.01.2001, 1. 
66 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, O.J. L177, 04.07.2008, 6. 
67 Art. 66 Brussels I recast. 
24 
 
                                                     
emphasis on the relevant changes made, as compared with the current Regulation, and the 
reasons for those changes.     
 
3. EU Private International Law Objectives 
 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter there is no formal and authoritative list of 
EU private international law policy objectives. An investigation of several resources is 
therefore needed in order to discover what they are. This subsection will identify them and 
give a brief explanation, but a more in-depth discussion and an evaluation and assessment 
as to whether the rules achieve their underlying objectives will follow in subsequent chapters 
of this thesis. 
Although the EU private international law project was given significant impetus by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, it is clear from its historical development that certain policy objectives 
were sought to be achieved by the Member States collectively long before private 
international law became a matter of EU competence under the umbrella of the ‘area of 
freedom, security and justice’ or the current umbrella of ‘judicial cooperation in civil 
matters’. When discussing EU private international law policy objectives it is therefore 
relevant to look at historical as well as current instruments. Reference will therefore be made 
to certain instruments no longer in force and strategies superseded,  because policy 
objectives of the EU, pursued through its legal instruments, such as the Brussels I and Rome 
I Regulations, can be viewed as the policy objectives of the Member States collectively, 
historically pursued through the instruments of the Conventions.     
First, both the Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation expressly state in their 
Preambles that their general objective is to maintain and develop an area of freedom, security 
and justice in which the free movement of persons is ensured through measures which are 
necessary for the sound operation of the internal market.68 In consequence, reference is made 
to the articles which gave the Community competence in the field of private international 
law such as Article 65 EC that provides for measures in the field of private international law 
to be taken insofar as necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market and under 
68 (1) Preamble Rome I and Brussels I. 
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the umbrella of the free movement of persons69, which is one of the constituent elements of 
the internal market. 
Second, Article 81 TFEU expressly identifies private international law, at least to a certain 
extent, as one of the areas in which EU action is needed for the proper functioning of the 
internal market. However, even before these changes were made by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
to the EC Treaty,70 and before the Treaty of Lisbon incorporated the new title, the signatories 
to the Brussels Convention had already expressed their will to strengthen the legal protection 
of persons established within the territories of the Member States to the EEC, despite the 
fact that the conflict of laws was then only marginally mentioned in the EEC Treaty.71 In 
terms of policy objectives underlying European private international law rules this is not 
surprising as differences in national rules in this area of law could very well create obstacles 
for the proper functioning of the common market,72 as will become clear from the following 
discussion of the general policy objective, legal certainty, and the specific policy objectives 
pursued to achieve the general objectives of the single market. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 The General Objective: Access to Justice 
 
The EU considers that EU citizens have a right to expect it to simplify and facilitate the 
judicial environment in which they live in the European Union context.73 The overriding aim 
sought to be achieved by the transfer of competences in the area of private international law 
in the Treaty of Amsterdam was to create a European judicial area in civil matters, where 
69 Title IV EC. 
70 Cf. supra EU Private International Law History. 
71 Preamble Brussels Convention. 
72 (2) Preamble Brussels I; Cf. Bogdan, M., 2006. Concise Introduction to EU Private International Law. 
Groningen: Europe Law Publishing. p 7. 
73 Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on How Best to Implement the Provisions of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam on an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, O.J. C19, 23.01.1999, 4. 
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EU citizens have a common sense of justice throughout the European Union and where 
justice facilitates their day-to-day life.74 Thus the notion of EU citizenship, introduced by 
the Treaty of Maastricht 1992,75 is strongly introduced in the area of private international 
law because, in order to facilitate the everyday life of EU citizens, this area of law was 
considered important if recent activity here is at all indicative. 
According to the European Commission, in order to achieve a European judicial area 
European individuals and businesses must be able to approach courts and authorities in any 
Member State as easily as in their own. They should not be prevented or discouraged from 
exercising their rights by the complexity of the legal and administrative systems in the 
Member States.76 It is true that the best access to justice, as well as the highest level of legal 
certainty, could be achieved through a full harmonisation or even unification of national 
substantive and procedural law.77 Substantive law is law which gives individuals, businesses 
and states rights and imposes obligations on them. Or, it is the part of the law that deals with 
rights, duties and all other matters that are not matters purely of practice and procedure.78 
Adjective or procedural law is the law which determines how these rights can be enforced 
and how these obligations are enforced from a practical perspective. In other words, it is the 
part of the law that deals with practice and procedure in the courts.79 As such, private 
international law is procedural rather than substantive. Insofar as harmonisation or 
unification on a substantive level does not (yet) exist however, private international law 
provides solutions in transnational legal conflicts.80 It is an example of an area of procedural 
law in which the EU has made significant efforts of unification, which is therefore definitely 
underpinned by the objective of improving access to justice.  
 
3.2 Legal Certainty and Predictability 
74  Explanatory Memorandum Proposal for a Council Regulation Establishing a General Framework for 
Community Activities to Facilitate the Implementation of a European Judicial Area in Civil Matters, COM 
(2001), 221 final, 15.05.2001, 1.2. 
75 Article 20. 
76  Explanatory Memorandum Proposal for a Council Regulation Establishing a General Framework for 
Community Activities to Facilitate the Implementation of a European Judicial Area in Civil Matters, COM 
(2001), 221 final, 15.05.2001, 1.2. 
77 Remien, O., 2001. European Private International Law, the European Community and its Emerging Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice. Common Market Law Review, 38, 64. 
78 Martin, E. and Law, J., 2006. Oxford Dictionary of Law. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
79 Martin, E. and Law, J., 2006. Oxford Dictionary of Law. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
80 Betlem, G. and Hondius, E., 2001. European Private Law after the Treaty of Amsterdam. European Review 
of Private Law, 1, 9. 
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 The Rome I Regulation states that, in order to “contribute to the general objective of this 
Regulation, legal certainty in the European judicial area, the conflict-of-law rules should be 
highly foreseeable”.81 Similarly, Brussels I says that “the rules of jurisdiction must be highly 
predictable”.82 There is no real dispute on the fact that this is indeed one of the main policy 
objectives underlying EU private international law rules. 83 
It seems logical that a true common market cannot exist without a reasonable degree of legal 
certainty. One of the consequences of the four freedoms and the internal market is that 
international disputes are more commonplace. If these are not dealt with in a manner 
safeguarding legal certainty and predictability, this will, in turn, undermine the internal 
market as people and businesses could be discouraged from exercising the freedoms. It is 
hard to see how legal certainty could exist if every Member State applies its own national 
private international law rules, a situation which has been referred to as “the chaos of 
insecure divergent national choice of law rules”.84 Therefore the policy of legal certainty 
underlying uniform conflict of laws rules is essential as these rules should increase the 
predictability of which court has jurisdiction85 as well as the predictability of the outcome 
of a dispute.86 
Legal certainty implies the identification of the competent jurisdiction and a clear 
designation of the applicable law,87 areas of private international law covered, by Brussels I 
and Rome I, respectively, regarding contract disputes. It also implies the clarity of the 
content of the domestic law which then applies, although this is not a private international 
law issue and will therefore not be discussed. Furthermore the importance of legal certainty 
in this area of law is stressed by the fact that it is highlighted as one of the core elements of 
EU private international law in several official EU documents as well as EU press releases 
regarding the Regulations. It is argued that legal certainty needs to be provided to individuals 
81 (16) Preamble Rome I. 
82 (11) Preamble Brussels I. 
83  Affirming this objective e.g. Remien, O., 2001. European Private International Law, the European 
Community and its Emerging Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Common Market Law Review, 38, 64; 
Hartnell, H.E., 2002-2003. EUstitia: Institutionalizing Justice in the European Union. Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business [online], 23, 84. Available via: HeinOnline. 
84 Remien, O., 2001. European Private International Law, the European Community and its Emerging Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice. Common Market Law Review, 38, 64. 
85 (11) Preamble Brussels I. 
86 (6) Preamble Rome I. 
87 Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on How Best to Implement the Provisions of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam on an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, O.J. C19, 23.01.1999, 4. 
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and business because foreseeable and simple rules enable citizens and firms to make more 
of the possibilities offered by the internal market and the basic freedoms in that market,88 
which, in turn, profits the functioning of the internal market.89 
 
3.3 Party Autonomy 
 
Party autonomy is recognised in the vast majority of legal systems throughout the world90 
and can in fact be seen as the private international law aspect of the freedom of contract 
which exists in contract law in general.91 Prior to the Brussels Convention it had already 
been rightly pointed out that this principle was in fact the only principle in Member State 
private international law accepted unanimously by the then Member States.92 The fact that 
it has been embodied in EU private international law is therefore not at all surprising. 
The principle of party autonomy in private international law regarding contracts means that 
the parties to a contract have a basic freedom to choose the country whose court or courts 
will have jurisdiction in disputes arising out of the contract93 as well as the freedom to choose 
which country’s law these courts will have to apply to the dispute before them.94 Both 
freedoms are expressly recognised in the Preambles to, and, more importantly, the text of, 
Brussels I95 and Rome I96 Regulations and have, as such, been largely undisputed ever since 
they were recognised in the Conventions.97 In fact, the only real debate that has evolved 
around the principle of party autonomy throughout the years has focussed on how “to further 
88 Press Release: Adoption of Two Commission Proposals Is a Vital Step in Completing the European Law-
Enforcement Area for Individuals and Firms, IP/05/1605, 15.12.2005. 
89 Press Release: European Citizens and Business to Benefit from Greater Access to Justice – Strengthening 
Co-operation in Civil and Commercial Matters, IP/09/606, 21.04.2009; Press Release: European Citizens and 
Businesses to Benefit from Greater Legal Certainty and Greater Access to Justice, IP/07/1872, 07.12.2007; 
Basedow, J., 2000. The Communitarization of the Conflict of Laws under the Treaty of Amsterdam. Common 
Market Law Review, 37, 703. 
90 Radicati di Brozolo, L.G., 1993. L’Influence sur les conflits de lois des principes de droit communautaire en 
matière de liberté de circulation. Revue critique de droit international privé, 82 (3), p. 410. 
91 McClean, J.D. and Beevers, K., 2009. Morris. The Conflict of Laws. 7th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell. p 
335. 
92 Drobnig, U., 1966-67. Conflict of Laws and the European Economic Community. American Journal of 
Comparative Law [online], 15, 212. Available via: HeinOnline. 
93 Art. 23 Brussels I. 
94 Art. 3 Rome I. 
95 (14) Preamble Brussels I. 
96 (11) Preamble Rome I. 
97 Art. 17 Brussels Convention; art. 3 Rome Convention. 
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boost the impact of the parties’ will”.98  As will be explained later on in this thesis this debate 
has highlighted certain conflicts with other policy objectives underlying EU private 
international law though, such as the protection of weaker parties to a contract and legal 
certainty and predictability. 
Because of the desire to give as much effect to the parties’ will as possible, without infringing 
other policies too much, and acknowledging common practice99 as well as the relevance of 
party autonomy in international commerce,100 the rules reflecting this principle have been 
adapted since the Conventions. It is submitted that they may continue to change in the future 
since the topic has been discussed again recently in the context of the recast of the Brussels 
I Regulation which illustrates that it is a very current issue still.101 
As already touched upon, despite the argument that party autonomy should not only be 
respected102 but even be one of the cornerstones of the conflict of laws regarding contractual 
obligations,103 this autonomy is not unlimited. Other policy objectives could limit party 
autonomy, the most important one of which is the protection of weaker parties to a contract, 
which will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
 
 
3.4 Protection of Weaker Parties 
 
Certain types of contracts are characterised by an inherent imbalance between the parties to 
it. Most discussed in the literature are consumer contracts and employment contracts where 
respectively the consumer and the employee are regarded as socio-economically weaker than 
98 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations (Rome I), COM (2005) 650 final, 5. 
99 Green Paper on the Conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations into a Community Instrument and its Modernisation, COM (2002) 654 final, 22. 
100 Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM(2009) 175 final, 5. 
101 Ibid. 
102 (14) Preamble Brussels I. 
103 (11) Preamble Rome I. 
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their contracting partners.104 Similarly, although somewhat less discussed in literature, the 
insurance policy holder or beneficiary are the weaker parties to a contract with an insurer.105  
It is accepted in the literature that the protection of weaker parties is a policy objective 
underlying European private international law rules106 and this is indeed affirmed by the 
discussion of this topic in EU preparatory documents, 107  reports, 108  preambles 109  etc. 
Moreover the Court of Justice of the European Union has, with regards to consumer contracts, 
repeatedly ruled that the party who is economically weaker and less experienced in legal 
matters than the other party, should be protected in order not to be discouraged from suing.110  
Aiming to reduce the imbalance between the parties to consumer, employment and insurance 
contracts, the conflict of laws rules governing these contracts depart from the general rules 
reflecting party autonomy as the basic principle.111 This does not mean that there is no party 
autonomy for these types of contracts but it is limited. Furthermore, the rules determining 
jurisdiction and applicable law in the absence of choice by the parties also aim to protect the 
weaker party. As the Court of Justice has explained, the basic idea underlying these special 
rules is to safeguard access to justice for weaker parties.112     
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has given an overview of the history of EU private international law with 
attention for the relevant historical events in a wider context. It is clear that, although the EU 
law project has been underway for many decades, it is not yet completed, and in the private 
104 Plender, R. and Wilderspin, M., 2009. The European Private International Law of Obligations. 3rd ed. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell. p. 223 (consumer contracts) and p. 301 (employment contracts). 
105 Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM (1999) 348 final, 15. 
106 E.g. Van den Eeckhout, V., 2008. Promoting Human Rights within the Union: the Role of European Private 
International Law. European Law Journal, 14 (1), 109-110. 
107 E.g. Green Paper on the Conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations into a Community Instrument and its Modernisation, COM (2002) 654 final. 
108 E.g. Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations by Mario Giuliano and 
Paul Lagarde, OJ C282, 31.10.1980, 1. 
109 (13) Preamble Brussels I; (23) Preamble Rome I. 
110 Case C-89/91 Shearson Lehmann Hutton Inc. v TVB Treuhandgesellschaft für Vermögensverwaltung und 
Beteiligungen mbH [1993] E.C.R. I-139, at 18; Case C-464/01 Johann Gruber v Bay Wa AG [2005] E.C.R. I-
439, at 34. 
111 See supra. 
112 Cf. infra. 
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international law context this is illustrated by the recent review of Brussels I. As such recent 
changes have been made by way of the Brussels I recast. Several of these will be analysed 
in-depth in this thesis. 
Four policy objectives underlying EU private international law rules have been identified 
and briefly explained. They will form the spine of this thesis in relation to the discussion and 
assessment of the Brussels I and Rome I Regulations. Before that however, an overview of 
the rules in these instruments will be given in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2. EU Private International Law: The Rules 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will outline EU private international law on jurisdiction and applicable 
law regarding contractual obligations as currently in force. The aim of the chapter is to 
give an overview of the law currently in force, to facilitate the analysis and evaluation 
of the rules in the chapters to follow. Furthermore it will provide the background to the 
analysis and evaluation and will situate it within the framework of the Regulations.  
It must be noted, as explained in chapter I, that the current instruments do not exist in 
a vacuum and therefore their predecessors may definitely be relevant for several 
reasons. Firstly, the current Regulations contain many provisions which are identical to 
the corresponding provisions in the earlier Conventions. Case law and academic 
commentary on those can therefore be used for the purposes of evaluating and assessing 
both the Conventions and the Regulations. Secondly, the changes which have been 
made over the years may be indicative of problems regarding the application or 
practical results of the rules. An investigation and analysis of the old as well as the 
current rules will also contribute, therefore, to the evaluation of current law. Reference 
to predecessors of the instrument currently in force will therefore be made where 
particularly relevant for the purposes of this research.     
As mentioned, the Brussels I Regulation has been revised recently.113 The Brussels I 
recast was published in the Official Journal in December 2012 and will enter into force 
on 10 January 2015.114 Evidently this development cannot be ignored, because the 
recast will be the law within less than one year. Furthermore, due to its recent nature, 
academic writing on the recast is limited and, where available, often lacks depth. 
It must be noted that the recast, generally speaking, is not a dramatic departure from 
the original Brussels I Regulation. Some significant changes are introduced though. 
113 See Chapter 1. 
114 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
(Recast), OJ L351, 20.12.2012, 1.   
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These will be discussed in so far as relevant to this thesis. The changes in relation to 
recognition and enforcement will therefore not form part of the analysis. The changes 
in relation to jurisdiction relating to contractual obligations, however, are discussed in 
order to analyse whether they reflect any changes in policy or, if not, whether they 
improve or reduce the achievement of existing policy aims.  
Both Brussels I and Rome I contain an extensive set of rules, not all of which need 
detailed analysis within the scope of this thesis. The Brussels I rules on jurisdiction and 
enforcement will not be discussed at all because they are not subject to the research 
project. Furthermore, for Brussels I as well as Rome I, the main focus will be on the 
provisions most relevant to the research project. 
 
2. Jurisdiction 
 
2.1 Outline of the Brussels I Regulation 
 
The first chapter of the Regulation defines its material scope. The second chapter, 
entitled “Jurisdiction” contains general provisions on jurisdiction in its articles 2 to 4. 
Its second section consists of Articles 5 to 7 which contain provisions regarding so 
called special jurisdiction, which give the plaintiff additional forums to sue. Grounds 
for jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance are contained in section 3 of chapter 2, 
in Articles 8 to 14. Jurisdiction on consumer contracts is the subject of section 4 of 
chapter 2, which comprises of Articles 15, 16 and 17. Section 5, containing Article 18 
to 21 is entitled “Individual contracts of employment”. Section 6 is made up of just one 
Article, Article 22, which contains so called exclusive grounds of jurisdiction. These 
relate to subject matters in which a certain court has jurisdiction regardless of other 
provisions. Section 7, entitled “Prorogation of Jurisdiction” contains Article 23, which 
provides for jurisdiction based on agreement by the parties, and Article 24, which 
envisages the situation in which the defendant submits by appearance. Provisions 
relating to lis pendens and related actions are contained in articles 27 to 30, which make 
up section 9 of chapter 2. Article 31 is the only provision in section 10 on provisional, 
including protective, measures.  
34 
 
 2.2 Scope 
 
In terms of scope a distinction must be made between the territorial scope of the 
Regulation and its material scope. Because the instrument is a Regulation, territorially 
it applies in all EU Member States (apart from Denmark which has opted out of it).115 
Regarding its material scope, the Regulation applies in civil and commercial matters, 
whatever the nature of the court or tribunal.116 It does not extend to revenue, customs 
or administrative matters.117 This provision aims to draw the line between private law 
claims as opposed to public law claims, as seems from a fairly large body of case law 
on this provision in the Brussels Convention, which was in the exact same wording as 
the provision in the Regulation.118 This case law is important because the concepts of 
private law and public law are not entirely the same in all Member States so they are 
given an autonomous meaning under EU law.119 Concisely put, civil and commercial 
claims are claims between either private persons or between private and public persons 
but whereby the latter do not act in the exercise of their public powers.120  
Certain matters are expressly excluded from the scope of the Regulation. Firstly it does 
not apply to the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out 
of a matrimonial relationship, wills and succession.121 It must be pointed out here that 
several of these matters are regulated by other EU private international law 
instruments. 122  Secondly the Regulation excludes claims relating to bankruptcy, 
115 Art. 1 (3) Brussels I. 
116 Art. 1 (1) Brussels I. 
117 Art. 1 (1) Brussels I. 
118 Case 29-76 LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v Eurocontrol [1976] ECR 1541; Case 
814-79 Netherlands State v Reinhold Rüffer [1980] ECR 3807; Case C-271/00 Gemeente Steenbergen v 
Luc Baten [2002] ECR I-10489; Case C-266/01 Préservatrice foncière TIARD SA v Staat der 
Nederlanden [2003] ECR I-4867; Case C-292/05 Irini Lechouritou and Others v Dimosio tis 
Omospondiakis Dimokratias tis Germanias [2007] ECR-I 1519. 
119 See also Stone, P., 2006. EU Private International Law. Harmonization of Laws. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing. p. 22. 
120 Case 29/76 LTU v Eurocontrol [1976] ECR 1541; Case 814/79 Netherlands v Rüffer [1980] ECR 
3807; Case C-172/91 Sonntag v Waidmann [1993] ECR I-1963.  
121 Art. 1 (2) (a) Brussels I.  
122  Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 Concerning Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and the Matters of Parental Responsibility, Repealing 
Regulation (EC) No. 1347/2000, OJ 23.12.2003, L 338, p. 1; Regulation (EU) No. 650/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition 
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proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, 
judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings.123 Again a different 
EU instrument covers these types of claims. 124  Thirdly social security claims are 
excluded125 and fourthly the Regulation does not apply to arbitration.126 
 
2.3 General Provisions 
 
The main connecting factor in the Brussels I Regulation is the defendant’s domicile 
because article 2 provides that persons domiciled in a Member State shall be sued in 
the courts of that Member State, whatever their nationality.127 They can only be sued 
in the courts of another Member State when this is provided for by articles 5 to 24 of 
the Regulation128 and national private international law rules will not apply as against 
them.129  
This basic rule presupposes that the defendant can usually defend himself most easily 
in his country of domicile. 130  It has also been pointed out that this ground for 
jurisdiction allows the defendant to appear before a “friendly court” and, if he were to 
be held in the wrong, most of his assets against which enforcement is sought are 
probably located in his country of domicile.131 
Alternative or additional grounds for jurisdiction can only be drawn from other 
provisions in the Regulation, which have different or additional policy objectives 
underlying them. 132  It is emphasised that national rules containing grounds for 
and Enforcement of  Decisions and Acceptance and Enforcement of Authentic Instruments in Matters of 
Succession and on the Creation of a European Certificate of Succession, OJ 27.07.2012, L 201, p. 107. 
123 Art. 1 (2) (b) Brussels I. 
124 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, OJ 30.06.2000, L 160, p. 1. 
125 Art. 1 (2) (c) Brussels I. 
126 Art. 1 (2) (d) Brussels I.  
127 Art. 2 (1) Brussels I. 
128 Art. 3 (1) Brussels I. 
129 Art. 3 (2) Brussels I. 
130 Case C-26/91 Handte v TMCS [1992] ECR I-3967. 
131 Stone, P., 2006. EU Private International Law. Harmonization of Laws. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing. p. 46-47. 
132 Cf. infra; the discussion of the other provisions of the Regulation. 
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jurisdiction do not apply. For the UK specific reference is made to certain grounds 
which have been called excessive.133 
Article 4 contains the general rule for so called “external defendants”. It states that, if 
the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of each 
Member State shall, subject to articles 22 and 23, be determined by the law of that 
Member State.134 From this provision it is immediately apparent that domestic private 
international law rules have not lost all relevance yet at all. Indeed, every time a plaintiff 
brings a claim before a Member State court against a defendant not domiciled in the 
EU, the court will apply its domestic law to solve the issue of jurisdiction before them. 
This seems problematic in terms of the EU’s policy objective of access to justice for 
EU citizens because these cannot sue a third country defendant based on EU law but 
have to rely on their domestic law to be able to sue either in the EU or elsewhere. Failing 
to achieve the EU policies in this respect it is therefore not surprising that this provision 
was under revision.135 This will be further explained in chapter 5. 
 
2.4 Special Jurisdiction 
 
Additional to the general ground for jurisdiction, the defendant’s domicile, articles 5 to 
7 contain alternative grounds. These are based on a close link between the court and the 
action and the underlying aim is to facilitate the sound administration of justice.136 Most 
of these provisions fall outside the scope of this thesis. Therefore the focus will solely 
be on those provisions specifically relating to claims regarding contracts. 
Article 5 (1) Brussels I states that a person domiciled in a Member State may, in another 
Member State, be sued, in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of 
performance of the obligation in question.137 For the purpose of this provision, and 
unless the parties have agreed otherwise, it is specified what the place of performance 
of the obligation in question shall be. In the case of the sale of goods it is the place in a 
133 ANNEX I Brussels I; cf. Chapter 3 on English private international  law. 
134 Art. 4 (1) Brussels I. 
135 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM (2010) 748 final. 
136 Recital (12) Brussels I. 
137 Art. 5 (1) (a) Brussels I. 
37 
 
                                                     
Member State where, under the contract, the goods were delivered or should have been 
delivered. In the case of the provision of services it is the place in a Member State 
where, under the contract, the services were provided or should have been provided.138 
If the contract is neither for the sale of goods, nor for the provision of services, the place 
of performance of the obligation has to be identified.139  
Following other provisions in the Regulation, this provision does not apply to all 
contracts. In particular it does not apply to insurance contracts, 140  consumer 
contracts,141 individual employment contracts,142 matrimonial contracts143 etc. For all 
other contracts this provision seems to make sense in terms of establishing jurisdiction 
for a court with a close link to the action. It appears, however, that the application of it 
is not as straightforward as one might think. The Brussels Convention simply referred 
to the place of performance of the obligation in question.144 The question then arises 
what the obligation in question is. The ECJ has held on several occasions that this is 
the obligation on which the claim is based. 145  When a claim involves several 
obligations the court must identify the principal obligation as the obligation in 
question.146 
After determining the relevant obligation the question arises what the place of 
performance of that obligation is. The Brussels Convention did not contain any clue 
and rather than to provide an autonomous definition, the ECJ held that the court should 
apply its domestic private international law rules in order to first determine the law 
applicable to the legal relationship and then determine the place of performance in 
accordance with that applicable law. 147  Not surprisingly this highly complicated 
approach suffered severe criticism.148 An effort to clear things up has been made in the 
Regulation by defining the place of performance for the sale of goods and the provision 
of services, provided that this place is within the EU. The effort seems to have failed as 
138 Art. 5 (1) (b) Brussels I. 
139 Art. 5 (1) (c) Brussels I. 
140 Cf. infra under e). 
141 Cf. infra under f). 
142 Cf. infra under g). 
143 Cf. supra: certain matters are excluded from the material scope of the Regulation. 
144 Art. 5 (1) Brussels Convention. 
145 E.g. Case 14/76 De Bloos v Bouyer [1976] ECR 1497. 
146 E.g. Case 266/85 Shenavai v Kreischer [1987] ECR 239. 
147 Case 12/76 Tessili v Dunlop [1976] ECR 1473. 
148 Fawcett, J. and Carruthers, J.M., 2008. Cheshire, North and Fawcett. Private International Law. 14th  
ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 237.  
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the definition only applies to a limited number of situations. In all other cases the highly 
complex approach does not seize to exist and this has prompted some to propose the 
deletion of article 5 (1) altogether.149 
The Brussels I Regulation also provides some additional grounds for jurisdiction in 
cases where there are a number of defendants. In such a case a person may be sued in 
the courts of the place where any of the defendants is domiciled, provided the claims 
are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to 
avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.150 This 
rule seems quite difficult to apply and one could even say that it would require a trial 
before a trial to assess whether the claims are so closely connected that not hearing 
them together would lead to irreconcilable judgments. Furthermore the question arises 
what irreconcilable judgments are. The ECJ has determined that a mere divergence in 
the outcome of the dispute is not sufficient to conclude to a risk of irreconcilable 
judgments. There must also be a divergence in the context of the same situation of fact 
and law.151 
 
2.5 Jurisdiction in Matters Relating to Insurance 
 
In order to ensure the protection of weaker parties to a contract, which is one of the 
main policy objectives underlying EU private international law rules,152 the Brussels I 
Regulation contains special rules determining jurisdiction for insurance contracts. 
These provisions contain different rather than additional grounds for jurisdiction, which 
means that the other grounds for jurisdiction in the Regulation do not apply to insurance 
contracts.153 
An insurer may be sued in the court of the Member State where he is domiciled154 or in 
another Member State, in the case of actions brought by the policyholder, the insured 
149 E.g. Stone, P., 2006. EU Private International Law. Harmonization of Laws. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing. p. 86. 
150 Art. 6 (1) Brussels I. 
151 Case C-539/03 Roche Nederland BV v Primus [2007] IL Pr 9. 
152 See Chapter 1. 
153 Art. 8 Brussels I. 
154 Art. 9 (1) (a) Brussels I. 
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or the beneficiary, in the courts for the place where the plaintiff is domiciled.155 If he is 
a co-insurer, he may be sued in the courts of a Member state in which proceedings are 
brought against the leading insurer.156 In respect of liability insurance or insurance of 
immovable property, the insurer may in addition be sued in the courts for the place 
where the harmful event occurred.157 In respect of liability insurance the insurer may 
also, if the law of the courts permits it, be joined in proceedings which the injured party 
has brought against the insured.158  
An insurer may bring proceedings only in the courts of the Member state in which the 
defendant is domiciled, irrespective of whether he is the policyholder, the insured or a 
beneficiary.159  
Departure of these rules is possible by an agreement which is entered into after the 
dispute has arisen 160  or which allows the weaker party to the contract to bring 
proceedings in courts other than those indicated in the special jurisdiction rules 
regarding insurance contracts.161 In case the policyholder and the insurer are domiciled 
or habitually resident in the same Member State at the time of conclusion of the 
contract, and the agreement provided that the courts of that State have jurisdiction, 
departure of the rules is also possible provided that the law of that State allows such 
agreement.162 An agreement concluded with a policyholder who is not domiciled in a 
Member State may also depart from the jurisdiction rules regarding insurance contracts 
except in so far as the insurance is compulsory or relates to immovable property in a 
Member State.163 Finally, departure of the rules by agreement is allowed if the contract 
covers certain specific risks.164  
In this respect it is important to note that a novelty in the Brussels I Regulation, as 
compared to the Brussels Convention, was that a clear distinction was made between 
mass risk insurance and large risk insurance. In mass risk insurance contracts, a 
155 Art. 9 (2) (b) Brussels I. 
156 Art. 9 (1) (c) Brussels I. 
157 Art. 10 Brussels I. 
158 Art. 11 (1) Brussels I. 
159 Art. 12 Brussels I. 
160 Art. 13 (1) Brussels I. 
161 Art. 13 (2) Brussels I. 
162 Art. 13 (3) Brussels I. 
163 Art. 13 (4) Brussels I. 
164 Art. 13 (5) juncto Art. 14 Brussels I. 
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jurisdiction agreement is allowed if in accordance with Article 13 (1) to (4), as 
explained in the previous paragraph. For large risk insurance contracts, a wider option 
is available, as large risks fall under Article 13 (5), 165  which allows jurisdiction 
agreements for such contracts without further requirements. 
 
2.6 Jurisdiction over Consumer Contracts 
 
For reasons similar to those regarding insurance contracts, the Regulation contains 
special rules determining jurisdiction for consumer contracts. These rules, like those on 
insurance contracts, contain different rather than additional grounds for jurisdiction.166  
The Regulation defines a consumer contract as a contract concluded by a person, the 
consumer, for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or 
profession.167 The contract is either a contract for the sale of goods on instalment credit 
terms,168 a contract for a loan repayable by instalments, or for any other form of credit, 
made to finance the sale of goods,169 or in all other cases a contract concluded with a 
person who pursues commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the 
consumer’s domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that Member State, and 
the contract falls within the scope of such activities.170 
A problem to flag up here is the fact that a person is only regarded as a consumer when 
he contracts for a purpose outside his trade or profession. This notion will be discussed 
further, as well as assessed, in chapter 8 because it seems from an initial assessment 
that, because of this notion, some deserving parties do not get extra protection because 
they are not considered weaker. 
Article 16 provides that a consumer may bring proceedings against the other party to a 
contract either in the courts of the Member State in which that party is domiciled or in 
the courts for the place where the consumer is domiciled. 171  Proceedings may be 
165 Read in conjunction with Art. 14 (5) Brussels I. 
166 Art. 15 (1) Brussels I. 
167 Art. 15 (1) Brussels I. 
168 Art. 15 (1) (a) Brussels I. 
169 Art. 15 (1) (b) Brussels I.  
170 Art. 15 (1) (c) Brussels I. 
171 Art. 16 (1) Brussels I. 
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brought against a consumer by the other party to the contract only in the courts of the 
Member State in which the consumer is domiciled.172 
Departure of the special jurisdiction rules for consumer contracts is only possible by an 
agreement which is entered into after the dispute has arisen173 or which gives the 
consumer additional options in terms of competent courts.174 Finally, if the consumer 
and the other party are domiciled or habitually resident in the same Member State, an 
agreement conferring jurisdiction on the courts of that State is allowed, provided that 
such an agreement is not contrary to the law of that Member State.175 
It is clear that these grounds for jurisdiction seek to protect the consumer as the weaker 
party to the contract. He can sue either in the country where the defendant is domiciled, 
in accordance with the general ground for jurisdiction in the Brussels I Regulation, or 
in the country where he is domiciled. When the consumer is defendant on the other 
hand, he can only be sued in his country of domicile. 
 
2.7 Jurisdiction over Individual Contracts of Employment 
 
The Brussels I Regulation also contains special rules to determine jurisdiction for 
individual employment contracts because here there is also a contractual relationship 
where one of the parties to the contract, the employee, is the weaker party to the 
contract. The same policy objective underlying the rules on consumer contracts is 
therefore also underlying these rules and the special grounds for jurisdiction are also 
different grounds rather than alternative grounds.176 
Article 19 Brussels I provides that an employer domiciled in a Member State may be 
sued in the courts of the Member State where he is domiciled.177 This is fully in line 
with the general ground for jurisdiction in the Regulation. He can also be sued in 
another Member State in the courts for the place where the employee habitually carries 
172 Art. 16 (2) Brussels I. 
173 Art. 17 (1) Brussels I. 
174 Art. 17 (2) Brussels I. 
175 Art. 17 (3) Brussels I. 
176 Art. 18 (1) Brussels I. 
177 Art. 19 (1) Brussels I. 
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out his work or in the courts for the last place where he did so,178 or, if the employee 
does not or did not habitually carry out his work in any one country, in the courts for 
the place where the business which engaged the employee is or was situated.179 
These provisions take account of the possibility that the employee may want to sue his 
employer after his employment contract has already been terminated because they refer 
to the last place where he habitually carried out his work. 180 Furthermore several 
atypical work relationships or work situations are covered by the rules in the sense that 
solutions are provided for employees who work in different countries. Case law has 
also specified that the place where the employee habitually carries out his work is the 
place where he has established the effective centre of his working activities, at or from 
which he performs the essential part of his duties towards his employer.181 
Departure from the jurisdiction rules on employment contracts is only possible by an 
agreement which is either entered into after the dispute has arisen182 or which gives the 
employee additional grounds for jurisdiction.183 
Parallel with the provisions on consumer contracts and insurance contracts, as well as 
the general provisions, the employee can only be sued in the courts of the Member State 
where he is domiciled.184 
2.8 Exclusive Jurisdiction 
 
The Regulation contains some rules holding grounds for exclusive jurisdiction. This 
means that these rules apply, regardless of domicile,185 appearance by the defendant186 
or even agreement between the parties.187 The reason for this is that the courts of a 
certain Member State were deemed to be uniquely well placed to hear claims regarding 
178 Art. 19 (2) (a) Brussels I. 
179 Art. 19 (2) (b) Brussels I. 
180 Cf. STONE, P., 2006. EU Private International Law. Harmonization of Laws. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing. p. 129. 
181 Case C-125/92 Mulox v Geels [1993] ECR I- 4075; Case C-383/95  Rutten v Cross Medical [1997] 
ECR I-57. 
182 Art. 21 (1) Brussels I. 
183 Art. 21 (2) Brussels I. 
184 Art. 20 (1) Brussels I. 
185 Art. 22 Brussels I. 
186 Art. 24 Brussels I. 
187 Recital (14) Brussels I. 
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certain subject matters.188 Examples of the subject matters in article 22 are rights in rem 
in immovable property, validity of entries in public registers etc. 
When a court of a Member State is seized of a claim which is principally concerned 
with a matter over which the courts of another Member State have exclusive jurisdiction 
by virtue of article 22, it must of its own motion declare that it has no jurisdiction.189 
 
2.9 Prorogation of Jurisdiction 
 
One of the cornerstones of EU private international law, and private international law 
in general, is party autonomy.190 The Brussels I Regulation therefore recognises the 
possibility for the parties to agree on which court or courts will have jurisdiction. In 
particular, if the parties, one of whom is domiciled in a Member State, have agreed that 
a court or the courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes 
which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, 
that court or those courts shall have jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive 
unless the parties have agreed otherwise.191  
This means that a choice by the parties will be respected regardless of any other 
provision. Important to note however, is that the exclusive grounds for jurisdiction laid 
out in article 22 will still apply so that in these specific subject matters a choice by the 
parties will not be respected.192 In all other cases their choice prevails, albeit that there 
are additional requirements for choice of court agreements regarding insurance 
contracts, consumer contracts and individual employment contracts.193 The Regulation 
specifies however, how such an agreement conferring jurisdiction shall be made. It shall 
be in writing or evidenced in writing,194 or in a form which accords with practices which 
the parties have established between themselves, 195  or in international trade or 
188 FAWCETT, J. and CARRUTHERS, J.M., 2008. Cheshire, North and Fawcett. Private International 
Law. 14th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 275. 
189 Art. 25 Brussels I. 
190 See chapter 1. 
191 Art. 23 (1) Brussels I. 
192 Cf. supra. 
193 Art. 23 (5) Brussels I juncto arts. 13, 17 and 21 Brussels I. 
194 Art. 23 (1) (a) Brussels I. 
195 Art. 23 (1) (b) Brussels I. 
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commerce, in a form which accords with a usage of which parties are or ought to have 
been aware and which in such a trade or commerce is widely known to, and regularly 
observed by, the parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade or 
commerce involved.196 Any communication by electronic means which provides a 
durable record of the agreement shall be equivalent to ‘writing’.197 
At first sight it seems that party autonomy is fairly well established and achieved 
through these provisions. The exhaustive198 requirements for, as well as the limitations 
to, a choice made by the parties seem reasonable and useful. This will be further 
discussed and assessed in chapter 7. 
In addition to the other grounds for jurisdiction in the Regulation, it also provides that 
a court of a Member State before which a defendant enters an appearance shall have 
jurisdiction, unless where appearance was entered to contest the jurisdiction, or where 
another court has [exclusive] jurisdiction by virtue of article 22. 199  This rule is 
straightforward and seems fair in the light of the possibility for parties to agree on which 
court will have jurisdiction. If a defendant is sued in a court and he does not contest this 
court’s jurisdiction, he in effect agrees to it. Very similar provisions also exist in 
English200 and Belgian201 law so it can be assumed that this ground for jurisdiction is 
fairly widely spread. 
 
2.10 Lis Pendens – Related Actions 
 
Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties 
are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the court first 
seized shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of 
the court first seized is established.202 Where the jurisdiction of the court first seized is 
196 Art. 23 (1) (c) Brussels I. 
197 Art. 23 (2) Brussels I. 
198 Case 150/80 Elefanten Schuh v Jacqmain [1981] ECR 1671. 
199 Art. 24 Brussels I. 
200 Chapter 3. 
201 Art. 6 §1 Code PIL. 
202 Art. 27 (1) Brussels I. 
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established, any court other than the court first seized shall decline jurisdiction in favour 
of that court.203 
This rule aims to avoid parallel proceedings which could result in incompatible 
judgments. However problems have arisen regarding it. It seems that this rule has been 
misused, or one could even say abused, by parties to delay proceedings. This has been 
especially striking in cases where there was a clear choice of court agreement between 
the parties but where one party, sensing imminent litigation, rushed to an incompetent 
court, preferably in a so called “slow-moving” jurisdiction, with a view to delay 
proceedings.204 Even in such a case, where it is quite obvious that the plaintiff has 
brought his case before a court with a malicious intent, the court not first seized must 
still stay its proceedings under this rule. This outcome is highly undesirable because it 
undermines legal certainty and predictability, access to justice and party autonomy.  
Similar problems arise where related actions are pending in the courts of different 
Member States because, although it is not an obligation, any court other than the court 
first seized may stay its proceedings.205 These provisions will therefore be critically 
evaluated in the relevant chapters. 
 
 
 
3. Applicable Law 
 
3.1 Outline of the Rome I Regulation 
 
203 Art. 27 (2) Brussels I. 
204 Franzosi, M., 1997. Worldwide Patent Litigation and the Italian Torpedo. European Intellectual 
Property Review [online], 19(7), 382-385. Available via: Westlaw. 
 
205 Art. 28 (1) Brussels I. 
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The first chapter of the Regulation defines its material scope and its universal 
application. The second chapter contains the so called uniform rules in its articles 3 to 
18. Various other provisions are contained in chapter III, article 19 to 28. 
 
3.2 Scope 
 
The Rome I Regulation applies in situations involving a conflict of laws, to contractual 
obligations in civil and commercial matters. It does not apply, in particular, to revenue, 
customs, or administrative matters.206 The second and third paragraph of the same 
article contain several subject matters excluded from the scope of the Regulation. This 
means that for claims regarding those matters the domestic private international law 
rules of the Member States will apply. 
Although some exceptions will always be made and could also make sense, it is 
regrettable that there are so many exceptions to the scope of this Regulation. It sets 
itself the goal to improve the predictability of the outcome of litigation and to achieve 
certainty as to the applicable law. To achieve this, the conflict of law rules in the 
Member States must designate the same national law irrespective of the country of the 
court in which an action is brought.207 
Evidently this aim is achieved for all the claims falling within the scope of the 
Regulation but this aim is undermined where claims fall outside its scope because the 
courts of different countries will apply different conflict of laws rules. 
The Regulation formulates the principle in its second article where it says that any law 
specified by this Regulation shall be applied whether or not it is the law of a Member 
State. 
3.3 Party Autonomy 
 
Party autonomy is of utmost importance in the Rome I Regulation as the parties’ 
freedom to choose the applicable law is considered one of the cornerstones of the 
206 Art. 1 (1) Rome I. 
207 Recital (6) Rome I. 
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system of conflict of law rules in matters of contractual obligations.208 Therefore the 
first article in chapter II of the Regulation on uniform rules contains the provisions 
regarding freedom of choice. It states that a contract shall be governed by the law 
chosen by the parties.209  
Although excluded under its predecessor, the Rome Convention, the Rome I Regulation 
may be interpreted as allowing the parties to a contract to choose a non-state law as the 
law applicable to their contractual relationship. Obviously that leads to problems in 
terms of legal certainty and predictability when the parties want to choose a non-state 
legal system to apply to their contract. This will be further evaluated and assessed in 
chapter 7. 
The Regulation says that a choice of law cannot only be express but can also be clearly 
demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case.210 The aim 
of this provision is to enhance party autonomy by not only giving effect to an express 
but also an implied choice of law by the parties. In terms of achieving this aim it can 
hardly be argued that no effect should be given to an implied choice. The way in which 
it is done however, causes some concerns regarding legal certainty and predictability. 
It seems from the researched case law and doctrine that this rule has been applied 
differently by courts of different Member States. English courts in particular have been 
quite likely to conclude that an implied choice had been made, which can be easily 
understood as it is fully in line with English domestic rules.211 Continental courts, on 
the other hand, have been far more reluctant to recognise a tacit choice. 212  This 
difference in application of the same rule throughout the EU undermines legal certainty 
and predictability as to which law will apply to a certain contractual obligation. 
3.4 Absence of Choice 
 
Article 4 (1) and (2) of the Regulation contain some fixed rules in order to determine 
the applicable law in case the parties have not made a choice. This provides legal 
208 Recital (11) Rome I.  
209 Art. 3 (1) Rome I. 
210 Art. 3 (1) Rome I. 
211 STONE, P., 2006. EU Private International Law. Harmonization of Laws. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
212 FAWCETT, J. and CARRUTHERS, J.M., 2008. Cheshire, North and Fawcett. Private International 
Law. 14th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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certainty and predictability. As a result of a compromise between different positions as 
to how rigid or how flexible private international law rules should be, which seems to 
have been driven partly by differences between common law and civil law,213 a general 
exception to these fixed rules was introduced. Where it is clear from all the 
circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more closely connected with 
another country or where there is an impossibility to determine the applicable law, the 
fixed rules are abandoned.214  
Although there is obviously a need for a rule providing a solution where the applicable 
law cannot be determined, there is the inherent risk that some courts will all too easily 
resort to this rule in order to avoid the fixed rules. This risk exists even more regarding 
the other exception as it has become clear from case law that English courts and civil 
courts have a tendency to interpret a more close connection very differently. Thus legal 
certainty and predictability could be seriously compromised. 
This problem becomes all the more poignant when looking at the second default rule 
set out by article 4, which states that where the contract is not covered by paragraph 1 
or where the elements of the contract would be covered by more than one of the points 
in paragraph 1, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the party 
required to effect the characteristic performance of the contract has his habitual 
residence.215 This concept of the characteristic performance has been called one of the 
most difficult concepts in the Rome Convention,216 and it has been pointed out that it 
can be very hard to identify in concrete situations.217 This could therefore again lead 
some courts to avoid applying the basic rules and resort too quickly to the exceptions, 
which, in turn, undermines legal certainty and predictability because different courts 
might apply different thresholds towards exceptions. The relevant provisions will 
therefore be discussed and analysed in detail in chapter 6. 
213 E.g. Response of the UK and the Netherlands to the Green paper on the Conversion of the Rome 
Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations into a Community Instrument and 
its Modernization, COM (02) 654, final. 
214 Art. 4 (3) and (4) Rome I. 
215 Art. 4 (2) Rome I. 
216 North, P. and Fawcett, J.J., 1999. Cheshire and North’s Private International Law. 13th ed. London: 
Butterworths. 
217 COLLINS, L., 1976. Contractual Obligations. The EEC Preliminary Draft Convention on Private 
International Law. International and Comparative Law Quarterly [online], 35. Available via: 
HeinOnline.  
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 3.5 Consumer Contracts 
 
Because of the aim to protect weaker parties to a contract there are special rules for 
consumer contracts regarding applicable law just as there are regarding jurisdiction. 
Since the definition of a consumer contract in the Rome I Regulation is consistent with 
the definition in the Brussels I Regulation, it will not be repeated here, nor will the 
comments regarding possible exclusion of certain deserving persons be repeated.218 
Rome I provides, as a rule different to the general rules, that a consumer contract shall 
be governed by the law of the country where the consumer has his habitual residence, 
subject to conditions, again, very similar to the conditions set out in the Brussels I 
Regulation.219  
The fact that, as a rule, the applicable law will be the law where the consumer has his 
habitual residence means that there is a clear intention to apply the law with which he 
is probably most familiar. The fixed rules in article 4 provide, quite oppositely, as the 
applicable law the law of the country in which e.g. the seller or the service provider 
have their habitual residence. Furthermore, where the parties decide to make a choice 
of the applicable law, additional criteria must be fulfilled in order for this to be a valid 
choice.220 The relevant provision will be subject to in-depth discussion in chapter 8. 
 
 
 
 
3.6 Individual Employment Contracts 
 
218 See supra under jurisdiction. 
219 Art. 6 (1) (a) and (b) Rome I. 
220 Art. 6 (2) Rome I. 
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Here again similarities are found between the jurisdiction rules on individual 
employment contracts and the rules regarding the law applicable to these. As for 
consumer contracts, a choice of law by the parties must meet some additional criteria 
in order to be valid.221 
To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen by the parties, 
the contract shall be governed by the law of the country in which or, failing that, from 
which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract. The 
country where the work is habitually carried out shall not be deemed to have changed 
if he is temporarily employed in another country.222 
Where the law applicable cannot be determined pursuant to the previous paragraph, the 
contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the place of business through 
which the employee was engaged is situated.223 
Where it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely 
connected with a country other than that indicated in the previous paragraphs, the law 
of that other country shall apply.224 
Although these rules are special rules for contracts of employment, it must be noted 
that the last paragraph is almost identical to the first exception to the general, fixed rules 
determining the applicable law in article 4.225  
 
3.7 Insurance Contracts 
 
The basic principle governing applicable law for insurance contracts is a choice by the 
parties. If they have not made a choice, the contract is governed by the law of the 
country where the insurer has his habitual residence. However, where it is clear from 
221 Art. 8 (1) Rome I. 
222 Art. 8 (2) Rome I. Cf. the concept of “habitually carries out his work” supra under jurisdiction. 
223 Art. 8 (3) Rome I. 
224 Art. 8 (4) Rome I. 
225 Cf. supra. 
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all the circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more closely connected 
with another country, the law of that country shall apply.226  
Although the parties can choose the law applicable to their insurance contract, this 
freedom is limited because they can only choose certain laws. In particular they can 
choose the law of any Member State where the risk is situated at the time of conclusion 
of the contract, 227  the law of the country where the policyholder has his habitual 
residence228 or, where the policy holder pursues a commercial or industrial activity or 
a liberal profession and the contract covers two or more risks which relate to those 
activities and are situated in different Member States, the law of any of the Member 
States concerned or the law of the country of habitual residence of the policy holder.229 
If the Member States grant the parties greater freedom to choose the applicable law, 
they can take advantage of that freedom.230 
Furthermore the parties may choose, in the case of life assurance, the law of the Member 
State of which the policy holder is a national231 or, for insurance contracts covering 
risks limited to events occurring in one Member State other than the Member State 
where the risk is situated, the law of that Member State.232 
 
3.8 Overriding Mandatory Provisions 
 
Mandatory provisions are provisions which cannot be derogated from by contract233 
and therefore they limit party autonomy to a certain extent. The reasons for this 
limitation, or, for the mandatory rules in question, vary as will seem from the discussion 
of those rules contained in the Regulation.234 
When the parties have made a choice but where all other elements relevant to the 
situation at the time of the choice are located in a country other than the country whose 
226 Art. 7 (2) Brussels I. 
227 Art. 7 (3) (a) Brussels I. 
228 Art. 7 (3) (b) Brussels I. 
229 Art. 7 (3) (e) Brussels I. 
230 Art. 7 (3) Brussels I. 
231 Art. 7 (3) (c) Brussels I. 
232 Art. 7 (3) (d) Brussels I. 
233 Art. 3 (3) Rome I. 
234 See also art. 9 (1) Rome I. 
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law has been chosen, the choice of the parties shall not prejudice the application of 
mandatory provisions of that law.235 Similarly, where all other elements relevant to the 
situation at the time of the choice are located in one or more Member States, the parties’ 
choice of applicable law other than that of a Member State shall not prejudice the 
application of provisions of Community law, where appropriate as implemented in the 
Member State of the forum, which cannot be derogated from by contract.236 This last 
provision was not contained in the Rome Convention but it was inserted in the 
Regulation in order to prevent fraudulent evasion of Community law.237 
Article 9 provides that nothing shall restrict the application of the overriding mandatory 
provisions of the law of the forum.238 Furthermore effect may be given to the overriding 
mandatory provisions of the law of the country where the obligations arising out of the 
contract have to be or have been performed, in so far as those overriding mandatory 
provisions render the performance of the contract unlawful. In considering whether to 
give effect to those provisions, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to 
the consequences of their application or non-application.239 
It has already been mentioned above240 that a choice of law agreement in a consumer 
or an individual employment contract has to meet some additional criteria in order to 
be valid. More specifically such a choice of law may not have the result of depriving 
the consumer or the employee of the protection afforded to them by provisions that 
cannot be derogated from by agreement under the law that would have been applicable 
in the absence of choice.241  
 
 
 
3.9 Public Policy 
235 Art. 3 (3) Rome I. 
236 Art. 3 (4) Rome I. 
237 Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the 
Council on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), COM (05) 650, final. 
238 Art. 9 (2) Rome I. 
239 Art. 9 (3) Rome I.  
240 See supra. 
241 Arts. 6 (2) and 8 (1) Rome I. 
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 Article 21 provides that the application of provisions of the law of any country specified 
by the Regulation may be refused only if such application is manifestly incompatible 
with the public policy of the forum. Where other provisions operate in a positive way, 
in the sense that they provide the possibility to apply certain rules instead of the 
applicable law, article 21 is negative in the sense that the court can refuse the application 
of a certain rule of the applicable law.242 This rule expresses an exception to normal 
conflict of laws rules which can be found in the traditions of both civil and common 
law systems.243 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has given an overview of relevant EU law for the purposes of the research. 
It also touched on some issues that could be identified regarding its potential failure to 
achieve its underlying policy objectives. In particular, the issues identified in need of 
further investigation were related to the scope of application of the Brussels I 
Regulation and external defendants, the lis alibi pendens rule, the possibility of an 
implied choice of applicable law, a choice of non-state law, the rules on applicable law 
in absence of a choice by the parties, and the rules protecting consumers. These issues 
will be the subject of an in-depth investigation in chapters 4 to 8. 
Specific attention will be paid to the recent revision of the Brussels I Regulation as it is 
provisionally submitted by the researcher that several problems identified have not been 
addressed yet, or have been addressed inappropriately. 
 
 
 
242 HILL, J., 2005. International Commercial Disputes in English Courts. 3rd ed. Oxford: Hart. p. 511. 
243 NORTH, P.M. and FAWCETT, J.J., 1999. Cheshire and North’s Private International Law. 13th ed. 
London: Butterworths. p. 584.   
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Chapter 3. English Private International Law and 
Policy 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The traditional English private international law rules have now been largely replaced 
by European instruments in the areas of jurisdiction and applicable law in contractual 
disputes. They do however still apply in cases which do not fall within the scope of 
these European instruments.  This chapter seeks to discuss these traditional rules as well 
as the policy objectives underlying them.  
 
2. Policy Objectives 
 
2.1 Access to Justice 
 
Historically every person in England, regardless of his nationality or residence, enjoyed 
the protection of the Crown when on the Crown’s territory because they also had the 
feudal duty of allegiance when on this territory.244 It has been held that “the right of 
access to the King’s court must not be lightly refused”245 and that “whoever is served 
with the King’s writ, and can be compelled consequently to submit to the decree made, 
is a person over whom the courts have jurisdiction”.246 The traditional English common 
law rules are therefore based on the principle that a person present on the territory has 
access to justice through the adjudication of the English courts.247 
Because of this history of feudal duty and corresponding protection of the Crown, 
certain grounds for jurisdiction of the English courts were developed which are now 
sometimes regarded as exorbitant and certainly very different from grounds for 
jurisdiction in other EU countries, particularly civil law countries such as for example 
244 GRAVESON, R.H., 1977. Comparative Conflict of Laws. Selected Essays, Volume I. Oxford: North-
Holland Publishing. p. 8-9. 
245 St Pierre v South American Stores (Garth & Chaves) Ltd [1936] 1 K.B. 382 at 398. 
246 John Russell and Co Ltd v Cayzer, Irvine and Co Ltd [1916] 2 A.C. 298 at 302. 
247 ROGERSON, P., 2013. Collier’s Conflict of Laws. 4th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
p. 139. 
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Belgium. It has been argued that the English courts should be open to anyone for several 
reasons.248 On the other hand, however, forum shopping is a phenomenon which must 
be avoided as it would allow parties to seek the assistance of courts which are not 
appropriate to hear the case. In particular forum shopping exists when a party files the 
case with a court because they believe they will gain an advantage through this forum249 
rather than because there is “a real and substantial connection” with the forum.250 This 
will become clear further under the discussion of the different rules in English private 
international law. 
 
2.2 Deal with Cases Justly 
 
Although the traditional rules on jurisdiction of the English courts have been 
historically developed, they are now enshrined in the Civil Procedure Rules.251 The 
CPR expressly state in their first part what the overriding objective of their rules is and 
evidently this should be borne in mind when reading and discussing the rules in force. 
It is said that the overriding objective of the rules is to enable the court to deal with 
cases justly and at proportionate cost.252 It is then specified that this includes, so far as 
is practicable, ensuring that the parties are on equal footing, saving expense, dealing 
with the case in ways which are appropriate to several factors, ensuring that the case is 
dealt with expeditiously and fairly and allotting to the case an appropriate share of the 
court’s resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases.253 
It is specified that the courts should deal with the case in ways which are proportionate 
to the amount of money involved, the importance of the case, the complexity of the 
issues and the financial position of each party.254 
248 CLARKSON, C.M.V. and HILL, J., 2011. The Conflict of Laws. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. p. 7. 
249 ROGERSON, P. , 2013. Collier’s Conflict of Laws. 4th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
p. 140. 
250 Amchem Products Inc. v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) [1993] 102 DLR (4th) 96 
at 110-111. 
251 Civil Procedure Rules 1998, No. 3132 (L. 17). 
252 CPR 1.1 (1). 
253 CPR 1.1 (2). 
254 CPR 1.2 (c). 
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This overriding objective in the Civil Procedure Rules contains several elements. 
Noteworthy is the explicit reference to economic efficiency. It is submitted that 
certainty and predictability contributes to economic efficiency because clear rules 
which are predictable in their application minimise the cost of litigation255 as there will 
be limited disagreement as to which court has jurisdiction and which law applies to the 
dispute, in turn limiting the length and complexity of litigation.  
The reference to ensuring the parties are on equal footing can be read, in the context of 
contractual obligations, as a protection of weaker parties to contracts. Reference must 
be made to chapter 1 here, where protection of weaker parties was identified as a key 
policy objective underlying EU private international law rules.  
The objective that the case is dealt with expeditiously and fairly refers to what is called 
a central concern in English law: justice in the individual case. In order to achieve this, 
English law is characterised by a high degree of judicial discretion and flexibility, 
which are concepts quite alien to civil law, where uniformity and legal certainty and 
predictability are always at the centre of attention.256 It is submitted that the emphasis 
on flexibility and judicial discretion in order to deal with cases fairly results, at times, 
in a lack of uniformity and legal certainty and predictability.257  
 
2.3 Party Autonomy 
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, party autonomy is recognised in the vast majority of legal 
systems throughout the world. It can be seen as the private international law aspect of 
the freedom of contract which exists in contract law in general.258 Similar to EU law, it 
is also recognised in English private international law as will seem from the discussion 
of the rules later on in this chapter. 
255  Keyes, M., 2008. Statutes, Choice of Law and the Role of Forum Choice. Journal of Private 
International Law, vol. 4, n° 1, 15.  
256 McClean, D. and Ruiz Abou-Nigm, V., 2012. Morris: The Conflict of Laws. 8th ed. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell. p. 344.   
257  Keyes, M., 2008. Statutes, Choice of Law and the Role of Forum Choice. Journal of Private 
International Law, vol. 4, n° 1, 15. 
258 McCLean, D. and Ruiz Abou-Nigm, V., 2012. Morris: The Conflict of Laws. 8th ed. London: Sweet 
& Maxwell. p. 344.   
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 2.4 Modernisation and International Openness 
 
Because society changes, private international law must be adapted to these changes. 
Society changes in several ways and, regarding contracts, the internationalisation of 
legal relationships as well as other tendencies, such as the increased need of consumer 
protection, are particularly relevant. Regularly inspiration for change is found in 
solutions applied by other legal systems, which could be viewed as an aspect of 
international openness. It is obvious that the EU can impact domestic rules and this 
impact is researched and assessed in this thesis.  
Long before the EU came into existence however, it was already pointed out by the 
House of Lords that “some fixed common principles should guide the courts in every 
country on international questions”.259 This is seen as a clear direction in favour of an 
international outlook in the judicial development of the conflict of laws.260 In this 
respect international openness does not refer to a country’s readiness to find inspiration 
in other legal systems or its willingness to accept that other legal systems, such as EU 
law, impact its national legislation. It rather refers to the fact that the English court 
should be prepared to adjudicate matters involving foreign elements, which, as 
highlighted above, does not seem to cause too much of a problem. 261  Similarly, 
however, it refers to the fact that the English courts should accept that cases involving 
English elements may be better adjudicated elsewhere. As illustrated by the Lord 
Chancellor in Udny v Udny: “A man may continue to be an Englishman, and yet his 
contracts and the succession to his estate may have to be determined by the law of the 
country in which he has chosen to settle himself. He cannot […] put off and resume at 
will obligations of obedience to the government of the country of which at his birth he 
is a subject, but he may many times change his domicile.”   
 
 
259 Udny v Udny [1869] L.R. 1 H.L. (Sc. & D.) 441. 
260 Graveson, R.H., 1977. Comparative Conflict of Laws. Selected Essays, Volume I. Oxford: North-
Holland Publishing. p. 44. 
261 See subtitle 1 of this chapter on access to justice. 
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 3. The Rules 
 
3.1 Jurisdiction 
 
3.1.1 Introduction 
 
As mentioned the historically developed English private international law rules are now 
enshrined in the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). Under these rules there are three grounds 
on which the English courts can have jurisdiction: 1) presence of the defendant in 
England, 2) submission of the defendant to the jurisdiction of the English courts and 3) 
service of process to the defendant abroad. 
 
3.1.2 Presence 
 
It has been long established at common law that the mere presence of the defendant on 
English territory is sufficient to give the English courts jurisdiction. Furthermore 
English private international law has a strong procedural character whereby the 
emphasis lies on the service of the claim form to the defendant. Service of this form in 
England gives the English courts jurisdiction. 
Other connecting factors such as the defendant’s nationality, domicile or residence are 
irrelevant as the Court of Appeal has confirmed that the English courts have jurisdiction 
when the defendant is served on English territory even though he is only there for a few 
days262 or to visit the Ascot races.263 The only exception to the rule that service of the 
claim form on English territory is enough to constitute jurisdiction of the English courts 
is that of abuse of process. This means that when the defendant is fraudulently induced 
to come to England with a view to serve him, the service of the claim form will be 
ignored by the court in determining their jurisdiction.264  
262 Colt Industries Inc. V Sarlie [1966] 1 W.L.R. 440. 
263 H.R.H. Maharanee Seethadevi Gaekwar of Baroda v Wildenstein [1972] 2 Q.B. 283. 
264 Watkins v North American Land and Timber Co Ltd [1904] 20 T.L.R. 534. 
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From a procedural point of view it is clear that the service of the claim form is extremely 
important because without this there is of course the likelihood that a defendant would 
not be aware of any proceedings being brought against them. That would severely 
undermine the policy object of placing the parties on equal footing.265 It has however 
been said that the service of the claim form as a ground for jurisdiction is exorbitant.266 
For a civil lawyer it is easy to agree with this upon first sight. It must therefore be 
applauded that there is at least an exception for fraudulently inducing the defendant to 
come to England, because it is definitely unjust to lure somebody into litigation in 
England, especially when this would mean he is put on completely unequal footing. 
That could be the case because he will have to travel a lot, he might not be familiar with 
the English legal system, he might not speak the language etc.  
There are more scenarios however, in which it seems that this ground for jurisdiction 
could lead to unjust results such as in the case where an English court has jurisdiction 
based on service of the claim form in England but where none of the other elements of 
the case have any connection with England. It is therefore equally important to 
investigate how other private international law rules regarding jurisdiction possibly 
rectify this situation. 
 
3.1.3 Submission and Party Autonomy 
 
There are several ways in which the English courts can have jurisdiction by submission. 
Part 11 of the CPR contains the rules for disputing the court’s jurisdiction and states 
that failing to abide by these the defendant is to be treated as having accepted that the 
court has jurisdiction to try the claim.267 This means that the defendant who does not 
object to the court’s jurisdiction submits himself to this court, thus giving it jurisdiction. 
If the defendant contests the case on its merits it is therefore held that he submits to the 
court.268 Furthermore the claimant [plaintiff], who has chosen to bring his case before 
an English court, thereby gives it jurisdiction to rule on a counterclaim from the 
265 See supra policy objectives. 
266 E.g. Graveson, R.H., 1977. Comparative Conflict of Laws. Selected Essays, Volume I. Oxford: North-
Holland Publishing. p. 9; McCLean, D. and Ruiz Abou-Nigm, V., 2012. Morris: The Conflict of Laws. 
8th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell. p. 112. 
267 CPR 11.5. 
268 Boyle v Sacker [1888] L.R. 39 Ch. D. 249. 
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defendant.269 A very similar rule also exists in EU law270 and Belgian law271 and this is 
not surprising as it closely relates to party autonomy. After all, if the defendant appears 
and does not contest the court’s jurisdiction, he in effect agrees to bring the case before 
that court. 
A different way of submitting to the English courts is to exercise party autonomy and 
hence contract expressly or impliedly that these courts will have jurisdiction in disputes 
relating to the contract.272 In international commerce it is in fact common practice to 
provide such a clause in the contract in which the parties agree between them where 
possible future disputes will be tried.273 The CPR clearly envisage this option as they 
permit the parties to a contract to agree on the method to be used to serve the claim 
form in the case of a dispute between them.274 
 
3.1.4 Service Abroad 
 
Common law, which only gave the English courts jurisdiction in case of service of the 
claim form in England or submission to the court, changed in 1852 when the Common 
Law Procedure Act introduced the possibility to serve a claim abroad. Since then, 
common law continued to develop this possibility, and other rules were introduced as 
well.275 The Civil Procedure Rules, introduced in 1998, provided a new code of civil 
procedure for the courts and hence replaced certain existing rules.276 The possibility to 
serve a claim abroad, however, remained subject to the rules laid down by common 
law. 
Since 2008 the CPR have been amended, introducing detailed grounds for permission 
of service abroad by the courts. This permission however, is limited in general by the 
discretionary power of the court to allow such service. This means that the claimant has 
269 South African Republic v La Compagnie Franco-Belge du Chemin de Fer du Nord [1897] 2 Ch. 487; 
Lesley June Al-Bassam v Abdullah Saleh Al-Bassam [2004] W.T.L.R. 157. 
270 Art. 24 Brussels I. 
271 Art. 6 §1 Code of PIL. 
272 Copin v Adamson [1875-76] L.R. 1 Ex. D. 17. 
273  Cf. Cheshire, North and Fawcett, 2008. Private International Law. 14th ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. p. 371.  
274 CPR 6.15. 
275 E.g. Rules of the Supreme Court 1965 and County Court Rules 1981. 
276 See explanatory note to the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. 
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to convince the court of several things. Firstly, he must prove that his claim falls within 
the scope of paragraph 3.1 of Practice Direction 6B.277 Secondly, he must show that his 
claim has a reasonable prospect of success,278 and finally he must satisfy the court that 
England and Wales is the proper place in which to bring the claim. 279  These 
requirements will now be discussed further. 
 
3.1.4.1 A claim within the scope of paragraph 3.1 of Practice Direction 6B 
 
General grounds  
- A claim is made for a remedy against a person domiciled within the jurisdiction280 
This ground seems fairly straightforward and corresponds to the basic EU rule on 
jurisdiction281 although it is important to note that the definition of domicile is of crucial 
importance here in order to determine whether the English courts have jurisdiction. 
Clearly EU law has influenced English law here because the CPR expressly refer to the 
Brussels I Regulation and the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Order 2001 for the 
determination of domicile. 282  That means that, regardless whether English private 
international rules apply or EU private international rules, the definition of domicile 
will be the same. 
 
- A claim is made for an injunction ordering the defendant to do or refrain from doing 
an act within the jurisdiction283 
For this ground to be fulfilled the injunction against an act in England or Wales must 
be the main part of the claim, being the substantial and genuine relief sought by the 
claimant284 and not just incidental to a different remedy sought by him.285 Furthermore 
277 CPR 6.37 (1) (a). 
278 CPR 6.37 (1) (b). 
279 CPR 6.37 (3). 
280 PD 3.1 (1). 
281 Art. 2 (1) Brussels I. 
282 CPR 6.31 (i) (ii). 
283 PD 3.1 (2). 
284 Amoco (U.K.) Exploration Co v British American Offshore Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 772. 
285 Rosler v Hilbery [1925] Ch. 250. 
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the English court will not accept jurisdiction if a foreign court can deal with the question 
more conveniently 286  or if the injunction sought cannot be made effective in 
England.287 
 
- A claim is made against a person on whom the claim form has been or will be served 
and: a) there is between the claimant and the defendant a real issue which is reasonable 
for the court to try and b) the claimant wishes to serve the claim form on another person 
who is a necessary or proper party to that claim.288 
This ground covers cases in which there is a claim based on a certain cause of action 
against two persons only one of whom can be served in England and Wales.289 It can 
also be used however, for cases in which there are claims against two defendants based 
on different causes of action, such as a claim against a principal based on breach of 
contract and a claim against an agent for breach of warranty of authority.290 A different 
example is a case in which a claimant brings an action for breach of contract against a 
defendant in England and an action in tort against a defendant abroad.291 
Brussels I also contains a rule to determine jurisdiction in cases where there are several 
defendants. Criticisms have been given to that rule because it seems quite difficult to 
apply.292 The English rule seems more straightforward and easy to apply because the 
judge does not have to assess whether hearing the claims in different courts could lead 
to irreconcilable judgments. It must only be reasonable for the court to hear the claim 
and the other party has to be a necessary or proper party. This rule therefore gives the 
court some leeway in its application and it could be argued that such an approach should 
be used on an EU level as well. The risk then of course exists that courts will all too 
easily draw claims towards them as it were. Further research and assessment seeks to 
find solutions here.  
 
286 Société Générale de Paris v Dreyfus Brothers [1888] L.R. 37 Ch. D. 215. 
287 Marshall v Marshall [1888] L.R. 38 Ch. D. 330. 
288 PD 3.1 (3). 
289 Williams v Cartwright [1895] 1 Q.B. 142. 
290 Massey and Another v Heynes and Co and Schenker and Co [1888] L.R. 21 Q.B.D. 330.  
291 The Manchester Courage [1973] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 386. 
292 Chapter 2. 
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- A claim is an additional claim under part 20 and the person is a necessary or proper 
party to the claim or additional claim.293 
Part 20 of the CPR is titled “counterclaims and other additional claims” and this ground 
must be read together with the previous ground as the main criterion for jurisdiction 
lies in the fact that the party to be served abroad is either a necessary or a proper party 
to the claim or additional claim.  
 
Claims for interim remedies 
- A claim is made for an interim remedy under section 25 (1) of the Civil Jurisdiction 
and Judgments Act 1982294 
In the past it was very difficult, or even impossible, to obtain a freezing injunction in 
respect of the defendant’s assets in support of litigation abroad. The Civil Jurisdiction 
and Judgments Act 1982 however, contained provisions which gave the English courts 
the power to grant interim relief much more easily under those circumstances, provided 
that the proceedings were held in one of the Brussels or Lugano Contracting States.295 
Later this power was extended to interim remedies in respect of proceedings in any 
country,296 which was a definite step forward in these modern times where international 
trade and litigation has become very common, as had been also emphasised by the 
House of Lords: “Given the international character of much contemporary litigation 
and the need to promote the mutual assistance between the courts of the various 
jurisdictions which such litigation straddles, it would be a serious matter if the English 
courts were unable to grant interlocutory relief in cases where the substantive trial and 
the ultimate decision of the case might ultimately take place in a court outside of 
England.”297 
 
293 PD 3.1 (4). 
294 PD 3.1 (5). 
295 Section 25 (1). 
296 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (Interim Relief) Order 1997, SI 1997/302; amended Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 section 25 (3). 
297 Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. and Another v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd. and Others [1993] A.C. 
334 at 341 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
64 
 
                                                     
 Claims in relation to contract  
- The contract was made within the jurisdiction298 
The place where a contract is made is a connecting factor and therefore English law 
will determine where that place was. Contracts made by postal correspondence are 
made in the jurisdiction where the acceptance is posted.299 The rule is different however 
for contracts concluded through instantaneous means of communication such as 
telephone, fax or email, which occurs regularly nowadays. In those cases the contract 
is made in the country where the acceptance is received.300 
In order for this rule to be met it is sufficient that the contract was substantially made 
within the jurisdiction. 301  It is also possible that a contract is made in different 
jurisdictions because, for example, there has been a long period of negotiations and 
several copies were signed in different countries.302 In that case the rule is met if one 
of these jurisdictions in England.  
- The contract was made by or through an agent trading or residing within the 
jurisdiction303 
This provision covers two different scenarios. The first scenario is that in which the 
agent in England actually makes the contract on behalf of a foreign principal. In 
addition to that however, the provision also covers the situation in which the agent does 
not have the authority to contract on behalf of the foreign principal but merely obtains 
orders which have to be transmitted to the foreign principal for his acceptance.304 
 
 
298 PD 3.1 (6) (a). 
299 Benaim and Co. v Debono [1924] A.C. 514. 
300 Entores Ltd. v Miles Far East Corp. [1955] 2 Q.B. 327; Brinkibon Ltd. v Stahag Stahl und 
Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft M.B.H. [1983] 2 A.C. 34. 
301 BP Exploration Co. (Lybia) Ltd. v Hunt [1976] 1 W.L.R. 788. 
302 Apple Corps. Ltd. v Apple Computer Inc. [2004] I.L.Pr. 34. 
303 PD 3.1 (6) (b). 
304 National Mortgage and Agency Co. of New Zealand Ltd. v Gosselin [1922] 38 T.L.R. 832. 
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- The contract is governed by English law305 
As explained in chapter I the rules in the Rome I Regulation determine which law 
governs a contract. If the application of these rules determines that English law governs 
the contract, the English courts have jurisdiction but this is subject to their discretion 
which should be exercised “with circumspection” in order to avoid “exorbitant” 
jurisdiction of the English courts.306 It has indeed been held by the House of Lords that 
the discretion to grant jurisdiction based on the law governing the contract depends on 
the individual circumstances of the case.307 
 
- The contract contains a term to the effect that the court shall have jurisdiction to 
determine any claim in respect of the contract308 
As already explained supra309 English law recognises party autonomy in the sense that 
parties can choose where to litigate by inserting provisions to that effect into their 
contract. CPR 6.15 recognises submission to the English courts when parties have 
agreed to a method to serve the claim form in the jurisdiction, the case in which no 
permission of the court needed. The rule discussed here however, envisages choice of 
jurisdiction situations which do not fall under the submission rule such as the situation 
in which no method of service was specified or the situation in which the contract 
contains a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause.310  
 
- A claim is made in respect of a breach of contract committed within the jurisdiction311 
Although a contract can of course be breached by either express 312  or implied 
repudiation,313 the most common form of breach is the failure by one of the parties to 
perform his obligations under the contract. If there are different obligations under the 
305 PD 3.1 (6) (c). 
306 Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v Kuwait Insurance Co. [1984] A.C. 50 at 65 per Lord Diplock. 
307 Spiliada Maritime Corp. v Cansulex Ltd. [1987] A.C. 460. 
308 PD 3.1 (6) (d). 
309 See supra. 
310 Gulf Bank KSC v Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 315. 
311 PD 3.1 (7). 
312 F.e. Mutzenbecher v La Aseguradora Espanola [1906] 1 K.B. 254. 
313 On this see: McClean, D. and Beevers, K., 2009. Morris: The Conflict of Laws. 7th ed. London: Sweet 
& Maxwell. p. 127. 
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contract, some of which are to be performed in England and others abroad, the breach 
has to occur with regards to the obligations with England as their place of performance 
in order for the English courts to have jurisdiction.314  
 
- A claim is made for a declaration that no contract exists where, if the contract was 
found to exist, it would comply with the conditions set out in the first four bullet 
points315 
 
3.1.4.2 A reasonable prospect of success 
 
The claimant must express his belief that his claim has a reasonable prospect of 
success.316 A reasonable prospect of success is a real prospect that is not imaginary or 
fanciful,317 which must be established by the claimant although the court does not rule 
on the merits of the case at this stage so that the standard of proof is lower. The House 
of Lords has ruled that the claimant must show that there is “a substantial question of 
fact or law or both, arising on the facts disclosed by the affidavits, which the plaintiff 
[claimant] bona fide desires to try”.318 
 
3.1.4.3 Forum conveniens 
 
The courts may allow service of the claim form out of the jurisdiction but this is not an 
obligation. The court must therefore be convinced that England is the proper place in 
which to hear the claim, or, in other words, England must be the most appropriate forum 
for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice.319 
 
314 Rein v Stein [1892] 1 Q.B. 753. 
315 PD 3.1 (8). 
316 PD 6.37 (1) (b). 
317 Swiss Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v United India Insurance Co. [2004] I.L.Pr. 4; Carvill America Inc. and 
Another v Camperdown Uk Ltd. and Others [2005] EWCA Civ 645. 
318 Seaconsar Far East Ltd. v Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran [1994] 1 A.C. 438 at 452. 
319 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] 1 AC 460. 
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3.2 Applicable Law 
 
3.2.1 The Proper Law of the Contract 
 
The doctrine of the proper law of the contract was developed by the English courts 
during the nineteenth and twentieth century and is characterised by a high degree of 
flexibility. It has been held that criteria such as the lex loci contractus or the lex loci 
solutionis are rigid and arbitrary and therefore the applicable law should be determined 
by ascertaining the intention of the parties to the contract.320 The doctrine of the proper 
law of the contract therefore comprises several rules to achieve this goal of ascertaining 
the parties’ intention. 
 
3.2.2 Party Autonomy 
 
As mentioned in chapter 1 all Member States of the EU recognise the principle of party 
autonomy in private international law. It is therefore indeed also expressly recognised 
in English law and it is clear that the intention of the parties is most easily ascertained 
when they have in fact made an express choice of law by inserting such a clause in their 
contract. The recognition of party autonomy therefore enhances legal certainty because 
the parties are at all times aware of the law governing their contract.321 It must be noted 
however, that an express choice of law will only have effect in an English court when 
it is bona fide, legal and not contrary to public policy.322 
Apart from an express choice of law by the parties, common law also recognises an 
implied choice of law whereby the proper law of the contract is the system of law by 
reference to which the contract was made.323 Such an implied choice of law can be 
320 Mount Albert Borough Council v Australasian Temperance and General Mutual Life Assurance 
Society Ltd [1938] A.C. 224, at 240. 
321 Clarkson, C.M.V. and Hill, J., 2002. Jaffey on the Conflict of Laws. 2nd ed. London: Butterworths. p. 
198; CLlarkson, C.M.V. and Hill, J., 2006. The Conflict of Laws. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. p. 170; McClean, D. and Beevers, K., 2009. Morris: The Conflict of Laws. 7th ed. London: 
Sweet & Maxwell. p. 353. 
322 Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] A.C. 277. 
323 Bonython v Commonwealth of Australia [1951] A.C. 201 at 219.  
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found from an arbitration clause,324 a choice of jurisdiction by the parties325 or the form 
of the contract, such as the use of a certain standard form.326 
 
3.2.3 Absence of Choice by the Parties 
 
When the parties to the contract have not made an either express or implied choice of 
law the court has to determine the proper law of the contract by identifying the law with 
which the transaction has its closest and most real connection.327 In doing this, the court 
has to take many matters into consideration such as the place of contracting, the place 
of performance, the places of residence or business of the parties and the nature and 
subject matter of the contract.328  
It is said that the objective of this rule is to give effect to the reasonable expectations of 
the parties but also to the interests of the country which is likely to have the greatest 
interest in the outcome of the dispute between these parties.329 It must be said however 
that this flexible approach, whereby many factors have to be taken into account, could 
also backfire because some cases will have factors connecting them equally strong to 
more than one country. It seems hard to achieve the named policy objectives in those 
cases. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
EU law has greatly influenced English private international law in the area of 
contractual obligations, as English common law has now largely been replaced by the 
Brussels I and the Rome I Regulation. When those Regulations do not apply, however, 
English courts will still apply domestic private international law. 
324 Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A. v Compagnie d’Armement Maritime S.A. [1971] A.C. 572.  
325 Hellenic Steel Co. v Svolamar Shipping Co. Ltd (the Komninos) [1991] Lloyd’s Rep 370. 
326 Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v Kuwait Insurance Co. [1984] A.C. 50. 
327 Bonython v Commonwealth of Australia [1951] A.C. 201 at 219. 
328 Re United Railways of the Havana and Regla Warehouses Ltd [1960] Ch. 52 at 91. 
329 Clarkson, C.M.V. and Hill, J., 2006. The Conflict of Laws. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
p. 171. 
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It appears that English private international law generally focuses on procedural issues 
and jurisdiction more than on applicable law. Furthermore English private international 
law is characterised by flexibility and achieving the just outcome in the concrete case 
rather than an urge to have rules set in stone. Many rules are formulated in a way giving 
the courts a large degree of discretion. As such, English private international law seems 
quite distinct from EU private international law, which is generally much more focused 
on legal certainty and predictability, and therefore more rule-based. 
It will be researched in chapters 4 to 8 whether the English approach could be of 
assistance or provide inspiration at EU level when problems with current EU law 
provisions are identified.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4. Belgian Law and Policies 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Until 2004 Belgian law had very few provisions regarding private international law, 
which were scattered among the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek), the Procedural Code 
(Gerechtelijk Wetboek), the Commercial Law Code (Wetboek van Koophandel) and 
several pieces of legislation regulating specific matters such as divorce between couples 
of different nationalities, 330  adoption 331  and supervision of the financial sector. 332 
Furthermore some private international law provisions could be found in legislation 
implementing international conventions such as the Act Liability Motor Vehicles 
implementing the Benelux Convention regarding Motor Vehicles. 333  The main 
provisions on which the conflict of laws was based, however, dated back to 1804, when 
they were introduced in France. They were adopted by Belgian law makers after 
Belgian independence in 1830. Since then they had never been adapted to changed 
social circumstances or new needs of a changing society and therefore the courts were 
left with no option but to try and be creative in applying these few and insufficient rules 
to the broad range of cases brought before them.334  
Among academics there had been a desire to codify private international law for quite 
some time335 but action was only taken in 1996 when legislators asked all professors in 
the conflict of laws in of the country to research codification of this area of law. Six 
professors from different universities agreed to participate in the preparation of a code 
of private international law. After different interest groups, such as public civil servants 
of the Ministry of Justice and the registrar’s office, judges and lawyers, were consulted, 
this research resulted in a proposal of law.336 This proposal was extensively discussed 
and amended several times in both the Chamber of Representatives (Kamer van 
330 Wet van 27 juni 1960 op de toelaatbaarheid van de echtscheiding wanneer ten minste één van de 
echtgenoten een vreemdeling is. 
331 Wet van 24 april 2003 tot hervorming van de adoptie. 
332 Wet van 2 augustus 2002 betreffende het toezicht op de financiële sector en de financiële diensten. 
333  Wet aansprakelijkheid motorrijtuigen van 19 februari 1968 ter implementering van de 
Beneluxovereenkomst van 24 mei 1966 met betrekking tot motorrijtuigen, B.S. 21 mei 1976. 
334 This will be explained further under General Policy Objectives. 
335 Carlier, J.-Y., Le Code belge de droit international privé, R.C.D.I.P. 2005, 13. 
336 For an extensive discussion of the genesis of the proposal for the code of private international law see 
Erauw, J., De codificatie van het Belgisch international privaatrecht met het ontwerp van Wetboek ipr, 
R.W. 2002, 1564-1566. 
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Volksvertegenwoordigers) and the Senate (Senaat). 337  From these parliamentary 
preparatory works the main objectives of Belgian private international law can be 
ascertained to some extent. It is also important, however, to conduct a detailed textual 
analysis and to research relevant academic writing as this sometimes identifies or 
clarifies some underlying issues which can only be read between the lines. The policy 
objectives underlying Belgian private international law will now be discussed in 
general, after which the actual private international law rules will be explained with 
reference to the policy objectives underlying them. 
 
2. Policy Objectives 
 
2.1 Transparency 
 
As already touched upon in the introduction, the existing private international law 
provisions were scattered among several entirely different legal instruments and the 
rules stemmed not only from these outdated provisions but were also largely based on 
case law from courts which tried to adapt them to the cases before them.338 It is fair to 
say that this situation, where an important area of law was based mainly on 
jurisprudence, was regarded as problematic and undermining legal certainty.339 Not 
only did the few old fashioned provisions available lead to rigidity in jurisprudence, it 
was also difficult to assess the scope of decisions which had tried to interpret and apply 
them to specific situations.340 In this complex field of law the practitioner often found 
337 As evidenced by the parliamentary preparatory documents: Verslag namens de Commissie  voor de 
Justitie van de Kamer uitgebracht door de dames Déom en Van der Auwera, Parl. St. (I) Kamer 2003-
04, nr. 51-1078/5; Verslag namens de Commissie voor de Justitie van de Senaat uitgebracht door 
mevrouw Nyssens en de heer Willems, Parl. St. (I) Senaat 2003-04, nr. 3-27/7; Tweede Verslag namens 
de Commissie voor de Justitie van de Senaat uitgebracht door mevrouw Nyssens en de heer Willems, 
Parl. St. (I) Senaat 2003-04, nr. 3-27/11; Memorie van Toelichting bij het Wetsvoorstel houdende het 
Wetboek van Internationaal Privaatrecht, Parl. St. (I) Senaat 2003-04, nr. 3-27/1; Amendementen bij het 
Wertsvoorstel houdende het Wetboek van Internationaal Privaatrecht, Parl. St. (I) Senaat 2003-04, nr. 3-
27/3.   
338 Verslag namens de Commissie  voor de Justitie van de Kamer uitgebracht door de dames Déom en 
Van der Auwera, Parl. St. (I) Kamer 2003-04, nr. 51-1078/5 at p. 7; ERAUW, J., 2005. Krachtlijnen van 
het nieuwe Wetboek van Internationaal Privaatrecht, in Internationale aspecten in de verschillende 
takken van het recht, Permanente vorming Order van Advocaten Kortrijk, Larcier, at p. 160. 
339 Verslag namens de Commissie voor de Justitie van de Senaat uitgebracht door mevrouw Nyssens en 
de heer Willems, Parl. St. (I) Senaat 2003-04, nr. 3-27/7 at p. 9; BARNICH, L., 2005. Présentation du 
nouveau code belge de droit international privé, Rev. not., at p. 7. 
340 Rommelaere, C., 2004. De codificatie van het internationaal privaatrecht. TVW, at p. 341. 
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himself lost in a chaos of provisions, case law and doctrine aiming to bring order in this 
chaos.341 The fear of this so called “gouvernement des juges”, or government by judges, 
is of course inevitably linked with the Belgian civil law system as this system is in some 
respects fundamentally different from the common law system. Apart from a few very 
limited exceptions,342 the only binding law is law made by the legislative power which 
is primarily in the hands of the parliament, consisting of the Chamber and the Senate, 
and to a limited degree in the hands of government. The judiciary merely applies the 
law made by the legislature but does not produce decisions which are regarded as a 
primary source of law.343 Furthermore courts or judges are not bound by precedent and 
precedent is even expressly prohibited by a provision in the Procedural Code.344  
It was therefore decided that this situation in the area of private international law had 
to change. The scattered provisions had to be brought together in one instrument which 
would first of all clarify the existing rules, 345  making them accessible and 
comprehensible for not only practitioners but also civilians.346 Following the analysis 
just made this definitely makes sense and in order to provide sufficient transparency 
and clarity the rules in the instrument had to be sufficiently detailed because a large part 
of the problems encountered in the area of private international law were indeed the 
result of a lack of relevant, let alone detailed, provisions. Despite the need for detail 
however, it was also stressed that there was a need for flexibility of the provisions which 
would allow to adapt them to the diversity of international legal relationships. 347 
Whether this need was met or not will be discussed further but it is interesting to already 
point out here that inspiration in this respect was sought in common law for some of 
the new provisions which were regarded as most revolutionary in terms of changes to 
the existing private international law.  
341 Carlier, J.-Y., 2005. Le Code belge de droit international privé. R.C.D.I.P., at p. 17. 
342  Such as two identical rulings by the Constitutional Court on a provision of law violating the 
Constitution for certain reasons such as discrimination. LOOK UP ARTICLES IN Laws re. constitutional 
court. 
343 Art. 36 of the Constitution specifies that legislative power is in the hands of the King and Parliament. 
344  Art. 6 Ger. W.  
345 Memorie van Toelichting bij het Wetsvoorstel houdende het Wetboek van Internationaal Privaatrecht, 
Parl. St. (I) Senaat 2003-04, nr. 3-27/1 at p. 3. 
346 Verslag namens de Commissie voor de Justitie van de Senaat uitgebracht door mevrouw Nyssens en 
de heer Willems, Parl. St. (I) Senaat 2003-04, nr. 3-27/7 at p. 18. 
347 Memorie van Toelichting bij het Wetsvoorstel houdende het Wetboek van Internationaal Privaatrecht, 
Parl. St. (I) Senaat 2003-04, nr. 3-27/1 at p. 3. 
73 
 
                                                     
To ensure transparency in a complex area of law with very detailed provisions it is 
important to use direct and clear language348 but also, and perhaps even more crucially, 
to provide structure in a logical and accessible fashion. It seems generally accepted that 
the legislator has succeeded in providing this349 and the discussion of the rules relevant 
to this chapter will therefore follow the structure of the Code. The first chapter of the 
Code contains general provisions regarding jurisdiction, applicable law and recognition 
and enforcement. Chapters II to XII contain provisions regarding jurisdiction and 
applicable law specific to certain subject matters, which are either supplementary or 
deviant from the general provisions. Chapter XIII contains provisions regarding entry 
into force, changes to other laws etc. 
 
2.2 Adaptation to Evolution /Modernisation 
 
The Code aims for modernisation in the sense that it takes four developments into 
account which have arisen since the entry into force of the old private international law 
rules. The first development is that of the interpretation of the old provisions by the 
Belgian courts in order to adapt them as far as possible to modern cases before them as 
well as the codification of private international law in other European countries, namely 
Switzerland, Italy, Liechtenstein and the Netherlands, which have obviously also tried 
to provide rules which meet the needs of modern society.350 
The second development is the fundamental change of social relationships in a time 
where the international movement of goods and persons are part of everyday life. 
Nationality as a connecting factor is therefore considered as far less relevant than 
348 Erauw, J., 2003. Het voorstel van Belgisch wetboek van international privaatrecht en zijn algemene 
bepalingen, W.P.N.R., n° 6537, at p. 482; Van Houtte, H. en Verlinden, J., 2005. De nieuwe ipr-codex 
voor de notaris: Inleiding tot de codex ipr, in Notariële nieuwigheden, Weyts, L., ed., Leuvense Notariële 
Geschriften, n° 7, Universitaire Pers Leuven, at p. 51. 
349 E.g. Carlier, J.-Y., 2005. Le Code belge de droit international privé. R.C.D.I.P., at p. 18; Van Houtte, 
H. en Verlinden, J., 2005. De nieuwe ipr-codex voor de notaris: Inleiding tot de codex ipr, in Notariële 
nieuwigheden, Weyts, L., ed., Leuvense Notariële Geschriften, n° 7, Universitaire Pers Leuven, at p. 51; 
Erauw, J., 2005. Krachtlijnen van het nieuwe Wetboek van Internationaal Privaatrecht, in Internationale 
aspecten in de verschillende takken van het recht, Permanente vorming Order van Advocaten Kortrijk, 
Larcier, at p. 159; 
350 Memorie van Toelichting bij het Wetsvoorstel houdende het Wetboek van Internationaal Privaatrecht, 
Parl. St. (I) Senaat 2003-04, nr. 3-27/1 at p. 4-5. 
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habitual residence or the principle of the closest connection.351 This development is 
even more poignant in the EU where the free movement of goods and persons leads to 
a virtual disappearance of barriers. The Code however, does not focus on rules aimed 
at international conflicts within the EU, as will become clear under heading 3. It rather 
aims to provide rules which acknowledge the internationalization of today’s society in 
general.    
Thirdly, since the early nineteenth century the way in which nationality is acquired has 
changed drastically. Nationality has become less permanent and is far less connected to 
the family unit than it used to be.352 This development, pointed out by the legislator, is 
of course correct although it closely relates to the second development identified and 
therefore becomes less relevant. Because of the second development nationality 
becomes less relevant as a connecting factor altogether, regardless whether it has 
become less permanent or not. 
Lastly, the Code aims to adapt the law to the evolution of the fundamental social values, 
providing rules which meet current needs.353 Despite the fact that this development is 
interesting to note, it is not necessarily very important in the area of contract law as it 
seems that contract law is less often touched by social values than other parts of the 
law. This development will therefore be of concern mainly in the area of family law, 
which becomes clear when reading the preparatory documents to the Code. The main 
issues debated on and subject to amendments in this context were repudiation, 
polygamy etc. This development in terms of adaptation of rules to evolution will 
therefore only be of marginal importance in this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
351 Memorie van Toelichting bij het Wetsvoorstel houdende het Wetboek van Internationaal 
Privaatrecht, Parl. St. (I) Senaat 2003-04, nr. 3-27/1 at p. 5. 
352 Memorie van Toelichting bij het Wetsvoorstel houdende het Wetboek van Internationaal 
Privaatrecht, Parl. St. (I) Senaat 2003-04, nr. 3-27/1 at p. 6. 
353 Memorie van Toelichting bij het Wetsvoorstel houdende het Wetboek van Internationaal 
Privaatrecht, Parl. St. (I) Senaat 2003-04, nr. 3-27/1 at p. 6. 
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2.3 International Openness 
 
Although many were looking forward to a Code of private international law,354 there 
were also some objections to be noted.355 Belgium is after all a tiny country so “would 
it not be presumptuous [...] to try and establish a law intended to regulate international 
relations all by ourselves?”356 This question received a “yes” from the Council of State 
(Raad van State), who were invited by the Minister of Justice to provide advice on the 
draft code of private international law. They motivated this answer by both a practical 
and a more fundamental concern. The practical concern was that Belgian authorities, 
which already had a very bad track record regarding timely implementation of 
international conventions, would now be even less inclined to speed up the process in 
this area because they would have their own new code to regulate matters.357 The 
fundamental concern was that Belgium would distance itself from harmonisation 
processes going on between its neighbours358 and, besides that, that EU legislation in 
the area, which was already underway, would be far better than a national code.359  
The legislator has apparently taken these concerns, as well as other related 
considerations, into account. A first indication of that lies in the text of article 2 of the 
code, which is in fact the first real provision since the first article merely refers to the 
constitutional basis for the code. Article 2 reads: “This law regulates in international 
situations the jurisdiction of Belgian courts, the designation of the applicable law and 
the conditions for the effect in Belgium of foreign judgments and authentic instruments 
in civil and commercial matters without prejudice to the application of international 
treaties, the law of the European Union or provisions of special statutes.” 
Furthermore the Code of private international law is intended to be characterised by an 
internationalist spirit in the sense that, although private international law is part of the 
national law of a country, the interests of the international movement of goods and 
354 Erauw, J., 2003. Het voorstel van Belgisch wetboek van international privaatrecht en zijn algemene 
bepalingen, W.P.N.R., n° 6537, at p. 481. 
355 E.g. Rigaux, F., 2000. Codification of Private International Law: Pros and Cons, Louisiana Law 
Review, 4, p. 1321-1330.  
356 Barnich, L., 2005. Présentation du nouveau code belge de droit international privé, Rev. not., at p. 7. 
357 Advies van Raad van State, Bijlage bij voorontwerp van wet houdende het Wetboek van internationaal 
privaatrecht, Parl. St. (I) Senaat 2001-02, nr. 2-1225/1, at p. 243-244. 
358 Advies van Raad van State, Bijlage bij voorontwerp van wet houdende het Wetboek van internationaal 
privaatrecht, Parl. St. (I) Senaat 2001-02, nr. 2-1225/1, at p. 244. 
359 Advies van Raad van State, Bijlage bij voorontwerp van wet houdende het Wetboek van internationaal 
privaatrecht, Parl. St. (I) Senaat 2001-02, nr. 2-1225/1, at p. 247-248. 
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persons have been taken into account.360 Thereto an effort has been made to abandon 
terminology typical of Belgian law in order to ensure the application of rules regarding 
similar foreign legal concepts. In addition the use of certain connecting factors in 
certain situations has been inspired by the tendencies in international instruments and 
other recent national codifications.361 
The importance of international codification, especially in the European Union is 
clearly recognised by the Belgian legislator but it is also rightly considered that, for the 
purpose of legal certainty, residuary rules are necessary. The reason for this is that 
international projects, even under the umbrella of the EU, only cover specific matters 
and usually have a limited scope of application.362 Brussels I is a good example of this 
as its rules do not apply when the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State.363 The 
national private international law rules of the Member States then have to fill in the 
gaps.  
 
3. The Rules 
 
As mentioned under heading 1), the Code of Private International Law consists of 
several parts. The first chapter contains general provisions and the other chapters 
contain provisions specific to certain areas or subject matters. The first chapter starts 
by defining certain concepts relevant to the conflict of laws such as nationality, 
domicile etc. After that it formulates the general rules regarding jurisdiction which 
apply regardless of the subject matter, unless the specific rules, contained in the other 
chapters of the code, state otherwise. The rules regarding applicable law are contained 
in the chapters on specific subject matters although the first chapter of the code also 
contains a few overriding rules which will always apply when seeking the applicable 
law. 
360 Memorie van Toelichting bij het Wetsvoorstel houdende het Wetboek van Internationaal Privaatrecht, 
Parl. St. (I) Senaat 2003-04, nr. 3-27/1 at p. 6. 
361 Memorie van Toelichting bij het Wetsvoorstel houdende het Wetboek van Internationaal Privaatrecht, 
Parl. St. (I) Senaat 2003-04, nr. 3-27/1 at p. 7. 
362 Verslag namens de Commissie voor de Justitie van de Senaat uitgebracht door mevrouw Nyssens en 
de heer Willems, Parl. St. (I) Senaat 2003-04, nr. 3-27/7 at p. 15. 
363 Art. 4 §1 Brussels I. 
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 3.1 Jurisdiction 
 
The first chapter of the Code of Private International Law contains the general rules on 
jurisdiction which means that these are the basic rules which apply to all subject 
matters. In addition to these basic rules however, there are rules specific to a certain 
subject matter which either formulate additional grounds for jurisdiction or which 
formulate other grounds for jurisdiction, excluding the application of the basic rules. 
For contractual obligations the specific rules contain additional grounds for jurisdiction, 
as will seem from the discussion of the law. 
This chapter will contain the actual text of the rules in italics after which they will be 
discussed with a view to extract the basic rules and principles underlying them in order 
to allow a first comparison with both EU and English rules in the field. A more detailed 
analysis will be conducted at a later stage in order to identify smaller nuances and 
differences between the laws, principles and approach of these legal systems. 
Firstly the general rules on jurisdiction will be discussed, structured around the central 
idea underlying them. Secondly the specific, additional, rules on jurisdiction regarding 
contractual obligations will be discussed. 
 
3.1.1 General rules on jurisdiction 
 
A first rule to be mentioned briefly here does not contain a ground for jurisdiction but 
is of a rather procedural nature, which is why it is mentioned first under this heading, 
although it appears after other rules in the Code. After that the general grounds for 
jurisdiction are discussed. 
 
 
“Verification of international jurisdiction” 
Art. 12. The court seized verifies its international jurisdiction of its own motion. 
78 
 
Brussels I contains a rule which says that the court shall verify its international 
jurisdiction in article 26 §1. The difference with article 12 however, is that under 
Brussels I the court only has to do this when the defendant does not enter an appearance 
whereas under this provision the court always has to do this. 
 
3.1.1.1 Domicile or residence of defendant 
 
“International jurisdiction based on the domicile or residence of the defendant” 
Art. 5. §1. Except when otherwise provided for by this law, the Belgian courts have 
jurisdiction if the defendant has his domicile or habitual residence in Belgium at the 
time the claim is filed.  
If there are multiple defendants, the Belgian courts have jurisdiction if one of them has 
his domicile or habitual residence in Belgium, unless the claim has been filed solely to 
remove a defendant from the jurisdiction of his domicile or habitual residence abroad. 
§2. The Belgian courts also have jurisdiction to hear claims regarding the exploitation 
of a secondary establishment of a legal person which has neither its domicile nor its 
residence in Belgium, if this establishment is located in Belgium when the claim is filed. 
 
This rule clearly responds to the policy objective to adapt private international law to 
evolution in the sense that nationality was abandoned as a basic connecting factor, in 
the sense that before the Code of Private International Law persons of Belgian 
nationality could be sued before the Belgian courts, regardless of where they were 
domiciled or habitually resident.364 This is a welcome change because of the arguments 
made in the introduction to this chapter.365 The rule goes further than Brussels I because 
habitual residence is sufficient as a connecting factor, where Brussels I requires 
domicile.366 It does not go as far as the English rule however, which focuses on the 
service of the claim form, and therefore attaches jurisdiction to mere presence of the 
364 Art. 15 B.W. (oud/old). 
365 See supra. 
366 Art. 2 §1 Brussels I. 
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defendant on English territory.367 One could therefore conclude that the Brussels I rule 
is a compromise between the rather broad common law approach and the more stringent 
civil law approach, which still applied in Belgium at the time the Regulation was made 
and came into force.  
 
3.1.1.2 Party Autonomy 
 
“Widening of international jurisdiction by choice” 
Art. 6. §1. When the parties, in a matter in which they can freely dispose of their rights 
under Belgian law, have lawfully agreed to confer jurisdiction on the Belgian courts or 
a Belgian court to hear existing or future disputes arising in connection with a legal 
relationship, the latter courts or court shall have exclusive jurisdiction. 
Except when otherwise provided for by this law, a Belgian court before which the 
defendant appears has jurisdiction to hear the claim filed against him, unless the main 
aim of the appearance is to dispute jurisdiction. 
§2. In the cases described in §1, the court may however decline its jurisdiction when it 
appears from the circumstances as a whole that the dispute has no meaningful 
connection with Belgium at all.  
“Exclusion of international jurisdiction by choice” 
Art. 7. When the parties, in a matter in which they can freely dispose of their rights 
under Belgian law, have lawfully agreed to confer jurisdiction on foreign courts or on 
a foreign court to hear existing or future disputes arising in connection with a legal 
relationship and when the case has been brought before a Belgian court, the latter must 
stay its proceedings, unless it is anticipated that the foreign decision will not be 
amenable to recognition and enforcement in Belgium or unless the Belgian courts have 
jurisdiction under article 11. The Belgian courts decline jurisdiction when the foreign 
decision can be recognised under this law.  
 
367 See chapter 3 on English law and policy. 
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Although not expressly mentioned in this chapter as a policy objective underlying 
Belgian private international law rules, party autonomy was already recognised in 
Belgium prior to the Code of Private International Law although no express provision 
to that effect existed. As explained in chapter 1, party autonomy has been recognised 
in most countries throughout the world368 and it is therefore logical that the Code of 
Private International Law recognises this principle in its main basic provisions. Hence 
the provisions not only fill a void which prior had to be filled by jurisprudence, it can 
also be viewed as a reinforcement of this principle. 
Although the Code distinguishes between a choice of a Belgian court and a choice of a 
foreign court, these choices are both the expression of the same autonomy. If party 
autonomy is recognised in favour of Belgian courts it is only logical and testament to 
international openness that a choice of jurisdiction in favour of a foreign court is equally 
recognised. The reason why they are treated in two separate provisions is of course 
because of the fact that exceptions are made to the recognition of a choice for a foreign 
court under certain circumstances. These seem reasonable and aimed at ensuring access 
to justice and legal certainty,369 although it must be further researched how they are 
applied.    
 
3.1.1.3 Related Actions 
 
The following rules envisage situations in which several claims and/or actions or 
measures relate to one case or situation. It is in the interest of legal certainty, access to 
justice and of course process economy to treat these before the same judge. Each article 
contains rules for different types of situations and will therefore be commented on 
separately. 
“Claim on a warranty or intervention claim and counterclaim” 
Art. 8. A Belgian court which has jurisdiction to hear a claim also has jurisdiction to 
hear: 
368 See Chapter 1 on EU law. 
369 Which are also two main aims of EU private international law: see chapter 1 on EU law. 
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1º a claim on a warranty or an intervention claim, unless it is filed solely to remove the 
defendant from the jurisdiction of the court which would normally have jurisdiction; 
2º a counterclaim arising from the fact or act on which the original claim is based. 
 
This provision does not need much explanation as it seems very logical. Comparison to 
English law could be difficult here however, as the Belgian provision contains terms 
which could not be correctly translated into English because English law does not know 
these concepts. This could raise concerns regarding the policy objective of international 
openness, under which the legislator wanted to avoid terminology typical of Belgian 
law.370  
 
“International coherence” 
Art. 9. When the Belgian courts have jurisdiction to hear a claim, they also have 
jurisdiction to hear a claim which is so closely connected with it that it is expedient to 
hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments if the 
claims were determined separately. 
 
This provision seems similar to article 28 Brussels I but it goes further than the latter. 
This article treats the risk of irreconcilable judgments as a ground for jurisdiction where 
article 28 treats this risk as a possible ground for an exception to jurisdiction. It must be 
further researched how this notion of “irreconcilable judgments” is interpreted and 
applied because it seems difficult to predict what the result of a separate determination 
of claims would be. Furthermore it will be researched in how far this rule envisages the 
same situations as its English equivalent,371 which uses the words “additional claim” 
and “necessary or proper party” to it, notions also open to different interpretations and 
applications.372   
370 Cf. supra. 
371 PD 3.1 (4). 
372 See chapter 3 on English law. 
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 “Provisional, protective and executory measures” 
Art. 10. In urgent cases the Belgian courts have jurisdiction to grant provisional, 
protective and executory measures regarding persons present or property located on 
Belgian territory at the time the claim was filed, even if the Belgian courts do not have 
jurisdiction to hear the substance of the case. 
 
This provision is completely in line with article 31 Brussels I. Furthermore English law 
also contains a similar rule although it has been explained that this possibility for the 
English courts to grant interim remedies was only fairly recently developed for cases in 
which litigation took place abroad.373 
 
3.1.1.4 Necessity / access to justice 
 
“Exceptional attribution of international jurisdiction” 
Art. 11. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this law, the Belgian courts will 
exceptionally have jurisdiction when the case has close connections with Belgium and 
proceedings abroad seem impossible or when it would be unreasonable to demand that 
the claim be filed abroad.  
 
This provision has historical roots in the sense that nationality used to be the main 
connecting factor for jurisdiction so that a Belgian citizen could always turn to a 
Belgian court (although the provision on which that right was based has not been in 
force since 1948). Similarly, although based on presence on the territory rather than 
nationality, English law has historically given its courts jurisdiction because it was said 
that the defendant deserved the protection of the Crown when on the Crown’s 
territory.374  
373 See chapter 3 on English law.  
374 See chapter 3 on English law. 
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Article 11 is now said to be based on article 6 §1 ECHR, which has, although 
controversially, been implied to contain a right of access to court.375 This rule could of 
course very well be based on a genuine concern of the legislator to provide people with 
a forum but it has to be said that, if applied too easily and interpreted too broadly, it 
could also lead Belgian courts to assume jurisdiction all too quickly. 
 
3.1.1.5 Lis Pendens 
 
“International lis pendens” 
Art. 14. When a claim has been brought before a foreign court and it is anticipated that 
the foreign decision will be amenable to recognition and enforcement in Belgium, the 
Belgian court before which, at a later time, a claim is brought between the same parties 
with the same object and cause of action, may stay its proceedings until the foreign 
decision has been rendered. The court takes into consideration the requirements of due 
process. It declines jurisdiction when the foreign decision can be recognised under this 
law. 
 
This provision is a novelty compared to the old Belgian private international law since 
the courts would in general refuse to stay proceedings when another court had already 
been seized. It seems that the legislator has been inspired by EU law in this respect, 
although it must also be said that the provision is formulated in such a way that 
proceedings will not necessarily be stayed. 
 
 
3.1.2 Specific rules on jurisdiction: Contracts 
 
“CHAPTER IX. OBLIGATIONS 
375 Airey v Ireland [1979] No. 6289/73, 2 E.H.R.R. 305. 
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Section 1. International jurisdiction 
“International jurisdiction regarding contractual and non-contractual obligations” 
Art. 96. In addition to the cases provided for in the general provision of this law, the 
Belgian courts have jurisdiction to hear claims in respect of obligations regarding: 
1º a contractual obligation, 
a) if it came into existence in Belgium; or 
b) if it is or has to be executed in Belgium […]”  
 
This rule is quite similar to the English rule in the sense that English law recognises as 
a connecting factor the place where the contract was made376 as well as the place where 
the breach occurred.377 Belgian law refers to the place of execution rather than the place 
of breach, which seems to have been inspired to some extent by the Brussels I 
Regulation, which attaches jurisdiction to the place of performance of the contract.378 
 
“International jurisdiction regarding consumer and individual employment contracts” 
Art. 97. §1. In addition to the cases provided for in article 96, the Belgian courts have 
jurisdiction to hear claims regarding an obligation referred to in article 96, filed by a 
natural person who acted with a purpose outside his professional activity, namely the 
consumer, against a party who supplied or should have supplied a good or service 
within the framework of his professional activities, if: 
1º the consumer completed the actions necessary to conclude the contract in Belgium 
and had his habitual residence in Belgium at that time; or 
2º the good or service was supplied or should have been supplied to a consumer who, 
at the time of the order, had his habitual residence in Belgium, if the order was preceded 
by an offer or by publicity in Belgium. 
376 PD 3.1 (6) (a). 
377 PD 3.1 (7). 
378 Art. 5 (1). 
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§2. Regarding individual labour relationships the contractual obligation is performed 
in Belgium within the meaning of article 96 if the employee habitually carries out his 
work in Belgium at the time of the dispute. 
§3. An agreement to attribute international jurisdiction only has effect with regard to 
the employee or consumer if entered into after the dispute has arisen.  
 
This provision is clearly inspired by the aim of the legislator to protect weaker parties 
to a contract. It is comparable to the provisions regarding consumers and employees in 
the Brussels I Regulation, one of the main aims of which is to ensure protection of such 
weaker parties. Such protection is provided for in this rule by giving weaker parties an 
additional forum which in many cases is far more convenient and thus lowers the barrier 
for them to go to court. 
 
 
3.2 Applicable law 
 
For the sake of clarity the Belgian rules on applicable law will be discussed somewhat 
differently than those on jurisdiction. The first chapter of the Code contains a set of 
general rules, a few of which do not contain rules determining the applicable law but 
rather procedural issues related to applicable law. These will be discussed first. Other 
rules in this first chapter are exceptions to the specific rules in the other chapter of the 
Code and they will therefore be discussed after these specific rules have been discussed. 
 
3.2.1 General rules on applicable law: preliminary issues 
 
3.2.1.1 Role of the court 
 
“Application of foreign law” 
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Art. 15. §1. The content of the law designate by this law is established by the court. 
Foreign law is applied in accordance with the interpretation given to it in the foreign 
country. 
§2. When the court cannot establish this content, it can require the parties to assist. 
When it is clearly impossible to establish the content of the foreign law in a timely 
fashion, Belgian law is applied. 
 
This rule seems to be quite different from the English rule in the sense that in England 
the parties are required to prove the content of the foreign law as a matter of fact. The 
argument can be made that this is indeed far more efficient than leaving everything up 
to the judge, especially because Belgian courts are coping with so many arrears in work 
as it is. It must be said however that the second paragraph provides a sensible solution 
to this problem. Practitioners know that some courts are very well aware of for example 
Moroccan family law because they apply it on an everyday basis in areas with a large 
concentration of Moroccan immigrants. In these cases the court will not need assistance 
from the parties, nor will it be necessary to resort to the application of Belgian law. In 
other scenarios however, the parties can assist in order to ensure the progress of the 
proceedings in a timely fashion.  
It must however be noted that the last possibility, the application of Belgian law, could 
lead to unwanted consequences if applied too easily.  
 
 
 
 
3.2.1.2 Renvoi 
 
“Renvoi” 
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Art. 16. Within the meaning of this law and notwithstanding special provisions, the 
meaning of the law of a State is the legal rules of that State with the exclusion of its 
rules of private international law. 
 
3.2.1.3 States with several legal systems 
 
“States with more than one legal system” 
Art. 17. §1. When this law refers to the law of a State with two or more legal systems, 
each system is considered the law of a State for the purpose of determining the 
applicable law. 
§2. A reference to the law of the State of which a natural person has the nationality 
refers, within the meaning of §1, to the legal system which is designated by the rules in 
force in that State or, in the absence of such rules, to the legal system with which the 
natural person has the closest connections. 
A reference to the law of a State with two or more legal systems, which are applicable 
to different categories of persons, relates, within the meaning of §1, to the legal system 
which is designated by the rules in force of that State or, in the absence of such rules, 
to the legal system which it has the closest connections with the legal relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Specific rules on applicable law: Contracts 
 
“CHAPTER IX. OBLIGATIONS 
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Section 2. Applicable law 
“The law applicable to contractual obligations” 
Art. 98. §1. The law applicable to contractual obligations is determined by the 
Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations concluded in Rome on 19 
June 1980. 
Except in the cases otherwise provided for by law, contractual obligations excluded 
from the scope of application of that convention, are governed by the law which is 
applicable by virtue of the articles 3 to 14 thereof. […]” 
 
This provision is a perfect example of a rule implementing the policy objective of 
international openness. Not only does it expressly state that the Rome Convention will 
be applied by the Belgian courts, it also provides that it will apply to contractual 
obligations which fall outside its scope. This of course enhances legal certainty and 
predictability because the same rules will apply to all contractual obligations. On the 
other hand it must be noted that the entry into force of the Rome I Regulation has given 
rise to the existence of two legal instruments beside each other, namely Rome I on the 
one hand and the Rome Convention on the other hand for those contractual obligations 
falling outside the scope of the Regulation. Although the consequences of this are not 
dramatic, it would be good to change the provision in order to avoid this as that was the 
legislator’s intention from the outset. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.3 General rules: exceptions 
   
3.2.3.1 Evasion of the law 
89 
 
 “Evasion of the law” 
Art. 18. For the determination of the applicable law in a matter in which the parties 
cannot freely dispose of their rights, facts and acts committed with the sole purpose of 
evading the application of the law designated by this law are not taken into account. 
 
3.2.3.2 Weak connection 
 
“Exception clause” 
Art. 19. §1. By way of exception, the law designated by this law does not apply if it 
manifestly appears from the circumstances as a whole that the matter had only a very 
weak connection with the State of which the law was designated, but is very closely 
connected with another State. In that case the law of this other State is applied. 
When applying §1 special consideration is given to: 
- the need of predictability of the applicable law, and 
- the circumstance that the relevant legal relationship was validly established 
according to the rules of private international law of the States with which it 
was connected at the time of its creation. 
 
§2. Paragraph 1 does not apply in case of a choice of law by the parties in accordance 
with the provisions of this law, or in case the designation of the applicable law is based 
on its content. 
 
 
 
3.2.3.3 Mandatory rules 
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“Mandatory rules” 
Art. 20. The provisions of this law do not prejudice the application of the Belgian 
mandatory or public policy provisions which, by virtue of the law or because of their 
apparent purpose, are aimed to govern an international situation irrespective of the 
law designated by the conflict rules. 
When applying the law of a State, by virtue of this law, effect may be given to the 
mandatory or public policy provisions of the law of another State with which the 
situation has a close connection, if and in so far as, according to the law of that other 
State, those provisions apply irrespective of the law designated by the conflict rules. In 
determining whether those provisions should be applied, regard shall be given to their 
nature and purpose as well as the consequences of their application or non-application. 
 
3.2.3.4 Public policy 
 
“Public policy exception” 
Art. 21. The application of a provision of the foreign law designated by this law is 
refused in so far it would lead to a result which is manifestly incompatible with public 
policy.  
In assessing this incompatibility special consideration is given to the degree in which 
the situation is connected with the Belgian legal order and to the significance of the 
consequences which would result from the application of the foreign law. 
If a provision of foreign law is not applied because of this incompatibility, a different 
relevant provision of that law or, if required, of Belgian law applies. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
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It is clear that Belgian private international law is very rule-based. This entails that there 
is limited discretion for the courts in applying the rules. In that respect, EU law seems 
more inspired by civil law systems than by English common law. It must be noted, 
however, that the Belgian rules explicitly provide for a certain amount of discretion in 
certain circumstances. This will also become clear later on in this thesis, when different 
options are examined. 
Generally speaking Belgian law has been heavily influenced by EU law in the area of 
private international law. Not merely because Belgian law is largely replaced by the 
Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation, but also because the Code of Private 
International law in places specifically provides that a certain situation will be resolved 
in accordance with the EU rules. In other words, even where EU rules do not apply, 
Belgian law provides that they must apply.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 5. Access to Justice 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is said by the EU that its citizens have a right to expect it to simplify and facilitate 
the judicial environment in which they live. 379  The overriding aim sought to be 
achieved by the transfer of competences in the area of private international law by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 from the Member States to the EU was to create a European 
judicial area in civil matters, where citizens have a common sense of justice throughout 
the European Union and where justice facilitates their day-to-day life.380 Thus the 
notion of European citizenship, first introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht 1992,381 is 
strongly emphasised in the area of private international law because, in order to 
facilitate the everyday life of EU citizens, this area of law was considered particularly 
important, as can be seen from the vast amount of initiatives in the area of private 
international law since the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997. 
Since access to justice relates to jurisdiction rather than applicable law, the issues 
discussed in this chapter are all related to jurisdiction and Brussels I. 
 
2. Scope of Application of Brussels I: External Defendants 
 
The Brussels I Regulation covers jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters. 
Particularly relevant for the purposes of this thesis in the context of the scope of 
application of Brussels I is article 4. 
It provides that, if a defendant is domiciled outside the EU, Brussels I does not apply, 
which means that domestic private international law rules will determine jurisdiction. 
The text of Article 4 is as follows: 
379 Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on How Best to Implement the Provisions of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam on an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, O.J. C19, 23.01.1999, 4. 
380 Explanatory Memorandum Proposal for a Council Regulation Establishing a General Framework for 
Community Activities to Facilitate the Implementation of a European Judicial Area in Civil Matters, 
COM (2001), 221 final, 15.05.2001, 1.2.; See chapter 1. 
381 Article 20. 
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“1. If the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of 
each Member State shall, subject to articles 22 and 23, be determined by the law of that 
Member State. 
2. As against such a defendant, any person domiciled in a Member State may, whatever 
his nationality, avail himself in that State of the rules of jurisdiction there in force, and 
in particular those specified in Annex I, in the same way as the nationals of that State.” 
 
Although the notion of European citizenship was strongly introduced in the area of 
private international law, Article 4 seems to fail to deliver in terms of access to justice 
for EU citizens. An EU citizen wanting to sue a third country defendant in the EU 
cannot do this based on EU law. On the contrary, EU law provides that he has to rely 
on his domestic private international law rules in order to find a ground for jurisdiction. 
This seems unsatisfactory in terms of EU policy objectives. It is therefore not surprising 
that this issue was raised by the Commission in its Green Paper on the revision of 
Brussels I.  
It was pointed out by the Commission that equal access to justice on the basis of clear 
and precise rules on international jurisdiction is crucial for defendants but also for 
plaintiffs domiciled in the EU because it is a requirement for the good functioning of 
the internal market. The jurisdictional needs of persons domiciled in the Union in their 
relations with third countries’ persons are similar to those required in their relations 
with persons domiciled in the EU from the perspective of a business or consumer. The 
Commission therefore proposed an extension of the personal scope of the rules to 
defendants domiciled in third countries, so that the Regulation would apply equally to 
them, and domestic rules would have no role.382  
It seems that the primary concern in contemplating such an extension of the personal 
scope of Brussels I was a concern of international courtesy. The Commission 
emphasised that “a balance should be found between ensuring access to justice on the 
382  Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM(2009) 175 final, 3. 
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one hand and international courtesy on the other hand”. 383  Similarly, the Belgian 
government noted that in all discussions regarding this issue the notion of international 
courtesy should be borne in mind.384 
The UK government went even further in its response and did not support extending 
the scope of the grounds of jurisdiction because they did not see problems significant 
enough in scale and frequency to justify such a measure. They did highlight an 
interesting problem in relation to the current state of affairs regarding third country 
defendants though. It was said that, for want of uniform jurisdiction rules in such cases, 
such defendants could be sued in any Member State, possibly on an exorbitant basis of 
jurisdiction if national law made such provisions. Judgments resulting from such 
proceedings would then however, be amenable to free recognition and enforcement 
throughout the Union.385 
In its Impact Assessment the Commission explained that national rules on jurisdiction 
for third country defendants vary widely between Member States. This divergence led 
to a situation in which EU citizens had unequal access to justice in cases where the 
defendant was domiciled outside the EU.386 Furthermore some issues in relation to 
protection of weaker parties were identified. These will be discussed in the chapter on 
weaker party protection.387 
However, the Commission’s proposal was not adopted. The Brussels I Recast now 
contains a provision dealing with such situations in which the defendant is domiciled 
in a third country which is similar to Article 4 of the Brussels Regulation.  Article 6 of 
the Recast provides: 
383  Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM(2009) 175 final, 3. 
384 Response of Belgium to the Commission’s Green Paper, p. 4. 
385 Response of UK to the Commission’s Green Paper, p. 2. 
386 Commission Staff Working Paper. Impact Assessment. Accompanying Document to the Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), SEC (2010) 1548 final, 
14.12.2010, at 2.2.1.1. Available via: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=52010
SC1547. 
387 See chapter 8. 
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“1. If the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of 
each Member State shall, subject to Article 18(1), Article 21(2) and Articles 24 and 25, 
be determined by the law of that Member State.” 
The Articles referred to in Article 6 are those relating to consumer and employment 
contracts, on the one hand, and exclusive jurisdiction and jurisdiction agreements on 
the other hand. The question must be asked if it is enough, where the D is a non EU 
domiciliary, to subject only those contracts to the Brussels I Regulation. In terms of 
access to justice this question must be answered in the negative. Only some parties will 
be allowed to “sue at home”388 based on the Regulation, while all other parties will still 
have to rely on the Member State laws on jurisdiction. 
Although, as mentioned, the notion of international courtesy is an important one, equal 
access to justice for all parties can only be achieved if the Regulation contained a rule 
extending its personal scope to all external defendants. It is suggested that further 
research should be done to assess the feasibility of such option.  
 
3. Lis Alibi Pendens 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This Latin term, which literally means “pending action elsewhere”, relates to the 
problem of the same or similar claims being brought before more than one court. It is 
often referred to shortly as lis pendens, which literally means “pending action”. It is 
this term which will be used in this thesis.  
This part of the thesis focuses on the provision relating to similar actions (lis pendens), 
which involve the same cause of action and between the same parties, 389  as 
distinguished from related actions but which are so closely connected that it is expedient 
388 Commission Staff Working Paper. Impact Assessment. Accompanying Document to the Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), SEC (2010) 1548 final, 
14.12.2010, at 2.2.3. Available via: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=52010
SC1547. 
389 Art. 29 (1) Brussels I. 
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to hear and determine them together.390 The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, it is 
submitted that it is the former rather than the latter that has proven particularly 
problematic in terms of achieving policy objectives underlying EU private international 
law. Secondly, the provision regulating such situations where the parties bring the same 
case, or very similar cases, before different courts has been revised in the context of the 
Brussels I recast whereas the provisions for closely connected cases has not. The 
amended provision in the recast Brussels I is therefore discussed and critically 
evaluated in this thesis. 
The relevant provision in the original Brussels I Regulation is, however, discussed and 
evaluated first because the instrument currently in force is still the original Brussels I 
Regulation,391 as the recast Regulation only applies to legal proceedings instituted on 
or after 10 January 2015.392 Moreover, it is impossible to assess the current provision 
without researching its predecessor and the reasons for its amendment as well as the 
extent to which it was amended and whether the changes made are a substantial 
improvement, a status quo or a deterioration. 
 
 
3.2 The relevant provision and its underlying objectives 
 
 
Article 27 of the original Brussels I reads: 
“1. Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same 
parties are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the 
court first seized shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the 
jurisdiction of the court first seized is established. 
2. Where the jurisdiction of the court first seized is established, any court other than 
the court first seized shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.” 
390 Art. 30 (3) Brussels I. 
391 Art. 66 (1) Brussels I. 
392 Art. 66 (2) Brussels I. 
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This rule was inspired by the aim to minimise the possibility of concurrent proceedings 
in different courts and to ensure that irreconcilable, or “mutually unenforceable”,393 
judgments, which could of course be the result of such proceedings, would not be given 
in courts of different Member States. This can be seen in Recital 15 to the Brussels I 
Regulation which formulates the aim underlying article 27 as follows: 
“In the interests of the harmonious administration of justice it is necessary to minimise 
the possibility of concurrent proceedings and to ensure that irreconcilable judgments 
will not be given in two Member States. There must be a clear and effective mechanism 
for resolving cases of lis pendens and related actions and for obviating problems 
flowing from national differences as to the determination of the time when a case is 
regarded as being pending. For the purposes of this Regulation that time should be 
defined autonomously.” 
It must also be mentioned that the preferred solution in Article 27, where the court 
second seized must stay its proceedings, was inspired by a will to ensure the parties 
would not have to institute new proceedings if the court first seized were to decline 
jurisdiction. As such “unnecessary disclaimers” were avoided.394 This would not have 
been the case had the drafters of the Convention, and later the Regulation, opted for a 
rule whereby the court second seized would have to decline jurisdiction, rather than 
staying its proceedings. Under such a solution it would have been easy for a party to 
delay proceedings as a simple claim that the second court has no jurisdiction would lead 
to that court declining jurisdiction, meaning the claim would have to be reinstituted at 
another court if the court first seized subsequently declined its jurisdiction.     
It seems that Article 27 has proven effective in avoiding parallel proceedings since the 
ECJ has interpreted and applied it very strictly so that virtually no exceptions can be 
made. 395  Case law has revealed however, that problems relating to several policy 
objectives, including access to justice, can arise. 
393 Term used by: Harris, J., 2000. Contractual Freedom in the Conflict of Laws. Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, vol. 20, 2, 247, at p. 249. 
394 Council Report by Mr. P. Jenard on the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, OJ C59, 05.03.1979, 1, at p. 42. 
395 E.g. Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693; Case C-159/02, Gregory 
Paul Turner v Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit and others [2004], ECR I-03565. 
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A discussion and critical analysis of the relevant case law will illustrate the application 
of Article 27 as well as the problems encountered in the context of Article 27 and the 
policy objectives underlying EU private international law rules. It must be noted that 
this case law involved issues regarding lis pendens under the Brussels Convention, and 
its Article 21 in particular, as there is no case law available on lis pendens under the 
Regulation. The decisions on the Convention however, are equally relevant to the 
Regulation as the lis pendens rule was maintained unchanged in this instrument. Article 
29 of Brussels I recast will then be discussed, as compared to Article 27 of Brussels I. 
An evaluation of the recast provision will conclude this section. 
 
3.3 The Overseas Union case396 
In Overseas Union the European Court of Justice was asked for a preliminary ruling on 
the interpretation of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention397 in a case regarding a 
dispute on an insurance contract. New Hampshire Insurance Company (“New 
Hampshire”) was a company incorporated in New Hampshire, USA, and registered in 
England as an overseas company and in France as a foreign company. It issued an 
insurance policy covering the costs relating to a warranty provided by a company 
incorporated in France with its registered office in Paris. Later on New Hampshire 
reinsured a proportion of its risk under that policy inter alia with Overseas Union 
Insurance Limited (“OUI”), a company incorporated in Singapore and registered in 
England as an overseas company, and with Deutsche Ruck UK Reinsurance Limited 
(“Deutsche Ruck”) and Pine Top Insurance Company Limited (“Pine Top”), both 
incorporated in England with their registered offices in London. 
OUI, Deutsche Ruck and Pine Top ceased all payment of claims and purported to avoid 
their respective insurance commitments, following which New Hampshire issued 
proceedings against OUI, Deutsche Ruck and Pine Top in Paris, claiming monies due 
under the reinsurance policies. Deutsche Ruck and Pine Top challenged the jurisdiction 
of the French court and OUI made it clear they intended to do likewise. 
396 Case C-351/89, Overseas Union Ins. V New Hampshire Ins. Co. [1991], ECR I-3317. 
397 Now Art. 27 Brussels I; Article 29 of the Recast. 
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OUI, Deutsche Ruck and Pine Top then brought an action against New Hampshire in 
London, seeking a declaration that they had lawfully avoided their obligations under 
the reinsurance policies. The English court stayed its proceedings pursuant to Article 
21 of the Brussels Convention until the French court gave a decision on the question of 
its jurisdiction. This order granting a stay of proceedings was appealed by OUI, 
Deutsche Ruck and Pine Top. 
The Court of Appeal submitted several questions to the European Court of Justice for 
a preliminary ruling, the relevant ones for the purposes of this discussion being the 
second and third questions, which were as follows: 
“(2) Under Article 21, paragraph 2, of the Convention, where the jurisdiction of the 
court first seized is contested, is the court second seized obliged in all circumstances to 
stay its proceedings as an alternative to declining jurisdiction?” 
“(3) (a) If the court second seized is not so obliged, is it (i) required or (ii) permitted 
for the purpose of deciding whether to stay its proceedings to examine whether the 
court first seized has jurisdiction? 
(b) If so, under what circumstances and to what extent may the second-seized court 
examine the jurisdiction of the first-seized court?”398 
As eloquently summarised by the Court of Justice, the Court of Appeal therefore sought 
to find out whether Article 21399 meant that, if the court second seized did not decline 
jurisdiction, it’s power was limited to staying its proceedings or whether it was also 
either required or permitted to examine the jurisdiction of the court first seized and, if 
so, to what extent.400  
The Court of Justice first noted that its ruling did not have to cover cases in which the 
court second seized has jurisdiction because this was not the situation in the case at 
hand.401 It held that in cases where it is not claimed that the court second seized has 
exclusive jurisdiction, the only exception to that court’s obligation to decline 
398 Case C-351/89, Overseas Union Ins. V New Hampshire Ins. Co. [1991], ECR I-3317, at para. 8. 
399 Later Art. 27 Brussels I. 
400 Case C-351/89, Overseas Union Ins. V New Hampshire Ins. Co. [1991], ECR I-3317, at para 19. 
401 Case C-351/89, Overseas Union Ins. V New Hampshire Ins. Co. [1991], ECR I-3317, at para 20. 
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jurisdiction, as imposed by Article 21,402 was its obligation to stay proceedings.403 The 
Court emphasises that the court second seized is in no case in a better position than the 
court first seized to determine whether the court first seized has jurisdiction. Either that 
first court has to determine its jurisdiction by virtue of the rules of the Convention – 
now the Regulation - which it applies with authority equal to the court second seized, 
or it has to determine its jurisdiction by virtue of its national law, which is undeniably 
knows better than the court second seized.404 The Court of Justice concluded that: 
“without prejudice to the case where the court second seized has exclusive jurisdiction 
under the Convention [...] Article 21 must be interpreted as meaning that, where the 
jurisdiction of the court first seized is contested, the court second seized may, if it does 
not decline jurisdiction, only stay the proceedings and may not itself examine the 
jurisdiction of the court first seized”.405 
As to cases where it is claimed that the court second seized has exclusive jurisdiction, 
by saying that its ruling was “without prejudice to the case where the court second 
seized has exclusive jurisdiction [...]”, which was not so in the case before it, the ECJ 
created the impression by some that the court second seized did not have to stay 
proceedings when it had exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to a jurisdiction agreement406 
or by virtue of subject-matter.407  It seems that this was indeed what the English courts 
read in Overseas Union, as it was subsequently decided in Continental Bank NA v Aekos 
SA408 that the English court was not required to stay proceedings in favour of the first 
seized Greek court since there was a jurisdiction agreement conferring jurisdiction on 
the English courts. In particular, the English court was asked to grant an anti-suit 
injunction preventing the defendants from continuing the proceedings in Greece, which 
were allegedly in breach of the jurisdiction agreement. 
The English court emphasised that it was important, in construing the Brussels 
Convention, to put aside pre-conceptions based on traditional English rules as the 
Convention was a new regime following the civilian rather than the common law 
402 Later Art. 27 Brussels I. 
403 Case C-351/89, Overseas Union Ins. V New Hampshire Ins. Co. [1991], ECR I-3317, at para 21. 
404 Case C-351/89, Overseas Union Ins. V New Hampshire Ins. Co. [1991], ECR I-3317, at para 23. 
405 Case C-351/89, Overseas Union Ins. V New Hampshire Ins. Co. [1991], ECR I-3317, at para 26. 
406 E.g. Nurmela, I., 2005. Sanctity of Dispute Resolution Clauses: Strategic Coherence of the Brussels 
System. Journal of Private International Law [online], 1(1), 115. Available via: HeinOnline. 
407 Stone, P., 2010. EU Private International Law. 2nd ed. Cheltenham: Elgar European Law. p. 198.  
408 Continental Bank SA v Aekos Compania Naviera SA [1994] 1 WLR 588. 
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approach. In particular the court referred to the fact that English courts traditionally 
exercise a discretion when asked to grant an anti-suit injunction, while such discretion 
did not generally exist in civilian legal systems.  
The court continued that, when Article 17 of the Convention applied, the jurisdiction 
agreement conferred jurisdiction on the state chosen by the parties, depriving any other 
courts of contracting states seized of the case of jurisdiction, regardless of which court 
was first seized. These other courts must of their own motion consider whether Article 
17 applied, and decline jurisdiction if it did. The court concluded there was no 
discretionary power in the Convention itself to override the conclusive effect of an 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement which conformed with the requirements of Article 17, 
meaning that Article 17 took precedence over Articles 21 and 22. Based on this 
reasoning the court assessed that it did not have to stay proceedings until the Greek 
court had ruled on its jurisdiction.409 Furthermore, on the facts, the grant of an anti-suit 
injunction was deemed the only effective remedy for the defendants’ breach of contract, 
that breach having taken the form of them  suing in Greece while they in fact had to sue 
in England pursuant to the jurisdiction agreement.410 
However, through the much criticised decision in Gasser v MISAT411 it became clear 
that the interpretation of Overseas Union by the English Court of Appeal was incorrect. 
 
3.4 The Gasser  case 
 
Erich Gasser GmbH (“Gasser”), a company incorporated under Austrian law, sold 
children’s clothing to MISAT Sri (“MISAT”), a company incorporated under Italian 
law. All invoices contained a jurisdiction clause in favour of the Austrian courts. After 
a breakdown in business relationships between the two companies MISAT brought 
proceedings against Gasser in Italy. Gasser, on the other hand, brought an action against 
MISAT in Austria, honouring the jurisdiction agreement. The Austrian court, as the 
court second seized, stayed its proceedings pursuant to Article 21 of the Brussels 
409 Continental Bank SA v Aekos Compania Naviera SA [1994] 1 WLR 588, at 596. 
410 Continental Bank SA v Aekos Compania Naviera SA [1994] 1 WLR 588, at 598. 
411 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693. 
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Convention, a decision appealed by Gasser. The higher court then asked the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling. 
The questions particularly relevant in the context of lis pendens and the application of 
the relevant provisions of the Convention were as follows: 
“2. May a court other than the court first seized, within the meaning of the first 
paragraph of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgment in Civil and Commercial Matters [“the Brussels 
Convention”], review the jurisdiction of the court first seized if the second court has 
exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to an agreement conferring jurisdiction under Article 
17 of the Brussels Convention, or must the agreed second court proceed in accordance 
with Article 21 of the Brussels Convention notwithstanding the agreement conferring 
jurisdiction? 
3. Can the fact that court proceedings in a Contracting State take an unjustifiably long 
time (for reasons largely unconnected with the conduct of the parties), so that material 
detriment may be caused to one party, have the consequence that the court other than 
the court first seized, within the meaning of Article 21, is not allowed to proceed in 
accordance with that provision?” 
 
Gasser and the UK government were of the opinion that the second question must be 
answered with a ‘yes’, based on the decision in Overseas Union which, as mentioned 
above, specifically said the obligation of the court second seized to stay its proceedings 
was “without prejudice to the case where the court second seized has exclusive 
jurisdiction under the Convention and in particular under Article 16 thereof” 412 . 
Referring to the needs of international trade and legal certainty in commercial 
relationships,413 the UK Government added that the court designated by a jurisdiction 
agreement is generally in a better position to rule on the effect of such agreement so 
that the normal lis pendens rule must not apply in such cases.414 
412 Case C-351/89, Overseas Union Ins. V New Hampshire Ins. Co. [1991], ECR I-3317, at para 26, cited 
in Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 29. 
413 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 31. 
414 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 32. 
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MISAT, the Italian Government and the Commission, on the other hand, were of the 
opinion that the rule in Article 21, requiring the court second seized to stay its 
proceedings until the court first seized has ruled on its jurisdiction, applied even if there 
was a jurisdiction agreement in favour of the court second seized. 415 
The Court of Justice agreed with the latter. It held that Article 21 did not draw a 
distinction between the various heads of jurisdiction provided for in the Brussels 
Convention.416 The fact that the Court, in Overseas Union, said that its decision was 
without prejudice to the case where the court second seized had exclusive jurisdiction 
following Article 16 merely meant that the Court of Justice declined to prejudge the 
interpretation of Article 21 in a hypothetical situation not before it.417 
The Court emphasised that Articles 21 and 22 were intended to prevent parallel 
proceedings in the interests of the proper administration of justice within the (then) 
Community. Therefore Article 21 must be interpreted broadly so as to cover, in 
principle, all situations of lis pendens before courts in Contracting States, irrespective 
of parties’ domicile.418 The fact that it was claimed in this case that the court second 
seized had jurisdiction under Article 17 of the Convention is not such as to call in 
question the application of the procedural rule contained in Article 21. This rule was 
based clearly and solely on the chronological order in which the courts involved were 
seized.419 
It was further held that it was conducive to legal certainty that, in cases of lis pendens, 
it should be determined clearly and precisely which of the two national courts was to 
establish whether it had jurisdiction under the rules of the Convention. It appeared from 
the clear wording of Article 21 that this was the court first seized.420 
Finally, in relation to the second preliminary question, the Court observed that the 
potential of delaying tactics by parties who wanted to delay a ruling on the substance 
415 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 34 and 35. 
416 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 43. 
417 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 45. 
418 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 41. 
419 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 47 juncto para. 46. 
420 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 51. 
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of the dispute should not be allowed to call in question the interpretation of a provision 
of the Convention as deduced from its wording and purpose.421 
In regards to the third question, Gasser and the UK Government referred to Article 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)422 which provides, inter alia, for 
the right to a fair trial in civil proceedings, and the UK pointed out, in particular, that a 
party fearing a judgment against them could run to a court where they expect that 
proceedings will go on for a very long time with the aim to delay a judgment against 
them. The automatic application of Article 21 under such circumstances would grant 
them a substantial and unfair advantage and may, in fact, dissuade the other party from 
enforcing his rights by legal proceedings.423 The UK Government suggested therefore 
that, under such circumstances, an exception to Article 21 should be recognised. Such 
exception should allow the court second seized to examine the jurisdiction of the court 
first seized.424 
MISAT, the Italian Government and the Commission, however, advocated the full 
applicability of Article 21, notwithstanding the excessive duration of court proceedings 
in one of the states concerned.425 MISAT based this point of view on considerations of 
legal certainty and the prevention of an increase in financial burden for the parties, 
while also referring to a potential contribution to paralysis of the legal system.426 The 
Commission equally referred to legal certainty but added that the Convention was based 
on mutual trust between, and the equivalence of, the courts of the Contracting States. It 
established a binding system of jurisdiction which all courts concerned were required 
to observe.427 It would therefore be incompatible with the philosophy and the objectives 
of the Brussels Convention for national courts to be under an obligation to respect rules 
on lis pendens only if they consider that the court first seized would give judgment 
within a reasonable period.428 Finally the Commission contended that the determination 
as to from which point proceedings become excessively long so as to seriously affect a 
421 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 53. 
422 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 59 and 61. 
423 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 62. 
424 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 63. 
425 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 65. 
426 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 66. 
427 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 67. 
428 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 68. 
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party’s interests, was an issue not to be settled in the context of the Brussels Convention 
but rather by the European Court of Human Rights.429 
The Court of Justice stated that it would be manifestly contrary to the letter and the 
spirit and to the aim of the Convention to interpret Article 21 of the Brussels Convention 
so that the application of that article should be set aside where the court first seized 
belongs to a Contracting State in whose courts there are, generally, excessive delays in 
dealing with cases.430 The reason for this was twofold according to the Court. Firstly, 
there was no provision in the Convention under which its articles ceased to apply 
because of the length of proceedings before the courts of the Contracting State 
concerned.431 Secondly, the Court referred to the trust of the Contracting States in each 
other’s legal systems and judicial institutions, based on which a compulsory system of 
jurisdiction was established. Thereby the Convention sought to ensure legal certainty 
by allowing individuals to foresee with sufficient certainty which court would have 
jurisdiction.432 
In summary the judgment of the Court of Justice in Gasser was therefore that even if 
there is a jurisdiction agreement, the court second seized must stay its proceedings until 
the court first seized has ruled on its jurisdiction. The fact that it takes an unjustifiably 
long time for the court first seized to rule on its jurisdiction, does not change that, nor 
the fact that parties could use the so called “torpedo tactic” discussed below.433  
 
3.5 The repercussions of the current rule as interpreted and applied by the Court 
of Justice  
 
As mentioned above,434 the decision in Gasser was subject to substantial and wide 
criticism. This criticism was voiced in academic literature435 and became apparent in 
429 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 69. 
430 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 70. 
431 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 71. 
432 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 72 
433 This term is explained further below in this section. 
434 See infra. 
435 E.g. Merrett, L., 2006. The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements within the Brussels Regime. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly [online], 55, 315. Available via: HeinOnline; Pertegás, 
M., 2005. De EEX-Verordening in de praktijk: enkele knelpunten, in Internationale aspecten van de 
verschillende taken van het recht, Permanente Vorming Orde van Advocaten, 157. Kortrijk:Larcier; 
Steinle, J. And Vasiliades, E., 2010. The Enforcement of Jurisdiction agreements under the Brussels I 
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several responses to the Commission’s Green Paper on the Brussels I Recast as well.436 
From the case law discussed it is clear that article 27 is applied very strictly, mainly 
because the Commission as well as the ECJ want a very clear rule with very limited 
exceptions to it in order to safeguard legal certainty.437 It was submitted that the lis 
pendens rule, as applied by the Court of Justice, could be misused, or abused, by parties 
to delay proceedings438 or the even try and prevent the court with jurisdiction to be 
seized.439 This is done by applying the “torpedo” tactic. 
This term was used by Italian lawyer Mario Franzosi.440 He focused on international 
patent litigation and referred to the well-known principle of sea warfare that an escorted 
convoy should travel at the speed of the slowest ship because, if the ships all travel at 
their own speed, there would be no convoy and no unity.441 He compared the EU 
nations and their judicial systems with these ships and concluded that the lis pendens 
rule resulted in all “ships” slowing down until the slowest “ship” had progressed.442 In 
particular he observed that a party could start an action for declaration of non-
infringement of a patent before a slow-moving Italian court and, until the Italian court 
had made a decision, all other EU courts had to decline jurisdiction as to actions alleging 
Regulation: Reconsidering the Principle of Party Autonomy. Journal of Private International Law 
[online], 6(3), 565. Available via: EBSCOHost; 
436 E.g. Response of the Bar Council of England and Wales to the Commission’s Green Paper on the 
Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters; 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0002/contributions/civil_society_ngo_academics_ot
hers/bar_council_of_england_and_wales_en.pdf; at 3.3 (b); Response of the Intellectual Property 
Lawyers’ Association to the Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 
44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0002/contributions/civil_society_ngo_academics_ot
hers/intellectual_property_lawyers_association_en.pdf,  p. 1-2. 
437 See the discussion of Gasser in particular. 
438 Mance, J., 2004. Exclusive Jurisdiction Agreements and European Ideals. Law Quarterly Review 
[online], 120, 357. Available via: Westlaw. 
439  Bříza, P., 2009. Choice-of –Court Agreements: Could the Hague Choice of Court Agreements 
Convention and the Reform of the Brussels I Regulation Be the Way Out of the Gasser-Owusu 
Disillusion? Journal of Private International Law [online], 5(3), 541. Available via: EBSCOHost.  
440 Franzosi, M., 1997. Worldwide Patent Litigation and the Italian Torpedo. European Intellectual 
Property Review [online], 19(7), 382. Available via: Westlaw.  
441 Franzosi, M., 1997. Worldwide Patent Litigation and the Italian Torpedo. European Intellectual 
Property Review [online], 19(7), 382. Available via: Westlaw. 
442 Franzosi, M., 1997. Worldwide Patent Litigation and the Italian Torpedo. European Intellectual 
Property Review [online], 19(7), 384. Available via: Westlaw. 
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infringement of the patent. As the Italian procedure could take an “outrageous length 
of time”, the enforcement of the intellectual property right would be paralysed.443 
The term “torpedo”, which is often linked to proceedings commenced in Italy or 
Belgium and therefore also called the “Italian torpedo” or “Belgian torpedo”, therefore 
refers to the situation where a party senses imminent litigation but want to delay 
proceedings. They do this by rushing to an, often incompetent, court, preferably in a 
“slow-moving”444 jurisdiction because then the court second seized has to stay its 
proceedings until the court first seized has ruled on its jurisdiction.445 This possibility 
to maliciously delay proceedings was pointed out by the UK Government in Gasser, as 
discussed above. Furthermore, it was one of the reasons the court in Continental Bank 
concluded the way it did by stating that applying the lis pendens rule so that the court 
chosen in the jurisdiction agreement must stay proceedings awaiting a decision of the 
court first seized, would mean that: 
“a party who is in breach of the contract will be able to set at naught an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement which is the product of the free will of the parties. The principle 
of the autonomy of the parties, enshrined in article 17, cannot countenance such a 
conclusion.”446 
Several responses to the Commission’s Green Paper on the Brussels I Recast pointed 
out that courts in the EU regularly encounter such abusive litigation tactics447 and a 
Commission Staff Working Paper discussed this risk, although it admitted that it was 
difficult to obtain reliable figures to quantify the risk of abuse of the existing rule.448 
443 Franzosi, M., 1997. Worldwide Patent Litigation and the Italian Torpedo. European Intellectual 
Property Review [online], 19(7), 384. Available via: Westlaw. 
444  Bříza, P., 2009. Choice-of –Court Agreements: Could the Hague Choice of Court Agreements 
Convention and the Reform of the Brussels I Regulation Be the Way Out of the Gasser-Owusu 
Disillusion? Journal of Private International Law [online], 5(3), 541. Available via: EBSCOHost. 
445 See e.g. House of Lords Report with Evidence on the Green Paper on the Brussels I Regulation; 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/148/148.pdf; p. 17-20. 
446 Continental Bank SA v Aekos Compania Naviera SA [1994] 1 WLR 588, at 597. 
447 Response of COMBAR (the Commercial Bar Association of the Bar of England and Wales) to 
Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0002/contributions/civil_society_ngo_academics_ot
hers/commercial_bar_association_en.pdf.  
448 Commission Staff Working Paper. Impact Assessment. Accompanying Document to the Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), SEC (2010) 1548 final, 
14.12.2010, at 2.3.1.3. Available via: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=52010
SC1547. 
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Referring to a study launched by the European Business Test Panel, the Commission 
observed that 7.7% of companies reported that in the five years prior their contractual 
counterpart took a dispute before a court not designated in their jurisdiction agreement. 
As 5.7% of companies reported that their jurisdiction agreement was held invalid, the 
Commission concluded that the percentage of these companies affected by abusive 
litigation tactics was between 2 and 7.7%.449  
This possibility to maliciously delay proceedings by a “pre-emptive strike” 450  is 
problematic in several respects, including legal certainty and predictability, party 
autonomy and access to justice. The focus in this chapter is on access to justice but the 
issue will be picked up in the chapters on legal certainty and predictability, on the one 
hand, and party autonomy, on the other hand, with particular reference to those policy 
objectives and referring back to the general discussion of the problem and its 
background in this chapter. 
As mentioned in chapter 1, one of the aspects of access to justice as one of the main 
policy objectives underlying EU private international law is that individuals and 
businesses must be able to approach courts and authorities in any Member State as 
easily as in their own. Furthermore they should not be prevented or discouraged from 
exercising their rights by the complexity of the legal and administrative systems in the 
Member States.451 Arguably the current lis pendens rule undermines this objective. It 
is true that the rule, as interpreted and applied by the Court of Justice, provides a clear 
solution for cases in which the same action is pending before the courts of more than 
one Member State but the advantage of certainty is outweighed by the considerable 
harm done by the rule in terms of hampering access to justice.  
The estimated 2% to 7.7% of companies affected by abusive litigation tactics, however, 
are, at least to an extent, denied access to justice as they will not have an opportunity to 
have their claim heard in the appropriate court until the court pre-emptively struck has 
ruled on its jurisdiction. One party, acting in bad faith, may deny the other party access 
449 Commission Staff Working Paper. Impact Assessment. Accompanying Document to the Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), SEC (2010) 1548 final, 
14.12.2010, at 2.3.1.3 juncto 1.4. Available via: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=52010
SC1547. 
450 Continental Bank SA v Aekos Compania Naviera SA [1994] 1 WLR 588, at 597. 
451 See chapter 1. 
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to justice in a timely fashion. This is all the more problematic if stalling tactics are 
worsened by selecting a court in a slow-moving jurisdiction. Furthermore these 
percentages refer only to those affected by abusive litigation tactics who had a 
jurisdiction agreement. They do not take into account those cases where there was no 
jurisdiction agreement but where parties employ similar abusive forum shopping tactics. 
Our attention will turn to each of these possible scenarios in term, starting with the 
situation where there is a jurisdiction agreement.  
3.6 Cases in which there is a jurisdiction agreement 
 
The Commission apparently realised that action against the torpedo claims explained 
above was needed and therefore sought to address this problem in cases where there 
was a choice of court agreement to “strengthen the effect” 452  of choice of court 
agreements. Having detected the problem, for example through research such as the 
survey referred to above,453 it proposed several solutions to remedy the problem. The 
solution which made it into the Brussels I Recast will be outlined first. After that it will 
be critically evaluated with reference to the alternative solutions which were suggested 
by the Commission in its Green Paper, with reference, where appropriate, to the 
relevant rules in English and Belgian law. 
Article 29 Brussels I Recast provides: 
“1. Without prejudice to Article 31(2), where proceedings involving the same cause of 
action and between the same parties are brought in the courts of different Member 
States, any court other than the court first seized shall of its own motion stay its 
proceedings until such a time as the jurisdiction of the court first seized is established.” 
Article 31 Brussels I Recast provides: 
“2. Without prejudice to Article 26, where a court of a Member State on which an 
agreement as referred to in Article 25 confers exclusive jurisdiction is seized, any court 
452  Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM (2009) 175 final, at 
p. 5. 
453 See supra. 
110 
 
                                                     
of another Member State shall stay the proceedings until such time as the court seized 
on the basis of the agreement declares that it has no jurisdiction under the agreement. 
3. Where the court designated in the agreement has established jurisdiction in 
accordance with the agreement, any court of another Member State shall decline 
jurisdiction in favour of that court. 
4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not apply to matters referred to in Sections 3, 4 or 5 where 
the policyholder, the insured, a beneficiary of the insurance contract, the injured party, 
the consumer or the employee is the claimant and the agreement is not valid under a 
provision contained within those Sections.”  
This rule reflects one of the solutions which was suggested by the Commission in its 
Green Paper. It, in effect, alters the priority in the lis pendens rule. Hence, the courts 
chosen by the agreement will have priority to determine its jurisdiction and the other 
court seized would stay its proceedings until the chosen court has ruled on its 
jurisdiction.  
In order to assess this new rule in terms of improving access to justice, as compared to 
the current rule, it must be compared, first, to the alternative solutions proposed by the 
Commission in its Green Paper.454 
One alternative was to release the court designated in a choice of court agreement from 
its obligation to stay proceedings where it was the court second seized. Such a solution 
would have been in line with relevant English and Belgian rules, according to which 
their courts are not required to stay their proceedings if there is a choice of the 
English455 or Belgian456 courts respectively, despite the fact that proceedings may be 
pending elsewhere already. The Commission rightly pointed out that this solution 
would mean that parallel proceedings leading to irreconcilable judgments were 
454  Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM(2009) 175 final, at 
p. 5-6. 
455 PD 3.1 (6) (d). 
456 Art. 14 juncto art. 25, §1, 7° and art. 6 §1 Code of PIL. 
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possible.457 Since the main idea behind the lis pendens rule was to avoid that,458 it is 
submitted that is was undesirable to amend it in such a way that this objective was 
undermined. Therefore this solution was not more desirable than the solution ultimately 
chosen.  
Another alternative proposed by the Commission was to maintain the lis pendens rule 
as it is, but with the organisation of direct communication and cooperation between the 
two courts seized. This communication and cooperation could be combined with a 
deadline for the court first seized to rule on its jurisdiction as well as an obligation to 
regularly report on the progress of proceedings to the court second seized. This solution 
seems complicated and rather impractical. It seems that such a system of regular 
communication and cooperation would increase the workload of courts and, as between 
the courts of most Member States, translations would be required. Since the torpedo 
tactic leads parties to seek courts in slow-moving jurisdictions, it seems undesirable to 
cause still further delays before these courts. Lastly this solution would also increase 
the cost of litigation because of the extra work, translation services and correspondence 
needed. 459  Because of the lack of sufficient support for this option, expressed by 
stakeholders following the consultation of the public on the Commission’s Green Paper, 
it was discarded.460 The author agrees with these criticisms, particularly because both 
increased delays and increased costs would further hamper access to justice, and 
therefore concludes that it was not the most desirable solution proposed.  
For the same reason, another proposed solution was discarded. This was to exclude the 
application of the lis pendens rule in situations where parallel proceedings consist of 
457 Commission Staff Working Paper. Impact Assessment. Accompanying Document to the Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), SEC (2010) 1548 final, 
14.12.2010, at 2.3.6.2. Available via: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=52010
SC1547. 
458 See supra. 
459 See also Comments from the United Kingdom on the Review of the Brussels I Regulation (EC) 
44/2001; 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0002/contributions/ms_governments/united_kingdo
m_en.pdfat 23. 
460 Commission Staff Working Paper. Impact Assessment. Accompanying Document to the Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), SEC (2010) 1548 final, 
14.12.2010, at 2.3.5. Available via: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=52010
SC1547. 
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one set of proceedings on the merits and another for declaratory relief. That would mean 
that the court second seized does not have to stay proceedings when the court first 
seized has been asked to provide a declaration as to the liability of the applicant. This 
solution did not seem desirable either because it would not effectively address the 
problem of torpedo tactics. After all, other than a declaration as to liability, a party 
wishing to employ such tactics could also bring an action seeking performance of the 
contract for example.461 
The Green Paper also proposed as a solution the introduction of a standard choice of 
court clause in order to remedy the uncertainty surrounding the validity of the 
agreement, which could also lead to a quicker decision regarding jurisdiction by the 
courts. In itself such a standard clause would of course not prevent the application of 
the torpedo tactic by parties and could therefore not be a sufficient solution to the 
problem of undermining access to justice. Moreover, even when combined with one of 
the other solutions, as suggested by the Commission, the question should be asked 
whether a standard clause is desirable in order to enhance party autonomy.462 It could 
also be asked whether such an initiative to unify certain clauses, and the detail of how 
to do this, should come from the trading industry itself rather than from the legislator. 
The answer should be yes when bearing in mind that it can be very expensive to change 
standard form contracts and that certain industries or sectors have certain needs and 
customs which they would like to respect.  
The Commission also proposed as a solution to enhance the efficiency of jurisdiction 
agreements by the granting of damages for breach of such agreements. At first glance 
this may seem a good idea. After all the party wanting to honour the jurisdiction 
agreement is, in reality, forced to defend himself before the court first seized, even 
though his defence may be limited to a defence of inadmissibility of the claim for lack 
of jurisdiction. Any such defence could lead to additional expenses for legal counsel, 
travel, translations etc. Furthermore the delay created by the party ignoring the 
jurisdiction agreement could also result in costs or other disadvantages for the other 
461 Commission Staff Working Paper. Impact Assessment. Accompanying Document to the Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), SEC (2010) 1548 final, 
14.12.2010, at 2.3.5. Available via: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=52010
SC1547. 
462 See chapter 8. 
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party, compensation for which may be appropriate. 463  It seems however that a 
substantive right to damages does not belong in a Regulation solely concerned with 
private international law. 464  Private international law is concerned with certain 
preliminary issues in a case, namely which court has jurisdiction and which law will be 
applied. It is not concerned with the trial of the case on the merits. A substantive right 
to damages for breach of jurisdiction agreements therefore belongs in the area of 
contract law or tort law rather than private international law. 465  Furthermore the 
granting of damages after the fact does not remedy the initial problem causing the 
damages.466  In addition, it could conflict with the principle of national procedural 
autonomy recognised by the ECJ in Rewe 158/80 This does not mean, however, that 
the national courts could not award damages for the breach of a choice of court 
agreement. It would not be based on the Brussels I Regulation, but remains a possibility 
under, for example, domestic English law, which does provide such a remedy at 
common  law.467 
To be complete, it must be noted that a status quo, whereby the unamended lis pendens 
rule would be maintained, was of course an option as well, although not mentioned in 
the Commission’s Green Paper. 468  As the author submitted above, the unamened 
provision, as interpreted and applied by the Court of Justice, is unsatisfactory in terms 
of the results it produces, undermining access to justice. Therefore this is definitely not 
considered a desirable option. 
463 Steinle, J. and Vasiliades, E., 2010. The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements under the Brussels 
I Regulation: Reconsidering the Principle of Party Autonomy. Journal of Private International Law, Vol. 
6, No. 3, p.  573 and 578-579. 
464 Comments from the UK; at 25. 
465 See also: Cuniberti, G., 2010. Mari and Pretelli on Choice-of-Courts Agreements, Lis Pendens and 
Torpedo Actions. Conflict of Laws .net [online]. Available via: http://conflictoflaws.net/2010/mari-and-
pretelli-on-choice-of-court-agreements-lis-pendens-and-torpedo-actions/; Merrett, L., 2006. The 
Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements within the Brussels Regime. International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly [online], 55(2), 332. Available via: Westlaw.  
466  Similarly: Response to the Green Paper of the Financial Markets Law Committee; 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0002/contributions/civil_society_ngo_academics_ot
hers/financial_markets_law_committee_en.pdf ; p. 4. 
467 E.g. National Westminster Bank v Rabobank Nederland [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 16. 
468 See however: Commission Staff Working Paper. Impact Assessment. Accompanying Document to 
the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), SEC (2010) 1548 
final, 14.12.2010, at 2.3.5. Available via: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=52010
SC1547. 
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The solution adopted in the recast must therefore be preferred as the best option. The 
Commission also points out a disadvantage however; if the choice of court agreement 
is invalid, this must be established before the chosen court first, i.e. before the 
competent court can be seized. This may lead to delays in judicial proceedings.469 This 
has led some to argue that the new provision may very well lead to more elaborate 
torpedo tactics, whereby a party can maliciously and incorrectly claim there is a choice 
of court agreement in favour of the court second seized, while the court first seized 
actually had jurisdiction and was thus rightly seized.470 Upon such a claim the decision 
in the court with jurisdiction will be delayed until the court allegedly designated by a 
choice of court agreement declines jurisdiction. 
Although this possibility is a drawback in terms of access to justice, the solution 
adopted in the recast must still be preferred. The solution must be preferred because the 
invalidity of jurisdiction clauses should be regarded as the exception to the rule so that 
giving way to the chosen court, whereby excluding the possibility of the traditional 
torpedo tactic, should prevail over the fear for the occasional invalid choice of court 
clause.471 
However, in those cases where a new type of torpedo action could be employed in bad 
faith, and the impediment to access to justice is still a risk, it is suggested that the rule 
is amended. Turner v Grovit472 made it clear that the English solution in the form of 
anti-suit injunctions was not an option under the Brussels regime. The ECJ stressed that 
the Convention, and now, therefore, the Regulation, is necessarily based on the trust 
which the Contracting States have in one another’s legal systems and judicial 
469 Commission Staff Working Paper. Impact Assessment. Accompanying Document to the Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), SEC (2010) 1548 final, 
14.12.2010, at 2.3.6.2. Available via: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=52010
SC1547. 
470 Cuniberti, G., 2010. Mari and Pretelli on Choice-of-Courts Agreements, Lis Pendens and Torpedo 
Actions. Conflict of Laws .net [online]. Available via: http://conflictoflaws.net/2010/mari-and-pretelli-
on-choice-of-court-agreements-lis-pendens-and-torpedo-actions/; Horn, F., 2011. The Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and the council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast). Note. European Parliament 
Directorate-General for Internal Policies. Policy Department. Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs. 
Available via: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2011/453202/IPOL-
JURI_NT(2011)453202_EN.pdf.   
471 STEINLE, J. and VASILIADES, E., 2010. The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements under the 
Brussels I Regulation: Reconsidering the Principle of Party Autonomy. Journal of Private International 
Law, Vol. 6, No. 3, p.  581-582. 
472 Case C-159/02, Gregory Paul Turner v Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit and others [2004], ECR I-03565. 
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institutions.473 It is therefore interpreted and applied by all European courts with the 
same authority.474 Therefore an anti-suit injunction, or, prohibition imposed by a court 
to restrain a party from commencing or continuing proceedings before a foreign court 
is incompatible with the Convention/Regulation because it interferes with and 
undermines the foreign court’s jurisdiction.475 It is submitted that the Belgian solution, 
whereby the court is granted a certain discretion as to whether or not to stay 
proceedings,476 is incompatible with the Regulation for the same reason.  
It is suggested, therefore that the relevant provisions should be amended to the extent 
that the competent court will determine whether damages can be awarded.477 As such, 
the Brussels I Regulation, a private international law instrument, does not itself provide 
for the grant of damages under certain circumstances but leaves it up to (the law of) the 
(valid) forum to decide on this issue. This suggestion will be further assessed below, 
after the issue of lis pendens has also been discussed in relation to the policy objectives 
of legal certainty and predictability and party autonomy. 
 
 
3.7 Cases in which there is no jurisdiction agreement 
 
As mentioned it must also be assessed whether change is needed in regards to cases 
where the parties have not made a choice of court agreement. In terms of access to 
justice, abusive litigation tactics such as the torpedo tactic, which has been the focus of 
this section, are equally problematic in cases where there is no jurisdiction agreement. 
In the recast of the Brussels I Regulation the EU has decided to change the lis pendens 
rule in relation to cases in which there is a jurisdiction agreement but not in relation to 
473 Case C-159/02, Gregory Paul Turner v Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit and others [2004], ECR I-03565, 
at para. 24. 
474 Case C-159/02, Gregory Paul Turner v Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit and others [2004], ECR I-03565, 
at para. 25. 
475 Case C-159/02, Gregory Paul Turner v Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit and others [2004], ECR I-03565, 
at para. 27. 
476 Art. 14 juncto art. 22 and 25 Code PIL.  
477  An issue briefly mentioned by: Cuniberti, G., 2010. Mari and Pretelli on Choice-of-Courts 
Agreements, Lis Pendens and Torpedo Actions. Conflict of Laws .net [online]. Available via: 
http://conflictoflaws.net/2010/mari-and-pretelli-on-choice-of-court-agreements-lis-pendens-and-
torpedo-actions/. 
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those in which there is no such agreement. It could be argued in the light of access to 
justice however, that the need to establish a mechanism for resolving conflicts of 
jurisdiction is just as great in cases involving an alleged jurisdiction agreement as in 
cases in which there is none.478 
Inspired by English and Belgian law, it should be assessed whether some discretion 
should be allowed in those cases where there is a clear abuse of the lis pendens rule. In 
English law, the fact that there are parallel proceedings pending is a factor which will 
be taken into account when deciding to stay proceedings, although it is not enough in 
itself though. 479  Hence bad faith on the side of the party who initiated the first 
proceedings could be decisive in determining whether to stay proceedings as the court 
second seized. As a matter of Belgian law, the court must take into account the 
requirements of due process generally, which includes parallel proceedings in deciding 
whether to stay proceedings. Important to note here is that the court must not stay 
proceedings if it seems that the foreign decision will not be amenable to recognition or 
enforcement in Belgium. 480 Looking at the grounds for refusal of recognition and 
enforcement in Belgian law, any exclusive jurisdiction given to the Belgian courts to 
hear the claim is relevant here.481 If a party uses the torpedo and the Belgian court, as 
the court second seized, finds that it has exclusive jurisdiction, a judgment by the 
foreign court would not be amenable to recognition and enforcement in Belgium. As a 
result the Belgian court will not stay proceedings in favour of the foreign court. 
As explained in the previous paragraph relating to cases in which there is a jurisdiction 
agreement, the Brussels regime was built on the notion that the Member States trust one 
another’s judicial systems. Discretion on the part of Member State courts as to whether 
or not to stay proceedings because of abusive litigation tactics by one of the parties 
could not only undermine legal certainty and predictability,482 but would also interfere 
with the authority of the courts in other Member States. Such a solution would therefore 
be undesirable, as also concluded in relation to the previous paragraph. 
 
478 Stone, P., 2010. EU Private International Law. 2nd ed. Cheltenham: Elgar European Law. p. 198. 
479 De Dampierre v De Dampierre [1988] AC 92, 108. 
480 Art. 14 Code PIL. 
481 Art. 25, §1, 7° Code PIL. 
482 See chapter 6. 
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 4. Conclusion 
 
To conclude it must be noted that it is obvious that the abusive use of the so called 
torpedo tactic causes very serious concerns regarding access to justice. If the parties 
have made a choice of court agreement, which is undermined by one party rushing to 
an incompetent court, this party, in bad faith, denies the other party access to justice in 
a timely fashion. This may be all the more problematic in regards to other policy 
objectives if stalling tactics are worsened by selecting a court in a slow-moving 
jurisdiction. 
It must therefore be concluded that the Regulation is a significant improvement in terms 
of access to justice in those cases where the parties have made an exclusive choice of 
court agreement and one of them rushes to an incompetent court. 
It was discussed, however, that the same tactic can be used when there is no jurisdiction 
agreement, and the Brussels I recast did not amend the lis pendens rule applicable in 
those cases. Furthermore a drawback of the new rule in the recast for cases in which 
there is an agreement, is that more advanced torpedo tactics could be used. After an 
analysis of potential solutions to these problems, it seems that the options available are 
undesirable for several reasons, the most important one being that it seems they could 
undermine legal certainty and predictability. This will be further assessed in the next 
chapter.  
As a result, it appears as though a perfect solution cannot be achieved within the 
Brussels I Regulation so that parties’ access to justice may, in a small number of cases, 
still be affected by abusive tactics of the other parties. In such cases, it seems that the 
domestic substantive law of the Member States will have to provide them with a remedy, 
in the form of, for example, damages to compensate them for the costs incurred or 
punitive damages. Such remedies do not belong in a private international law 
instrument. 
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Chapter 6. Legal Certainty and Predictability 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Legal certainty and predictability regarding private international law consists of the 
possibility, for the plaintiff, to easily identify the court before which he can bring his 
claim and, for the defendant, to easily foresee the court before which he can be sued.483 
Furthermore it entails that both parties can easily foresee which law the competent court 
will apply to their dispute.484  
The adoption of both the Brussels I and Rome I Regulations happened in order to 
progressively establish an area of freedom, security and justice in the European 
Union.485 Such an area cannot exist without a reasonable degree of legal certainty and 
predictability.486 The highest degree of legal certainty and predictability in international 
trade within the Union would of course be achieved through the unification of 
substantive law concerned with international commerce, such as contract law. Although 
efforts are being made in order to unify, or at least harmonise, certain areas of 
substantive law, we are not there yet. Therefore the unification of private international 
law remains highly important in the Union in order to achieve legal certainty and 
predictability. 
483 Merrett, L., 2009. Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation: a Comprehensive Code for Jurisdiction 
Agreements? International and Comparative Law Quarterly [online], p. 555. Available via: Westlaw. 
484  Keyes, M., 2008. Statutes, Choice of Law, and the Role of Forum Choice. Journal of Private 
International Law, vol. 4, n°1, p. 14. 
485 (1) Preamble Brussels I; (1) preamble Rome I. 
486 Cf. Chapter 1. 
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Brussels I states in its preamble that “the rules of jurisdiction must be highly 
predictable”487 and Rome I’s preamble contains terms to the same effect. It states that 
“the proper functioning of the internal market creates a need, in order to improve the 
predictability of the outcome of litigation [and] certainty as to the law applicable [...], 
for the conflict-of-law rules in the Member States to designate the same national law 
irrespective of the country or the court in which the action is brought.”488 Therefore, 
“to contribute to the general objective of this Regulation, certainty in the European 
judicial area, the conflict-of-law rules should be highly foreseeable.”489  
Several aspects of the Regulations will be discussed in-depth in this chapter, while two 
will be discussed fairly briefly as they are the subject of the next chapter on party 
autonomy. 
 
 
2. Jurisdiction 
 
2.1 Lis Alibi Pendens 
 
2.1.1 Introduction 
 
The issue of lis alibi pendens, or lis pendens, was introduced in the previous chapter, 
Chapter 5, and discussed in relation to the policy objective of access to justice. Its 
meaning, the provisions relevant to it and the key cases will not be repeated in detail 
here, although, in brief, it should be recalled that the lis pendens rule attempts to avoid 
parallel proceedings in situations where more than one court is seized of the same 
proceedings. Instead reference will be made to the relevant sections in chapter 5.490 In 
this chapter the relevant rules will be assessed with particular reference to the 
underlying policy objective of legal certainty and predictability. 
490 Section 3.1.: meaning of lis pendens; section 3.2.: relevant provisions; 3.3.: case law. 
490 Section 3.1.: meaning of lis pendens; section 3.2.: relevant provisions; 3.3.: case law. 
490 Section 3.1.: meaning of lis pendens; section 3.2.: relevant provisions; 3.3.: case law. 
490 Section 3.1.: meaning of lis pendens; section 3.2.: relevant provisions; 3.3.: case law. 
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The preamble of the Brussels I Regulation, the relevant section of which was quoted in 
chapter 5,491 specifically refers to legal certainty and predictability in relation to the lis 
pendens rule. It states that “there must be a clear and effective mechanism for resolving 
cases of lis pendens and related actions […]”.492 This phrase remained unchanged in 
the preamble of the Brussels I Recast.493  
The current rule, which provides that the court second seized in relation to similar 
actions must stay its proceedings until the jurisdiction of the court first seized is 
established,494 has been the subject of several cases before the Court of Justice, which 
were discussed in detail in chapter 5.495 Those aspects particularly relevant to the policy 
objective of legal certainty and predictability will, however, form part of the discussion 
and evaluation of the relevant rules in this chapter. Reference will be made, in 
particular, to those elements which specifically refer to legal certainty and 
predictability. 
Reference must be made, first, to the decision in Gasser496, which has been called a 
“shocking”497 case in terms of choice of party autonomy and which was discussed in 
depth in the previous chapter. Against the background of legal certainty and 
predictability as a policy objective underlying EU private international law, the case is, 
however, not necessarily shocking. Why will be clarified with reference to the decision. 
The facts of the case as well as the preliminary questions submitted to the CJEU are 
summarised here again for the purpose of clarity. Gasser, an Austrian company, sold 
clothing to MISAT, an Italian company. All invoices contained a jurisdiction clause in 
favour of the Austrian courts. MISAT, however, brought proceedings against Gasser in 
Italy, after which Gasser initiated proceedings in Austria. The Austrian court sought to 
find out from the Court of Justice whether the court second seized could review the 
jurisdiction of the court first seized if there was a jurisdiction agreement favouring the 
court second seized. Furthermore it asked whether the lis pendens rule in the Brussels 
Convention could be derogated from where the duration of proceedings before the 
491 See section 3.2. 
492 (15) Preamble Brussels I. 
493 (21) Preamble Brussels I Recast. 
494 Art. 27(1) Brussels I. 
495 See supra. 
496 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693. 
497 Briggs, A., 2008. Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
p. 276. 
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courts of the Contracting State in which the court first seized was established was 
excessively long.498  
In its submission to the Court as an intervener the UK Government emphasised, in 
relation to the first issue, that the commercial practice of agreeing which courts are to 
have jurisdiction in the event of disputes should be supported and encouraged because 
such choice-of-court clauses contribute to legal certainty in commercial relationships. 
This is because they enable the parties, in case of a dispute, to determine easily which 
courts will have jurisdiction to deal with it.499 The UK Government continued that, in 
cases where there is an exclusive jurisdiction agreement, the court second seized, which 
is favoured in the agreement, is in a better position to rule on its jurisdiction than the 
court first seized.500 To avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments, the court first seized, 
not favoured by the jurisdiction agreement, must stay its proceedings until the court 
second seized, designated by the agreement has ruled on its jurisdiction.501  
The Commission disagreed with this position and highlighted that Article 21 of the 
Brussels Convention sought not only to obviate irreconcilable decisions, but also to 
uphold economy of procedure. This is achieved because the court second seized is 
initially required to stay proceedings, and to decline jurisdiction as soon as the 
jurisdiction of the court first seized is established. The Commission concluded that such 
a clear rule is conducive to legal certainty.502 It was not of the opinion that the lis 
pendens rule should be applied any differently in cases where there was a jurisdiction 
agreement between the parties.503  
The Court of Justice agreed with the Commission. It held that, in view of the disputes 
which could arise as to the very existence of a genuine agreement between the parties, 
it was conducive to the legal certainty sought by the Convention that, in cases of lis 
pendens, it should be determined clearly and precisely which of the two national courts 
was to establish whether it had jurisdiction. 504  It further held that the potential 
difficulties, stemming from delaying tactics employed by parties who, aiming to delay 
498 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 20. 
499 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 31. 
500 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 32. 
501 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 33. 
502 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 38. 
503 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 35. 
504 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 51. 
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settlement of the substantive dispute, commence proceedings before a court which they 
know lacks jurisdiction, are not such as to call in question the interpretation of any 
provision of the Brussels Convention, as deduced from its wording and its purpose.505  
In relation to the second issue raised by the Austrian court in its preliminary questions, 
MISAT submitted that a derogation from the lis pendens rule should be allowed where 
the proceedings in the country of the court first seized were excessively long. If not, 
MISAT contended, legal uncertainty would be created and the financial burden would 
be increased for litigants, who would be required to pursue proceedings at the same 
time in two different states and to appear before the two courts seized, without being in 
a position to foresee which court would give judgment before the other.506  
The Commission, on the other hand, emphasised that the Brussels Convention was 
based on mutual trust and on the equivalence of the courts of the states. It established a 
binding system of jurisdiction which all the courts within the purview of the Convention 
were required to observe. The compulsory system of jurisdiction established by the 
Convention was, according to the Commission, conducive to legal certainty because 
the parties and the courts could properly and easily determine international 
jurisdiction.507  
The Court of Justice equally emphasised the mutual trust in each other’s legal systems 
between the [Contracting] Member States as well as legal certainty. It said that: 
“[...] It must be borne in mind that the Brussels Convention is necessarily based on the 
trust which the Contracting States accord to each other’s legal systems and judicial 
institutions. It is that mutual trust which has enabled a compulsory system of 
jurisdiction to be established, which all the courts within the purview of the Convention 
are required to respect, and as a corollary the waiver by those States of the right to 
apply their internal rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in 
favour of a simplified mechanism for the recognition and enforcement of judgments. It 
is also common ground that the Convention thereby seeks to ensure legal certainty by 
505 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 53. 
506 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 66. 
507 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 67. 
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allowing individuals to foresee with sufficient certainty which court will have 
jurisdiction.”508 
 
 
 
2.1.2 Current issues regarding legal certainty and predictability 
 
It is clear from chapter 1 and the introduction to this chapter that legal certainty and 
predictability is, of all the policy objectives underlying EU private international law 
rules, one of the key objectives. The extracts from the case of Gasser discussed in the 
precious section also illustrate the importance attached to this objective when 
interpreting and applying EU private international law provisions. Against the 
background of this central policy objective it must be assessed whether the lis pendens 
rule achieves its desired result. It is clear from both the discussion in chapter 5 and the 
discussion of the relevant parts of case law in this chapter that the current rule, and how 
it is applied, establishes a clear priority rule in cases of lis pendens. The lis pendens rule 
is applied very broadly so that it covers all situations in which similar actions are 
brought before the courts of more than one Member State. The decisions in Overseas 
Union and, even more so, Gasser made it clear that the rule is invariable so that under 
no circumstances the court second seized can examine the jurisdiction of the court first 
seized.509 As such the Brussels I Regulation provides a clear and effective mechanism 
for resolving cases of lis pendens, which is what it aimed to do according to its 
preamble.510 
The lis pendens rule, and the way in which it is applied, therefore achieves legal 
certainty. Parties know that the court second seized must stay its proceedings until the 
court first seized has ruled on its jurisdiction without exception. Because of that clear 
priority rule there is very little scope for concurrent proceedings arising out of the same 
508 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 72. 
509 Stone, P., 2010. EU Private International Law. 2nd ed. Cheltenham: Elgar European Law. p. 198. 
510 (15) Preamble Brussels I. 
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events511 and cases of lis pendens are dealt with consistently, ensuring legal certainty. 
Problems have arisen however. 
Reference must be made to the previous chapter, in which the problem of “torpedo 
tactics” or the malicious delay of proceedings by parties was explained. This problem 
does not only affect access to justice but legal certainty and predictability as well. The 
current lis pendens rule does provide legal certainty as to what will be done if similar 
actions are brought before more than one court. Unfortunately it also provides the 
certainty that it will in fact permit delaying tactics by parties rushing to an incompetent 
court in a slow-moving jurisdiction. A system which allows its rules to be abused by 
parties acting in bad faith does not safeguard the legal certainty it aims for very well. If 
the forum is highly foreseeable because there is a clear rule determining jurisdiction, 
for example the rule that a choice of forum by the parties will be respected, a party 
rushing to an incompetent court without consequence could totally undermine the clear 
rule because his actions are of course not foreseeable. Therefore, although the lis 
pendens rule itself safeguards legal certainty and predictability, its potential abuse 
undermines this policy objective. 
Furthermore, without addressing the extent to which party autonomy is undermined by 
such tactics, as that will be the subject of chapter 7, a choice-of-court agreement greatly 
contributes to legal certainty in contractual relationships, as was highlighted by the UK 
Government in Gasser. 512  The possibility for parties acting in bad faith to delay 
judgment by rushing to a court which clearly does not have jurisdiction pursuant to the 
jurisdiction agreement, obviously undermines that legal certainty. 
Some authors argue that the need for a clear mechanism resolving cases of lis pendens 
is as great in cases where there is an alleged jurisdiction agreement as in any other case. 
The consistent application of Article 27 Brussels I, honoured by the Gasser ruling, is 
therefore preferred by them.513 This argument must be put in perspective. When parties 
make a jurisdiction agreement they, in effect, choose to have absolute certainty as to 
which court is competent to hear the claims arising out of their contractual relationship. 
Assuming that this foreseeability of the forum is not affected, in the end, by an 
511 Bell, A., 1995. The Negative Declaration in Transnational Litigation. Law Quarterly Review [online], 
678. Available via: Westlaw. 
512 See supra. 
513 Stone, P., 2010. EU Private International Law. 2nd ed. Cheltenham: Elgar European Law. p. 199. 
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incompetent court examining its jurisdiction first, it is exactly that. Eventually legal 
certainty and predictability as to the competent court is not affected. During the, 
potentially substantial, period of delay legal certainty may very well be affected. 
It can therefore be argued that abuse of the current rule is even more problematic in 
cases where there is a choice of court agreement. First, one party is confronted with 
unforeseeable behaviour by the other party who seizes an incompetent court. As such 
legal certainty and predictability is undermined just as much, if not more, in cases where 
there is no choice of court agreement as in cases where there is one. It can be argued 
that in cases where there is an agreement, however, the competent court is even more 
clearly identified than in cases where there is no agreement. If the parties to a contract 
insert a choice-of-court clause in their agreement, which fulfils the requirements set by 
the Brussels I Regulation, they unequivocally know, often in advance of any conflict 
between them, which court will hear the dispute. As such, legal certainty existed to a 
larger extent and is therefore undermined more severely by abusive litigation tactics. 
Assuming that the incompetent court will decline jurisdiction because it was not 
favoured in the jurisdiction agreement and assuming that the court second seized is in 
no better position than the court first seized to rule on its jurisdiction, there is still a 
delay in proceedings during which there is a certain degree of uncertainty for the party 
wanting to honour the jurisdiction agreement. 
As discussed in chapter 5, the problem of “torpedo tactics” attracted the EU’s attention 
and was addressed on the road to the Brussels I recast although only in relation to cases 
in which there was a jurisdiction agreement. These will therefore be discussed first. 
 
2.1.3 Analysis and proposed solutions 
  
As the research has identified that problems regarding legal certainty and predictability 
existed under the original lis pendens rule discussed above, it must be assessed whether 
the new rule in the recast appropriately addresses this problem or whether another 
solution would have been better. The new rule in Article 31 Brussels I Recast reverses 
the priority in the lis pendens rule in cases where there is a jurisdiction agreement. As 
such, the court chosen by the agreement has priority to determine its jurisdiction and 
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the other court seized has to stay its proceedings until the chosen court has ruled on its 
competence.  
As mentioned in chapter 5 there are certain drawbacks to this solution in relation to 
access to justice.514 It will now be evaluated whether these are also present in relation 
to legal certainty and predictability. 
As pointed out by Professor Stone there is no reason to presume that the alleged 
jurisdiction agreement exists or is valid.515 If the agreement is non-existent or invalid, 
following the new rule, this must be established at the allegedly chosen forum before 
the competent court can be seized. As a result there is scope for more advanced torpedo 
tactics, whereby a party claims there is a choice-of-court agreement, even though there 
is none or one that is invalid, resulting in the court first seized to stay its proceedings 
while the court allegedly chosen examines its jurisdiction. As such the legal certainty 
aimed for by the Regulation by way of clear jurisdiction rules can be undermined, at 
least temporarily, in a fashion similar to that experienced under the original Brussels I 
Regulation.516 
A possible solution was suggested by Horn, who said that giving more flexibility to the 
courts seized could prevent, or discourage, the use of “improved” torpedo actions. The 
courts involved could then decide which proceedings should continue, even in parallel 
to another proceeding, based on considerations of cost and effort.517 This suggestion is 
in line with the Belgian and the English solution, discussed in the previous chapter, 
which both entail a certain amount of discretion for the court.518 
It cannot be denied that judicial discretion could lead to different interpretations and 
applications of the same rules, depending on the forum. This should be prevented as 
much as possible because it would undermine legal certainty as, depending on where 
514 See chapter 5. 
515 Stone, P., 2010. EU Private International Law. 2nd ed. Cheltenham: Elgar European Law. p. 199. 
516 Cuniberti, G., 2010. Mari and Pretelli on Choice-of-Courts Agreements, Lis Pendens and Torpedo 
Actions. Conflict of Laws .net [online]. Available via: http://conflictoflaws.net/2010/mari-and-pretelli-
on-choice-of-court-agreements-lis-pendens-and-torpedo-actions/. 
517 Horn, F., 2011. The Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the council on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
(Recast). Note. European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies. Policy Department. 
Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs. p. 24. Available via: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2011/453202/IPOL-
JURI_NT(2011)453202_EN.pdf.   
518 See chapter 5. 
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litigation takes place, the outcome of the jurisdiction dispute could be very different. 
Some national courts could decide to stay their proceedings while some may decide 
under the same circumstances not to stay their proceedings. Flexibility could therefore 
lead to less legal certainty and predictability than under the clear priority mechanism 
established by the Brussels regime. The emphasis put on legal certainty, as opposed to 
flexibility, has also been pointed out by literature519 and EU official documents such as 
action plans520 and research reports.521 Furthermore it appears from, for example, the 
preamble of the Rome I Regulation that discretion of the courts in applying EU private 
international law rules is viewed as undermining legal certainty because it is formulated 
in terms which formulate discretion as the opposite of legal certainty and foreseeability 
of rules.522 
It is true that this approach, whereby legal certainty has priority over flexibility, has 
been described as traditionally Continental-European523 and the CJEU’s case law in 
this area as compromising the very foundations of common law principles of civil 
jurisdiction.524 Even if that is true, it is the EU’s approach and the rules it produces must 
therefore be assessed against the background of that approach. More discretion for the 
courts is therefore not desirable because it does not safeguard legal certainty and 
predictability. 
It is submitted that the solution opted for in the Brussels I Recast is to be preferred 
because it does safeguard legal certainty and predictability in terms of providing a clear 
priority rule in cases of lis pendens. Furthermore it ensures that the legal certainty, 
sought by parties by way of a choice-of-court agreement, is upheld as the court favoured 
in the agreement is to establish its jurisdiction while the other court seized stays its 
proceedings. As a result, there will be no period of time in which parties are waiting for 
519 E.g. Santomauro, P., 2010. Sense and Sensibility: Reviewing West Tankers and Dealing with its 
Implications in the Wake of the Reform of EC Regulation 44/2001. Journal of Private International Law, 
6(2), p. 282 and 293.  
520 Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on How to Best Implement the Provisions of the 
treaty of Amsterdam on an area of Freedom, Security and Justice, OJ C19, 23.01.1999, p. 4 at para. 16.  
521 Report on the Application of the Brussels I Regulation Presented by Hess, B., Pfeiffer, T. and 
Schlosser, P., 2007. Study JLS/C4/2005/03 (“The Heidelberg Report”). Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_application_brussels_1_en.pdf. p. 196 at para. 447.  
522 (16) Preamble Rome I. 
523 Nurmela, I., 2005. Sanctity of Dispute Resolution Clauses: Strategic Coherence of the Brussels 
System. Journal of Private International Law [online], 1(1), p. 143. Available via: HeinOnline. 
524  Bříza, P., 2009. Choice-of –Court Agreements: Could the Hague Choice of Court Agreements 
Convention and the Reform of the Brussels I Regulation Be the Way Out of the Gasser-Owusu 
Disillusion? Journal of Private International Law [online], 5(3), 539. Available via: EBSCOHost. 
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an incompetent court to assess the existence and validity of a choice-of-court agreement 
not favouring them.  
What, then, of the possibility of so-called “improved” torpedo tactics? It cannot be 
denied that this is a drawback indeed, because it could, again, affect legal certainty as 
a party acting in bad faith can allege there is a choice-of-court agreement, delaying 
proceedings and avoiding the trial of the substantive dispute before the competent court. 
Furthermore, the priority rule has been reversed only in relation to cases in which it is 
said there is an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. What, then, with torpedo actions in 
those cases in which there is no exclusive jurisdiction agreement? The lis pendens rule 
will still lead to delay, and associated uncertainty, under those circumstances as well. 
In chapter 5 it was suggested that the solution contained in the Brussels I Recast must 
be retained, despite the fact that it does not appropriately address the new possibilities 
to abuse it and despite the fact that it does not come to the aid of parties who are 
victimised by abusive tactics in cases where there is no jurisdiction agreement.525 It 
must be assessed whether this conclusion holds true in view of legal certainty and 
predictability. 
First, the new rule in the Brussels I recast ensures that the legal certainty aimed for by 
jurisdiction agreements is restored. In those cases where there is a valid exclusive 
choice-of-court agreement torpedo tactics in the sense of rushing to a court not favoured 
in the agreement will be to no avail, as the court indicated in the agreement will rule on 
its jurisdiction while the other court stays its proceedings. As a result there will be more 
certainty of enforcement of jurisdiction agreements, compared to the situation under 
the Brussels I Regulation as originally drafted.526  
Second, although the invalidity of choice-of-court agreements must be regarded as 
exceptional rather than the rule,527 parties acting in bad faith still have the opportunity 
to apply stalling tactics, which is highly undesirable not only because it clashes with 
access to justice but also because it may impact legal certainty. The solutions identified 
525 See chapter 5. 
526 For a critique on the situation under the Brussels I Regulation see: Steinle, J. and Vasiliades, E., 2010. 
The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements under the Brussels I Regulation: Reconsidering the 
Principle of Party Autonomy. Journal of Private International Law [online], 6(3), p. 574. Available via: 
EBSCOHost. 
527 See chapter 5. 
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in the previous chapter were anti-suit injunctions on the one hand, and more discretion 
for the courts on the other hand. For the reasons discussed in that chapter, these 
solutions seem undesirable.  
Third, the solution identified to solve the problem of torpedo tactics in cases in which 
there is no jurisdiction agreement was to give the courts more discretion in deciding 
whether to stay their proceedings until the court first seized had ruled on its jurisdiction. 
It was concluded that this solution was not desirable. In relation to legal certainty and 
predictability this conclusion must be upheld as it was explained higher in this section 
that discretion for the national courts could undermine this policy objective. 
 
 
3. Applicable Law 
 
3.1 Choice of applicable law 
 
3.1.1 Introduction 
 
The issues in relation to a choice of law made by the parties will be discussed in-depth 
in chapter 7 on party autonomy. It is necessary, however, to provide a general overview 
in this chapter as this will allow for a provisional conclusion in relation to legal certainty 
and predictability. This, albeit provisional, conclusion will then inform the assessment 
carried out in the next chapter, so that a definitive conclusion can be reached there. 
The Rome I Regulation honours party autonomy as one of the fundamental principles 
in private international law by allowing the parties to a contract to choose which law 
will apply to their contractual relationship.528 As such, Article 3(1) provides: 
“A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice shall be 
made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the 
528 (11) Preamble Rome I.  
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circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties can select the law applicable to 
the whole or to part only of the contract.” 
When the parties to a contract expressly choose which law will apply to their 
contractual relationship, one of the consequences is that a high degree of legal certainty 
and predictability is achieved.  The parties make an agreement so that they can clearly 
foresee which law will apply.  
 
3.1.2 Implied choice of applicable law 
 
An express choice is relatively straightforward in most cases because it is a clause 
literally stating that the contract shall be governed by e.g. English law or a reference to 
standard terms and conditions containing such a clause.529 The concept of express 
choice by the parties is therefore quite easy to apply and unlikely to cause a lot of 
dispute530. A so called implied choice is less straightforward. As will be discussed in 
the next chapter, it is submitted that effect should be given to an implied choice of law 
for reasons of party autonomy.531 In the application of this concept however, problems 
may arise regarding legal certainty and predictability. In this respect it is necessary to 
address, albeit briefly, the Rome I’s predecessor and commentary on it. 
The Rome Convention said that a choice had to be demonstrated with reasonable 
certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case. 532 This is 
because, even though a choice of law will often be express, the Convention recognised 
the possibility that the court, in the light of all facts, may find that the parties have made 
a real choice of law. 
There were some problems with the application of this provision however. It was 
formulated in more flexible or more strict terms depending on which language was 
used. 533 The Commission said that the differences in formulation in the different 
529 See e.g. Ferguson Shipbuilders Ltd. v Voith Hydro GmbH and Co. KG [2000] S.L.T. 229. 
530 Hill, J., 2004. Choice of Law in Contract under the Rome Convention: The Approach of the UK Courts. 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly [online], 53, 325 at p. 326. Available via: Westlaw. 
531 See chapter 7. 
532 Art. 3 (1) Rome Convention. 
533 Green paper on the Conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations into a Community Instrument and its Modernization, COM (02) 654, final, para. 3.4.2.1 as well 
as footnote 47. 
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linguistic versions of the Convention carried the inherent risk of different 
interpretations in different countries.534 Moreover, case law showed that there were 
indeed differences in the application of article 3 between the courts of the Contracting 
States. 535 This was clearly undesirable from the perspective of legal certainty and 
predictability. 
There were different opinions especially, on the question in how far a choice of a certain 
court or a choice of an arbitrator in a certain country constitutes a choice of the law of 
that court’s country or of the country where the arbitration is to be held. At common 
law a choice for the courts of a country or an arbitration clause is considered to be a 
very strong indication of the parties’ intention to have their contract governed by the 
law of that country.536 After the entry into force of the Rome Convention it was then 
necessary to examine whether this rule was still applicable, and it was held that it was. 
More specifically it was held by the English courts that the test under the Rome 
Convention and the test under common law were very similar so therefore a choice of 
jurisdiction was highly likely to imply a choice of law.537 
Where some were of the opinion that this approach stemmed from a correct 
interpretation of the Rome Convention,538 others argued that stronger evidence of the 
parties’ intention was required and that a mere choice of jurisdiction cannot be 
interpreted as implying a choice of law without further indications of the parties’ 
intention.539  
The Rome I Regulation as originally proposed aimed to bring some clarity regarding 
the impact of a choice of court clause on an implied choice of law. How it attempted to 
do that and whether it would have been successful will be the subject of chapter 7. For 
534 Green paper on the Conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations into a Community Instrument and its Modernization, COM (02) 654, final, at para 3.2.4.1. 
535 See chapter 7 
536 Hamlyn and Co. v Talisker Distillery and Others [1894] A.C. 202; Compangnie d’ Armement Maritime 
SA v Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA [1971] A.C. 572; Compania Naviera Micro SA v Shipley 
International Inc. (The “Parouth”) [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 351. 
537 Egon Oldendorff v Libera Corp. [1996] C.L.C. 482. See also: Hellenic Steel Co. and Others v Solamar 
Shipping Co. Ltd. and Others (The “Komninos”) [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 370. 
538 Plender, R. and Wilderspin, M., 2001. The European Contracts Convention. The Rome Convention on 
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. 2nd ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell. p. 93-96. 
539  For example: Morse, C.J.G., 1982. The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations. Yearbook of European Law, 2, 107 at p. 117. 
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the purposes of this section it suffices to say that the proposed provision did not make 
it into the Regulation. 
An addition was made to the preamble of the Rome I Regulation however which did 
make it in to the Regulation as adopted. The Preamble states that an agreement between 
the parties to confer on one or more courts or tribunals of a Member State exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine disputes under the contract should be one of the factors to be 
taken into account in determining whether a choice of law has been clearly 
demonstrated. It is provisionally concluded here that this is insufficient. It is unclear 
how it could bring a significant improvement to legal certainty as it is quite vague. 
Based on the initial findings made it seems that additional guidance is needed as to 
when the national courts can find that parties have made an implied choice of law. 
 
3.1.3 Choice of non-State Law 
 
Although this issue will also be discussed in-depth in chapter 7 on party autonomy, it 
must be touched upon here as well. Under the Rome Convention parties were not 
allowed to choose as the applicable law a non-state body of law, such as international 
conventions, divine law, lex mercatoria etc. They only had the option to choose the law 
of a country.540  
The original Rome I proposal, in order to boost the impact of the parties’ will, contained 
a provision in Article 3 which expressly allowed a choice of a non-state body of law, 
although some choices were still excluded. This provision was adopted.  It would not 
have added to legal certainty and predictability and it can be argued that it would even 
have undermined the objective because it may not have been clearly foreseeable 
whether a particular choice would be allowed under the new rule or not. In the light of 
this policy objective it is therefore positive that the provision did not make it into the 
Regulation. As will be discussed in the chapter 7, this evaluation does not necessarily 
hold true in the light of the objective of party autonomy however. 
540 Art. 1(1) Rome Convention; Lando, O., 1996-1997. Some Issues relating to the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations. King’s College Law Journal, 7, 55 at p. 60; Sambugaro, G., 2008. What “law” 
to choose for international contracts?.The European Legal Forum [online], 3(I), 126, 130. Available via:  
http://www.simons-law.com/library/pdf/e/887.pdf. 
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It must be mentioned, finally, that the preamble of the Rome I Regulation as adopted 
provides that the Regulation does not preclude parties from incorporating by reference 
into their contract a non-state body of law or an international convention.541 It is unclear 
what the preamble adds to the rule. The question must be asked here whether this recital 
entails that a choice of non-state law as the applicable law is now allowed under the 
Regulation, as opposed to the Convention and, if so, whether it is clear which types of 
non-state law can be chosen. As will be explained in detail in the next chapter, the 
preamble merely confirms that, in principle parties can insert into their contract non-
state law. From a private international law view this is not very significant as the 
incorporation of law does not mean the contract will be governed by that law. As a 
result it is safe to say that the Rome I Regulation does not cause particular issues in 
relation to legal certainty and predictability; it is clear that a choice of non-state law as 
the law applicable to the contract is still not allowed. 
 
 
3.2 Absence of choice by the parties: Article 4 
  
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
If the parties to a contract do not make an either express or implied choice of law, the 
Rome I Regulation contains rules on the applicable law in the absence of choice. It can 
be said that Articles 3 and 4 are the most important provisions in the Regulation.542 
Article 3 regulates the freedom of choice and was briefly discussed in the previous 
section. Article 4 is the subject of this section. It states: 
“1. To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen in 
accordance with Article 3 and without prejudice to Articles 5 to 8, the law governing 
the contract shall be determined as follows: 
541 (13) Preamble Rome I. 
542 Magnus, U., 2009. Article 4 Rome I Regulation: The Applicable Law in the Absence of Choice. In 
Ferrari, F. and Leible, S., 2009. Rome I Regulation: The Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations in 
Europe. Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers. p. 27.  
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(a) a contract for the sale of goods shall be governed by the law of the country where 
the seller has his habitual residence; 
(b) a contract for the provision of services shall be governed by the law of the country 
where the service provider has his habitual residence; 
(c) a contract relating to a right in rem in immovable property or to a tenancy of 
immovable property shall be governed by the law of the country where the property is 
situated; 
(d) notwithstanding point (c), a tenancy of immovable property concluded for 
temporary private use for a period of no more than six consecutive months shall be 
governed by the law of the country where the landlord has his habitual residence, 
provided that the tenant is a natural person and has his habitual residence in the same 
country; 
(e) a franchise contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the franchisee 
has his habitual residence; 
(f) a distribution contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the 
distributor has his habitual residence; 
(g) a contract for the sale of goods by auction shall be governed by the law of the 
country where the auction takes place, if such a place can be determined; 
(h) a contract concluded within a multilateral system which brings together or 
facilitates the bringing together of multiple third-party buying and selling interests in 
financial instruments, as defined by Article 4(1), point (17) of Directive 2004/39/EC, in 
accordance with non-discretionary rules and governed by a single law, shall be 
governed by that law. 
2. Where the contract is not covered by paragraph 1 or where the elements of the 
contract would be covered by more than one of points (a) to (h) of paragraph 1, the 
contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the party required to effect 
the characteristic performance of the contract has his habitual residence. 
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3. Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly 
more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, 
the law of that other country shall apply. 
4. Where the law applicable cannot be determined pursuant to paragraphs 1 or 2, the 
contract shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely 
connected.” 
This provision could be viewed as incorporating both a rule which is typical of civil 
law and a rule which is typical of common law. As such, alarm bells immediately ring 
as to whether the long standing and well developed approaches to interpretation and 
application of this rule in two very different types of legal system will result in a 
uniform interpretation and application of Article 4 of the Regulation. It must be 
evaluated first, if these prima facie concerns are justified. To that effect, the predecessor 
of the Rome I Regulation and the evaluation of its application will be of assistance. 
Second, it must be assessed whether the current rule in the Regulation is a status quo, 
an improvement or deterioration to legal certainty and predictability, as compared to its 
predecessor. 
 
3.2.2 Article 4 of the Rome Convention 
 
As the current rule in the Rome I Regulation is a relatively significant departure from 
the previous rule under the Rome Convention, the old rule must be recollected. Article 
4 Rome Convention stated: 
“1. To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen in 
accordance with Article 3, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country with 
which it is most closely connected. Nevertheless, a separable part of the contract which 
has a closer connection with another country may by way of exception be governed by 
the law of that other country. 
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article, it shall be presumed that the 
contract is most closely connected with the country where the party who is to effect the 
performance which is characteristic of the contract has, at the time of conclusion of the 
contract, his habitual residence, or, in the case of a body corporate or unincorporate, 
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its central administration. However, if the contract is entered into in the course of that 
party's trade or profession, that country shall be the country in which the principal 
place of business is situated or, where under the terms of the contract the performance 
is to be effected through a place of business other than the principal place of business, 
the country in which that other place of business is situated. 
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article, to the extent that the 
subject matter of the contract is a right in immovable property or a right to use 
immovable property it shall be presumed that the contract is most closely connected 
with the country where the immovable property is situated. 
4. A contract for the carriage of goods shall not be subject to the presumption in 
paragraph 2. In such a contract if the country in which, at the time the contract is 
concluded, the carrier has his principal place of business is also the country in which 
the place of loading or the place of discharge or the principal place of business of the 
consignor is situated, it shall be presumed that the contract is most closely connected 
with that country. In applying this paragraph single voyage charter-parties and other 
contracts the main purpose of which is the carriage of goods shall be treated as 
contracts for the carriage of goods. 
5. Paragraph 2 shall not apply if the characteristic performance cannot be determined, 
and the presumptions in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 shall be disregarded if it appears from 
the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with another 
country.” 
Similarly to the current rule in the Rome I Regulation, this provision combines the 
civilian rule of the law of the characteristic performance and the common law rule of 
the proper law of the contract.543 
Article 4 of the Rome Convention refers in its first paragraph to the law of the country 
with which the contract is most closely connected. This rule is very similar to the 
English common law rule, as well as the rules from the other contracting states,544 
543 Vondráèek, O., 2007. Art. 4 of the Rome Convention: a Fruitful or Fruitless Compromise? Common 
Law Review [online], 8(7), 4893, at 2.2. Available via: 
http://review.society.cz/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=33&Itemid=2. 
544 Apart from Italy: Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations by  Mario 
Giuliano, Professor, University of Milan, and Paul Lagarde, Professor, University of Paris I, OJ No. C282, 
31.10.1980, p.1. 
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which applied before the entry into force of the Rome Convention. The common law 
rule stated that in the absence of a choice by the parties, the courts had to find the proper 
law of the contract by determining with which law system it has its closest and most 
real connection.545 In doing this, the courts applied a flexible test, taking many matters 
into consideration such as the place of contracting546, the place of residence547 or 
business548 of the parties, the place of performance,549 the nature and subject matter of 
the contract550 or the place where the relationship between the parties was centred.551 
The position under the Rome Convention is similar but the Giuliano-Lagarde Report 
added that the courts could also take factors into account which supervened after the 
conclusion of the contract552, which was not possible under the common law rule553 
and was criticised by some because it would allow a party to one-sidedly change the 
law applicable to the contract554. It was argued, however, that such factors should only 
be taken into account to strengthen the factors existing at the moment of the conclusion 
of the contract rather than to be seen as independent factors555. This approach would 
exclude the possibility of a one-sided alteration of the applicable law.  
As mentioned, the first paragraph of the rule in article 4 so far came across as very 
familiar from an English common law point of view, adhering to a high degree of 
flexibility in determining the country with which the contract has the closest 
connection. It then moved on, in its second paragraph however, to introduce this 
concept of “characteristic performance”, a concept alien to English law. It was said to 
be one of the innovations of the Convention, having gained its ground in in legal 
545 John Lavington Bonython and Others v Commonwealth of Australia [1951] A.C. 201; James Miller and 
Partners v Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. [1970] A.C. 583; Amin Rasheed Corp. v Kuwait 
Insurance Co. [1984] A.C. 50. 
546 Cantieri Navali Riunti S.P.A. v N.V. Omne Justitia and Others (the “Stolt Marmaro”) [1985] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 428. 
547 Jacobs, Marcus and Co. v the Crédit Lyonais [1883-1884] L.R. 12 Q.B.D. 589.  
548 Re Anglo-Austrian Bank [1920] 1 Ch. 69.  
549 The Assunzione [1954] P. 150.  
550 British South Africa Co. v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. [1910] 1 Ch. 354. 
551 X AG v A Bank ( X, Y and Z v B) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 535. See also: Sri Ram, Vinayak, 2005. Choice 
of Law in Contracts. University College London Jurisprudence Review [online], 12, 256-273. Available via: 
Westlaw. 
552 Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations by  Mario Giuliano, Professor, 
University of Milan, and Paul Lagarde, Professor, University of Paris I, OJ No. C282, 31.10.1980, p.1. 
553 James Miller and Partners v Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. [1970] A.C. 583.  
554 Bogdan, M., 2006. Concise Introduction to EU Private International Law. Groningen: Europe Law 
Publishing. p. 126. 
555 Hill, J., 2005. International Commercial Disputes in English Courts. 3rd ed. Oxford: Hart. p. 485. 
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writings and case law in many countries556 but quite clearly a concept stemming from 
Swiss doctrine and case law557. It has been called one of the most difficult concepts 
used in the Convention558 and it has, as a result, not been without criticism. As it is a 
concept alien to common law, much of the criticism came from English 
commentators. 559  The question must be asked, therefore, what the characteristic 
performance of a contract is. 
The Giuliano-Lagarde Report explained that the characteristic performance is usually 
the performance for which the payment is due 560 . However, the payment will 
sometimes constitute the characteristic performance and therefore this attempted 
definition by the Report is not always helpful561. Moreover there are contracts where it 
is impossible to determine the characteristic performance because parties perform 
obligations of the same type562. It may be clear that the concept is not the easiest concept 
to apply, although advocates of it can be found as well.563 
In addition to this concept of characteristic performance, alien to common law, the 
provision further departs from common law by significantly limiting the flexibility in 
determining with which country the contract is most closely connected. Paragraphs 2 
to 4 contain a whole list of presumptions to be taken into account by the courts. These 
presumptions have been heavily criticised, not in the least because, similar to the 
concept of characteristic performance, they are based around concepts which lack 
definition in the Regulation such as the concept of “habitual residence”, “central 
administration” and “principal place of business”. It seems that the courts will therefore 
556 Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations by  Mario Giuliano, Professor, 
University of Milan, and Paul Lagarde, Professor, University of Paris I, OJ No. C282, 31.10.1980, p.1. 
557 D’ Oliveira, H.U., 1977. “Characteristic Obligation” in the Draft EEC Obligation Convention. American 
Journal of Comparative Law [online], 303 at p. 304. Available via: HeinOnline. 
558 North, P.M., Fawcett, J.J., 1999. Cheshire and North’s Private International Law. 13th ed. London: 
Butterworths. p. 569. 
559 By way of example: Atrill, S., 2004. Choice of Law in Contract: The Missing Pieces of the Article 4 
Jigsaw? International and Comparative Law Quarterly [online], 53(3), 549. Available via: Westlaw; 
Vlachos, D., 2006. Characteristics Ain’t Always Proper. Hertfordshire Law Journal [online], 6(1), 42. 
Available via: http://www.herts.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/38680/HLJ_V6I1_Viachos.pdf. 
560 Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations by  Mario Giuliano, Professor, 
University of Milan, and Paul Lagarde, Professor, University of Paris I, OJ No. C282, 31.10.1980, p.1. 
561  Collins, L., 1976. Contractual Obligations. The EEC Preliminary Draft Convention on Private 
International Law. International and Comparative Law Quarterly [online], 35 at p. 48. Available via: 
HeinOnline. 
562 Apple Corps Ltd. v Apple Computer Inc. [2004] I.L.Pr. 34. 
563 Mankowski, P., 2010. The Principle of Characteristic Performance Revisited Yet Again. In Boele-
Woelki, K. et al. (eds.), 2010. Convergence and Divergence in Private International Law. Liber 
Amicorum Kurt Siehr. The Hague: Eleven International Publishing. 
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have to rely on their national definitions of these concepts where possible564, which is 
obviously problematic with regards to a uniform interpretation and application of the 
Convention565. 
Furthermore the Convention stated in its article 4, paragraph 5 that paragraph 2 shall 
not apply if the characteristic performance cannot be determined. Since the presumption 
of characteristic performance appeared to be rather difficult to apply, the more general 
question arose what exactly the relationship was between the presumptions in paragraph 
2, 3 and 4, on the one hand, and paragraph 5, on the other hand. Paragraph 5 contained 
an escape clause as it stated that these presumptions shall be disregarded if it appears 
from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with 
another country. In other words the question arose was which weight was to be attached 
to the presumptions in the second, third and fourth paragraph. Opinions varied on this 
among legal writers566 and there were differences in the approach by the national courts 
of the contracting states as well.  
The courts in several contracting states, famously those in the Netherlands, disregarded 
the presumptions only in very exceptional cases567 where it appeared from all the 
circumstances that the contract was more closely connected with another country than 
the country presumed568. Particularly famous in this respect is the Dutch case of Société 
Nouvelle des Papeteries de l’ Aa SA v BV Machinefabriek BOA569 where the Dutch 
Supreme Court court refused to discard the presumption in article 4 (2) and decided that 
Dutch law applied to the contract, even though the contract was clearly more closely 
connected to France and the only connection with the Netherlands was that the seller’s 
principal place of business was situated there. The court held that the presumption in 
article 4 (2) “should be disregarded only if, in the special circumstances of the case, the 
564 North, P.M., Fawcett, J.J., 1999. Cheshire and North’s Private International Law. 13th ed. London: 
Butterworths. p. 571. 
565 Hill, J., 2005. International Commercial Disputes in English Courts. 3rd ed. Oxford: Hart. p. 491. 
566 On the different approaches see: Atrill, S., 2004. Choice of Law in Contract: The Missing Pieces of 
the Article 4 Jigsaw? International and Comparative Law Quarterly [online], 53(3), 549. Available via: 
Westlaw. 
567 McClean, D. and Beevers, K., 2005. Morris: The Conflict of Laws. 6th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell. p. 
350. 
568 Lagarde, P., 1982. The European Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations: An 
Apologia. Virginia Journal of International Law [online], 222 (1), 91 at p. 97. Available via: HeinOnline. 
569 Hoge Raad 25 september 1992. See Struycken, T.H.D., 1996. Some Dutch Judicial Reflections on the 
Rome Convention, Article 4 (5). Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, 18. 
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place of business of the party who is to effect the characteristic performance has no real 
significance as a connecting factor”.570 
This so called “strong presumption theory” was criticised for undermining the general 
principle of the most close connection laid out in the first paragraph of article 4571 and 
it was even said that the application of this theory could lead to “dramatic” results when 
all factors but one point towards a different law.572 
UK courts on the other hand applied the “weak presumption theory”, whereby the 
presumptions in paragraph 2, 3 and 4 were regarded as to provide help and guidance in 
determining the closest connection, which was regarded as the general aim of article 4. 
Where the presumptions did not lead to the law which had the closest connection to the 
contract, the courts fell back on the fifth paragraph of article 4573. More specifically the 
English courts were in favour of a literal interpretation of paragraph 5, 574  and 
emphasised that it stated that the presumptions could be disregarded and not rebutted, 
which meant that paragraph 5 should be promoted because the presumptions were very 
weak575.  
Thus the presumptions were reduced in the UK to not much more than “tie-breakers” 
in situations where it was difficult to determine that the contract had a closer connection 
with one country rather than another576. It must be said that this approach clearly 
reflected the rules which were in force in England before the Convention577 since 
according to common law tradition in the matter a very flexible approach was practised. 
The problem with this weak presumption theory, however, was that it did not enhance 
legal certainty and predictability, which was just what the presumptions were intended 
570 Société Nouvelle des Papeteries de l’ Aa SA v BV Machinefabriek BOA, 25.09.1992. Number 14.566. 
Available in Dutch via: http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=71&step=FullText. 
571 Clarkson, C.M.V. and Hill, J., 2006. The Conflict of Laws. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 
191. 
572 Plender, R. and Wilderspin, M., 2001. The European Contracts Convention. The Rome Convention on 
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. 2nd ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell. p. 122. 
573  ATRILL, S., 2004. Choice of Law in Contract: The Missing Pieces of the Article 4 Jigsaw? The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly [online], 53 (3), 549 at p. 553. Available via: Westlaw.  
574 E.g.  Definitely Maybe (Touring) Ltd. v Marek Lieberberg Konzertagentur GmbH [2001] 1 W.L.R. 1745; 
Land Rover Exports Ltd. v Samcrete Egypt Engineers and Contracters SAE [2001] E.W.C.A. Civ. 2019. 
575 Crédit Lyonnais v New Hampshire Insurance Co. [1997] 9 C.L.C. 909. 
576 Diamond, A., 1979. Conflict of Laws in the EEC. Current Legal Problems, 32, 155 at p. 167. 
577 McClean, D. and Beevers, K., 2005. Morris: The Conflict of Laws. 6th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell. p. 
350. 
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to provide578. It was therefore necessary that the relationship between the presumptions 
and paragraph 5 of article 4 was clarified in the new Regulation579. 
It must be noted that the Dutch case cited above led to a judgment by the CJEU, which 
answered a preliminary question of the Dutch Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) as to the 
application of Article 4. In its preliminary ruling the CJEU, emphasising the need to 
ensure a high level of legal certainty in contractual relationships, made it clear that the 
criteria in paragraphs 2 to 4 of the Rome Convention operate like presumptions in the 
sense that the court must take them into consideration in determining the law applicable 
to the contract.580 Only when it is clear from the circumstances as a whole that the 
contract is more closely connected with the country other than that identified on the 
basis of the presumptions, can the court disregard those criteria and apply paragraph 
5.581 As this judgment was made in 2009, after the arrival of the Rome I Regulation, 
this thesis will not focus on whether the CJEU’s judgement added to legal certainty but 
rather whether the new rule in the Regulation did. 
 
3.2.3 Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation 
 
Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Rome I Regulation, cited above,582 contains fixed rules 
instead of presumptions to determine the applicable law in the absence of choice. 
Paragraph 2 then states that where the contract is not covered by any of the rules set out 
in the first paragraph or where it would be covered by more than one rule of the first 
paragraph, it will be governed by the law of the country where the party required to 
effect the characteristic performance of the contract has his habitual residence. 
Paragraph 3, again, contains an exception clause which under the Rome Convention 
was criticised for undermining legal certainty and predictability. It states that where it 
is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more 
closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law 
578 Hill, J., 2005. International Commercial Disputes in English Courts. 3rd ed. Oxford: Hart. p. 503.  
579 Clarkson, C.M.V. and Hill, J., 2006. The Conflict of Laws. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 
194. 
580 Case C-133/08, Intercontainer Interfrigo SC (ICF) v Balkenende Oosthuizen BV and MIC Operations 
BV [2009], ECR I-09678. At para. 55. 
581 Case C-133/08, Intercontainer Interfrigo SC (ICF) v Balkenende Oosthuizen BV and MIC Operations 
BV [2009], ECR I-09678. At para. 63-64. 
582 See supra. 
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of that other country shall apply. Moreover paragraph 4 says that the courts also have 
to apply the law of the country with which the contract has the closest connection in 
case the applicable law cannot be determined pursuant to paragraphs 1 or 2.  
The introduction of fixed rules instead of presumptions can definitely be seen as a step 
forward for certainty.583 They replace the original rule with characteristic performance 
as a connecting factor for eight types of contracts. This is conducive to legal certainty 
and predictability because, rather than presumptions, which can be disregarded, the 
provision provides clear rules identifying the applicable law.  
It must be regretted, however, that the Regulation holds onto the much criticised notion 
of characteristic performance for those contract not falling in one of the categories in 
paragraph 1. The fixed rules do not solve the problem of identifying the characteristic 
performance in relation to complex contracts.584 It has been argued that “all that can be 
said with certainty is that there are certain types of contract in relation to which it is 
impossible to determine the characteristic performance”. 585  Since the aim of the 
revision of the Article 4 rules was to enhance certainty, this could be viewed as 
somewhat surprising.  
Even more problematic in terms of legal certainty and predictability, however, is that 
the Regulation has not abandoned the exception, or escape, clause which had arguably 
been over-relied on.586 If a contract is manifestly more closely connected with another 
country, the fixed rules may be set aside.587 This exception clause means that the courts 
retain a certain degree of discretion, and is therefore reflective of recital 16 of the 
Regulation which states that the conflict-of-law rules should be highly foreseeable but 
that the courts should retain a degree of discretion to determine the law that is most 
closely connected to the situation. The wording of the escape clause suggests that its 
scope is narrower than that under the Rome Convention as there has to be a manifestly 
583 See also: Editorial Comments, 2006. On the Way to a Rome I Regulation. Common Market Law Review 
[online], 43 (4), 913 at p. 916. Available via: EBSCOHost. 
584 On the difficulty identifying the characteristic performance for complex contracts see e.g. North, P. 
and Fawcett, J.J., 1999. Cheshire and North’s Private International Law. 13th ed. London: Butterworths. 
p. 564-574. 
585 Hill, J., 2004. Choice of Law in Contract under the Rome Convention: the Approach of the UK Courts. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly [online], 53(2), 335. Available via: Westlaw. 
586 Compare the ruling of the CJEU in Intercontainer Interfrigo SC (ICF) v Balkenende Oosthuizen BV 
and MIC Operations BV [2009] with some of the English case law discussed in this chapter. 
587 Art. 4(3) Rome I. 
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closer connection with another country rather than merely a “closer” connection.588 It 
has been argued, however, that the addition of the word “manifestly” makes no 
significant difference.589 As a result it must be feared that problems, similar to those 
experienced under the Rome Convention, may rise again. As these related to a lack of 
uniformity in interpretation and application, that would be detrimental to legal certainty 
and predictability.  
It is therefore suggested by the researcher that the rules proposed in the Rome I Proposal 
but not adopted would have been better. The proposed provision also contained the 
fixed rules determining the applicable law for certain types of contracts, followed by a 
paragraph which still referred to the characteristic performance to determine the 
applicable law for contracts not specified in the fixed rules. The big improvement in 
terms of legal certainty, however, lay in the fact that the exception clause was 
abandoned.590  The aim of this approach was to make the rules applicable in the absence 
of choice by the parties as precise and foreseeable as possible so that parties could be 
sure at the time of contracting which law would apply to their contract and therefore 
make a well-considered choice to either exercise or not exercise their party 
autonomy.591   
This proposed rule however, was amended by the European Parliament,592 resulting in 
an article that reflects a compromise between the different opinions there were on how 
article 4 should be modified.593 Particularly relevant in this respect was its amendment 
588 Tang, Z., 2008. The Interrelationship of European Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Contract. Journal 
of Private International Law, 4(1), 55.  
589 Briggs, A., 2009. When in Rome, Choose as the Romans Choose. Law Quarterly Review [online], 
125(Apr), 192. Available via: Westlaw  UK. 
590 Stone, P., 2010. EU Private International Law. 2nd ed. Cheltenham: Elgar European Law. p. 312. 
591 Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council 
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), COM (05) 650, final. See also: Response of the 
City of London Law Society, Financial Law Sub-Committee to the Commission’s Rome I Green Paper, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/doc/city_london_law_society_financial_s
ub-committee_1_en.pdf. 
592 See: Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligaions (Rome I), COM (05) 650, - C6-0441/2005 – 2005/0261 (COD), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A6-2007-
0450&language=EN&mode=XML. 
593  See e.g.: Response of the Netherlands to the Commission’s Rome I Green Paper, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/doc/netherlands_en.pdf; Response of 
the Czech Republic to the Commission’s Rome I Green Paper, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/doc/czech_republic_en.pdf; Response 
of the Nordic Group for Private International Law tot the Commission’s Rome I Green Paper, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/doc/nordic_group_private_internation
al_law_en.pdf; Joint Response of Prof. Ulrich Magnus and Prof. Peter Mankowski to the Commission’s 
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which added recital 20 stating: “Where the contract is manifestly more closely 
connected with a country other than that indicated in Article 4 (1) or (2), an escape 
clause in those provisions provides that the law of that country should apply. In that 
event, account should be taken, inter alia, of whether the contract in question has a 
very close relationship with another contract or contracts”.594 
As a result, Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation is an improvement to its predecessor to 
an extent but legal certainty and predictability are not completely safeguarded. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed and evaluated the Brussels I lis pendens rule from the 
perspective of legal certainty and predictability. The problem of parties abusing the 
current rule, by employing so called torpedo tactics, which had been considered to be 
particularly problematic in cases where there is a choice of court agreement, has now 
been addressed in the Brussels I recast so that legal certainty and predictability will 
improve in this respect. Parties acting in bad faith, however, could now apply a new 
form of torpedo tactic, alleging there is a valid jurisdiction agreement when there is 
none. It has been assessed whether a possibility of anti-suit injunctions or the granting 
of more discretion to the courts could improve this situation without sacrificing legal 
certainty and concluded that these solutions would undermine legal certainty and 
predictability. Finally, in cases where there is no jurisdiction agreement and where it is 
not alleged that there is one, parties could still in bad faith rush to an incompetent court. 
In such cases granting more discretion to the courts is not desirable either because, as 
mentioned, it would negatively impact legal certainty. As such, although the Brussels I 
Rome I Green Paper, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/doc/university_hamburg_en.pdf; 
Response of the United Kingdom to the Commission’s Rome I Green Paper, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/doc/united_kingdom_en.pdf; 
Response of the Bar Council of England and Wales to the Commission’s Rome I Green Paper, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/doc/bar_council_england_wales_en.p
df; E.g. Response of the Law Society of England and Wales to the Commission’s Rome I Green Paper, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/doc/law_society_england_wales_en.p
df; Response of the Max-Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/doc/max_planck_institute_foreign_pr
ivate_international_law_en.pdf. 
594 Amendment 19 of the European Parliament [or whatever – not sure of  provenance of “Amendment 
19”] adding recital 8g to the draft Regulation. 
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recast improves legal certainty and predictability, this policy objective remains, to an 
extent, undermined. 
As to the possibility for parties to a contract to make a tacit choice of law , it has been 
noted that the differences in linguistic versions that existed under the Rome Convention 
were removed from the Rome I Regulation, which increased legal certainty and 
predictability. The uncertainty which also existed under the Rome Convention on the 
question in how far a choice of a particular court constituted a choice of the law of that 
court’s country has been clarified in part by the amendment of the preamble of the 
Rome Regulation to the effect that such a choice of court should be one of the factors 
to be taken into account in determining whether parties had made an implied choice. It 
is provisionally concluded that this is insufficient to significantly improve legal 
certainty. 
Further, it has been examined above whether the parties to a contract have the 
possibility under the Rome I Regulation to make a choice of non-state law, which was 
clearly excluded under its predecessor. Although the Rome I proposal sought to 
introduce such an option which could have adversely affected legal certainty and 
predictability, the proposed provision was deleted so that the Rome I Regulation does 
not raise particular issues in relation to legal certainty here. It is clear that parties must 
still choose a state law as the applicable law. 
Finally, the rules determining the applicable law in the absence of a choice by the parties 
have been researched. First, it has been identified that the concept of characteristic 
performance is problematic in terms of legal certainty as it is appears very difficult to 
identify the characteristic performance for complex contracts. Sadly this concept, 
adopted under the Rome Convention, was retained in the Rome I Regulation. The 
Regulation made improvements in terms of legal certainty as well however. The much-
criticised presumptions in the Rome Convention were replaced by fixed rules for eight 
types of contracts, improving foreseeability of the applicable law. It is concluded that 
it must be regretted though, that the exception clause in the Rome Convention, which 
had caused a lack of uniform application of the rules and which had therefore led to 
division for as long as it had existed, remained in the Regulation. As such legal certainty 
may still be undermined. 
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Chapter 7. Party Autonomy 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As mentioned in chapter 1,595 party autonomy is recognised in the vast majority of legal 
systems throughout the world. 596  It was in fact the only private international law 
principle recognised by all the Member States when the European private international 
law project started.597 Party autonomy is the private international law aspect of the 
freedom of contract which exists in contract law in general.598 Often the term is used 
primarily to refer to the freedom of the parties to choose the law applicable to the 
disputes arising out of their contractual relationship. It also comprises however, their 
freedom to choose which court will have jurisdiction to hear claims stemming from 
such disputes. As such the term is used to refer to both these freedoms or rights of the 
parties to a contract.599 
Brussels I and Rome I expressly recognise party autonomy in their preambles600 and, 
more importantly, in their substantive terms601, as discussed above.602 Although there 
are limitations to party autonomy inspired by the EU’s desire to achieve other policy 
objectives,603 revisions of EU private international law rules have generally focussed 
on further enhancement of the parties’ freedoms.604 This is true for revisions relevant 
to the Brussels regime as well as the Rome regime.  
This chapter focuses on one key issue relating to jurisdiction and two key issues in the 
area of applicable law. In relation to jurisdiction, the issue of lis alibi pendens, which 
was evaluated in the previous two chapters in relation to access to justice and legal 
595 See supra.  
596 Nygh, P., 1999. Autonomy in International Contracts. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p. 8-14. 
597 Drobnig, U., 1966-67. Conflict of Laws and the European Economic Community. American Journal 
of Comparative Law [online], 15, 212. Available via: HeinOnline. 
598 McCLean, J.D. and Beevers, K., 2009. Morris. The Conflict of Laws. 7th ed. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell. p 335. 
599 E.g. Harris, J., 2000. Contractual Freedom in the Conflict of Laws. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
vol. 20, 2, p. 247-248; Merrett, L., 2009. Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation: A Comprehensive Code 
for Jurisdiction Agreements? International and Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 545.  
600 (14) Preamble Brussels I; (11) Preamble Rome I. 
601 Art. 23 Brussels I; art. 3 Rome I. 
602 See Chapter 2 
603 See Chapter 4, this chapter below and Chapter 7. 
604 See chapter 1. 
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certainty and predictability, is discussed and analysed in the light of the underlying 
policy objective of party autonomy. In relation to the applicable law, party autonomy 
is discussed with a particular emphasis, first, on the issue of how the existence and 
terms of an implied choice of law by the parties is to be determined and, second, the 
extent of the option of the parties to choose a non-state body of law to apply to their 
contractual relationship. Each of these key issues regarding party autonomy will be 
further evaluated in order to see whether and how the EU’s policy objective can be 
better achieved.  
 
 
2. Jurisdiction 
 
2.1 Lis Alibi Pendens 
 
2.2.1 Current Issues In Relation to Party Autonomy 
 
The issues surrounding cases of lis pendens have been discussed in depth in chapter 5 
and 6 in relation to access to justice and legal certainty and predictability respectively. 
In order to avoid repetition the most relevant points will be summarised here in order 
to give sense to the discussion in relation to party autonomy. Where possible, however, 
reference will be made to the relevant section in the previous chapters. 
It was explained that the current rule provides a clear solution for cases of lis pendens. 
As such, it is conducive to legal certainty, especially because the relevant provisions 
have been applied without exception.605 It has also been argued, however, that this clear 
rule can be abused by way of so-called torpedo tactics, whereby a party rushes to an 
incompetent court with a view to delay proceedings.606 A strict application of Article 
27 Brussels I would mean the court second seized has to stay its proceedings until the 
court first seized has ruled on its jurisdiction, even if the party bringing proceedings in 
the first court is acting in bad faith. 
605 See chapter 6. 
606 See chapter 5. 
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The infamous case of Gasser 607  made it clear that even an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement does not alter the application of Article 27 Brussels I, despite the fact that 
the UK Government argued strongly in favour of party autonomy. That is, they 
contended that the commercial practice of agreeing which courts are to have jurisdiction 
in the event of disputes should be supported and encouraged. The reason they gave was 
that jurisdiction agreements contribute to legal certainty in commercial relationships.608 
The UK Government continued that, in cases where there is an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement, the court second seized, which is favoured in the agreement, is in a better 
position to rule on its jurisdiction than the court first seized.609 To avoid the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments, the court first seized, not favoured by the jurisdiction 
agreement, must stay its proceedings until the court second seized, designated by the 
agreement has ruled on its jurisdiction.610  
This position, which did not find favour with the CJEU because it focused primarily on 
the legal certainty achieved through a clear and consistent priority rule, must be 
assessed. First, it is true that choice-of-court agreements contribute to legal certainty in 
commercial relationships. They allow the parties to easily predict which court or courts 
will have jurisdiction to hear their claims in the case of a dispute.611 Even without 
reference to legal certainty however, the UK Government had a valid point based purely 
on the fact that party autonomy is one of the key objectives underlying EU private 
international law rules. It could therefore be argued that, regardless of whether or not 
legal certainty is achieved, a choice made by the parties should be respected as a matter 
of party autonomy. The fact that respect for such a choice also adds to legal certainty is 
a plus, and of course relevant to this thesis which investigates several provisions in 
relation to more than one underlying policy objective. 
Second, the UK Government argued that the court favoured in the jurisdiction 
agreement is in a better position than the court first seized to rule on its jurisdiction. 
Bearing in mind the mutual trust in each other’s legal systems upon which the 
Regulation is based,612 this argument cannot be upheld. The situation is rather that the 
607 See chapter 5 and 6. 
608 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 31. 
609 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 32. 
610 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at para. 33. 
611 As also discussed in chapter 6. 
612 See chapter 6 and, e.g., Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2003], ECR I-14693, at 
para. 72. 
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court chosen in the jurisdiction agreement is in no better position than the court first 
seized to assess the validity of the agreement.613 It can be argued, however, that this is 
irrelevant. If parties have made a jurisdiction agreement the chosen court is the court 
favoured by them. It is this court therefore, which should have priority to hear the case. 
If, however, this court is not competent because the choice-of-court clause is invalid 
for example, the case can be brought before the other court.  
The current problem for party autonomy in relation to the lis pendens rule will be 
illustrated here by way of example. Say there are two parties to a contract for the sale 
of goods. The buyer is domiciled in Germany and the seller is domiciled in the UK. 
They make a choice of court agreement in favour of the UK courts. The buyer does not 
pay his invoice and gets several notices from the seller requesting him to pay. He senses 
that litigation is imminent but he wants to delay the proceedings because he is insolvent. 
He therefore rushes to a Greek court to file a claim. Following the ruling in Gasser, 
when the seller now goes to the UK court, which clearly has jurisdiction pursuant the 
choice of court agreement and in accordance with the original Article 23 Brussels I 
Regulation,614 this court cannot do anything until the Greek court, as the court first 
seized, has ruled on its jurisdiction. In the previous two chapters it was explained that 
in such a scenario both access to justice and legal certainty and predictability are 
compromised. Furthermore the possibility for one of the parties to delay proceedings in 
such a way also clearly undermines the effectiveness and practical relevance of a choice 
of court agreement and therefore party autonomy.    
It could be argued that party autonomy is only undermined towards the party who wants 
to honour the jurisdiction agreement and not towards the other party to the contract 
because the latter exercises his freedom to choose a court unilaterally by ignoring the 
previous agreement. That argument is flawed however. As explained in chapter 1 and 
the introduction to this chapter, party autonomy is the term given to the private 
international law aspect of freedom of contract. A contract presupposes agreement on 
its terms by all parties to it as it does not only generate rights but also obligations 
towards one another. The freedom of contract, and party autonomy, can therefore only 
613 E.g. Case C-351/89, Overseas Union Ins. V New Hampshire Ins. Co. [1991], ECR I-3317, at para 23; 
Stone, P., 2010. EU Private International Law. 2nd ed. Cheltenham: Elgar European Law. p. 199. 
614 See Chapter 2. 
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be exercised by consent.615 Party autonomy means that parties can freely choose not 
just the law applicable to their contractual relationship, but also the court which will 
have jurisdiction in the disputes relating to this relationship. Their mutually agreed 
choice of court is a contractual term, which means they must both respect it. If the 
relevant rules allow for a possibility whereby one party decides not to respect the choice 
of court agreement by rushing to a different court the principle of party autonomy is 
severely undermined. 
The Brussels I rule, as amended in the Brussels I recast, restores the respect for party 
autonomy in cases of lis pendens. By reversing the priority of the court which has to 
examine its jurisdiction first, the parties’ exclusive jurisdiction agreement will be 
effectively enforced. The court they have chosen will rule on its jurisdiction, while 
another court, not favoured in the agreement, stays its proceedings. The other court will 
only be involved if the choice-of-court agreement is invalid. 
The possibility of more advanced torpedo claims, identified in chapters 5 and 6, 
whereby a party claims there is a jurisdiction agreement although there is none or an 
invalid one, is less problematic in relation to the policy objective of party autonomy. 
After all, where there is an agreement, it will be respected as the court chosen in the 
agreement will rule on its jurisdiction first. Only when there is no agreement a problem 
may arise. Therefore, if the question is: “Did the Brussels I recast appropriately address 
the problems experienced under the original lis pendens rule?”, the answer must be: 
“When it comes to party autonomy, it did.”   
 
3. Applicable Law 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In its preamble the Rome I Regulation states that the EU considers the parties’ freedom 
to choose the applicable law one of the cornerstones of the system of conflict-of-law 
rules in matters of contractual obligations.616 The importance of this policy objective, 
615 Knight, CJS, 2008. The Damage of Damages: Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law. Journal 
of Private International Law, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 502.  
616 (11) Preamble Rome I. 
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and the central role it plays in the Rome I Regulation, is further illustrated by the fact 
that it was consistently mentioned as a key objective in the EU’s press releases 
regarding the Rome I proposal and the adoption of the Regulation.617 As such, the 
Regulation contains provisions which honour a very liberal position towards party 
autonomy, which is hardly “policed”. 618  Article 3, entitled “Freedom of choice”, 
provides: 
“1. A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice shall be 
made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the 
circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties can select the law applicable to 
the whole or to part only of the contract. 
2. The parties may at any time agree to subject the contract to a law other than that 
which previously governed it, whether as a result of an earlier choice made under this 
Article or of other provisions of this Regulation. Any change in the law to be applied 
that is made after the conclusion of the contract shall not prejudice its formal validity 
under Article 11 or adversely affect the rights of third parties. 
3. Where all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are located 
in a country other than the country whose law has been chosen, the choice of the parties 
shall not prejudice the application of provisions of the law of that other country which 
cannot be derogated from by agreement. 
4. Where all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are located 
in one or more Member States, the parties' choice of applicable law other than that of 
a Member State shall not prejudice the application of provisions of Community law, 
where appropriate as implemented in the Member State of the forum, which cannot be 
derogated from by agreement. 
617 Press Release, 2005. Adoption of Two Commission Proposals Is a Vital Step in Completing the 
European Law-Enforcement Area for Individuals and Firms, IP/05/1605, 15.12.2005. Available via: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-05-1605_en.htm; Press Release, 2007. 2838th Coucil Meeting, 
Justice and Home Affairs, PRES/07/275, 06.12.2007. Available via: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_PRES-07-275_en.htm?locale=en; Press Release, 2007. European Citizens and Businesses to 
Benefit from Greater Legal Certainty and Greater Access to Justice, IP/07/1872, 07.12.2007. Available 
via: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-1872_en.htm. 
618 Symeonides, S., 2010. Party Autonomy in Rome I and II from a Comparative Perspective. In Boele-
Woelki, K., et al., 2010. Convergence and Divergence in Private International Law. Liber Amicorum 
Kurt Siehr. The Hague: Eleven International Publishing. At p. 522 and 527. That does not mean, however, 
that party autonomy is without limitations, as will seem from this chapter, and the chapter on protection 
of weaker parties in particular. 
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5. The existence and validity of the consent of the parties as to the choice of the 
applicable law shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Articles 10, 11 
and 13.” 
As a result of Article 3, parties can make an express choice of law. Often, such an 
express choice consists of the inclusion of a choice of law clause in the contract between 
the parties. It can even be argued that few contracts of high value are signed without 
the insertion of such a clause. 619  Commercial reality is, however, that not every 
international commercial contract contains a choice of law clause. 620 Furthermore, 
although an express choice can be made by way of oral agreement,621 for example in 
the course of negotiations,622 it is quite possible that no express choice is made between 
the parties. 
For those cases in which there is no express choice by the parties the Regulation 
provides that the choice must be “clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or 
the circumstances of the case.”623 The question arises what this means and how this 
provision is applied by the courts. That will be the subject of the next section. 
Secondly, as mentioned in the previous chapter,624 there has been some obscurity as to 
which legal systems parties can choose, particularly in relation to non-municipal law. 
That discussion, and the extent to which parties should be allowed to choose as the 
applicable law a non-state system of law, will be the subject of discussion below. 
 
3.2 Implied Choice of Law 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, a choice of law can be very 
straightforward. Although drafting errors or allegations of misunderstanding or 
misrepresentation could occur, an express choice is very straightforward in most 
619 Crawford, E., 2006. Choice of Law Clauses in Contracts. Scots Law Times [online], 29, 185. Available 
via: Westlaw. 
620 McClean, D. and Ruiz Abou-Nigm, V., 2012. Morris. The Conflict of Laws. 8th ed. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell. p. 351.  
621 Oakley v Ultra Vehicle Design Ltd [2006] B.C.C. 57. Para. 61. 
622 Stone, P., 2010. EU Private International Law. 2nd ed. Cheltenham: Elgar European Law. p. 299. 
623 Art. 3(1) Rome I. 
624 See chapter 6. 
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cases625 because it is in the form of a clause inserted in the substantive agreement 
literally stating that the contract shall be governed by English law or in the form of a 
reference to standard terms and conditions containing such a clause.626 
 It is important to note however, that no effect should be given to an express choice of 
law unless the parties clearly agreed on that specific term of the contract. The case of 
Iran Continental Shelf Oil Company v IRI International Corporation627 is exemplary 
of this. The case concerned a dispute between an Iranian and a US corporation. The 
Iranian corporation sought to rely on the choice of Iranian law, which was included in 
its standard terms and conditions which were sent to its counterparty early in the 
negotiations. The US company, on the other hand, sought to rely on the express choice 
of the law of Texas, as their quotation for the work had been made expressly subject to 
terms and conditions favouring Texan law. The court decided that, under these 
circumstances, there was no choice of any applicable law within the meaning of Article 
3 of the Convention. As the applied provision in the Regulation has not changed, this 
decision is relevant in the context of the Regulation as well. 
The decision on the absence of a choice of express law was not contested by the parties 
on appeal,628 and illustrates that the Rome I regime seeks to honour parties’ choice of 
law only if there is a real agreement and clear consensus between them.629 After all, 
should not party autonomy mean that the parties are free to choose but equally that they 
are free not to choose? It is submitted that the freedom to choose is a freedom which 
must be exercised affirmatively so that you lose it if you do not use it.630 
In this respect special attention must be drawn to the fact that the Rome I Regulation 
recognises a so called implied choice of law which is sometimes called a “tacit 
choice”.631 The Regulation refers to a choice clearly demonstrated by the terms of the 
contract or the circumstances of the case632. It is submitted that a recognition by the 
Regulation of an implied choice must be applauded as it gives full effect to party 
625 Fentiman, R., 2010. International Commercial Litigation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 190. 
626 E.g. Ferguson Shipbuilders Ltd. v Voith Hydro GmbH and Co. KG [2000] S.L.T. 229. 
627 Iran Continental Shelf Oil Company v IRI International Corporation [2002] C.L.C. 372, at 376-377. 
628 Iran Continental Shelf Oil Company v IRI International Corporation [2004] C.L.C. 696, at 700. 
629 Hill, J., 2004. Choice of Law in Contract under the Rome Convention: the Approach of the UK Courts. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly [online], 53(2), 325, at p. 326. Available via: Westlaw. 
630 Briggs, A., 2013. The Conflict of Laws. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 233.  
631 Van Calster, G., 2013. European Private International Law.  Oxford: Hart Publishing. p. 132. 
632 Art. 3(1) Rome I Regulation. 
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autonomy and enhances it as one of the key principles in EU private international law, 
and the domestic legal systems of all the Member States. 633  It is, however, less 
straightforward to determine whether such an implied choice has been made, compared 
to an express choice.  
It seems that some caution has to be exercised in concluding that the parties have made 
an implied choice because, if concluded to too easily, the will of the parties will not be 
respected since then the court will decide there was a choice when the parties would 
construe that there was not. When, then, must the courts conclude that there has been 
an implied choice of applicable law? 
The Regulation does not provide any particular guidance on the matter. It merely states 
in its preamble that “an agreement between the parties to confer on one or more courts 
or tribunals of a Member State exclusive jurisdiction to determine disputes under the 
contract should be one of the factors to be taken into account in determining whether a 
choice of law has been clearly demonstrated”. 634 This guidance has been called 
“surprisingly unhelpful”.635 Because of the way in which the recital is phrased it does 
indeed provide hardly any guidance as to how it should be determined whether parties 
have made a tacit choice. It must be assessed, therefore, whether the Guiliano-Lagarde 
Report can be of any assistance. Although this is of course a report on the application 
on the Rome Convention and the wording has slightly changed in the Regulation, and 
therefore this report is still relevant.  
The Guiliano-Lagarde Report provides: 
“The choice of law by the parties will often be express but the Convention recognizes 
the possibility that the Court may, in the light of all the facts, find that the parties have 
made a real choice of law although this is not expressly stated in the contract. For 
example, the contract may be in a standard form which is known to be governed by a 
particular system of law even though there is no express statement to this effect, such 
as a Lloyd's policy of marine insurance. In other cases a previous course of dealing 
between the parties under contracts containing an express choice of law may leave the 
court in no doubt that the contract in question is to be governed by the law previously 
633 See also the introduction to this chapter. 
634 (12) Preamble Rome I. 
635 Briggs, A,. 2013. The Conflict of Laws. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 235. 
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chosen where the choice of law clause has been omitted in circumstances which do not 
indicate a deliberate change of policy by the parties. In some cases the choice of a 
particular forum may show in no uncertain manner that the parties intend the contract 
to be governed by the law of that forum, but this must always be subject to the other 
terms of the contract and all the circumstances of the case. Similarly references in a 
contract to specific Articles of the French Civil Code may leave the court in no doubt 
that the parties have deliberately chosen French law, although there is no expressly 
stated choice of law. Other matters that may impel the court to the conclusion that a 
real choice of law has been made might include an express choice of law in related 
transactions between the same parties, or the choice of a place where disputes are to 
be settled by arbitration in circumstances indicating that the arbitrator should apply 
the law of that place. 
This Article does not permit the court to infer a choice of law that the parties might 
have made where they had no clear intention of making a choice. Such a situation is 
governed by Article 4.” 
It was argued before that the phrase that a choice must be express “or demonstrated 
with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the 
case”636 was not intended to mean an implied choice of law.637 The examples given in 
the Giuliano-Lagarde Report, however, contradicted this. At the same time, the Report 
made it clear here that, whereas the Convention says regards must be had to the terms 
of the contract or the circumstances of the case, the courts must consider both.638 
Finally, it is clear from the report that the court can never infer a choice of law where 
there is none.639 They must not presume that the parties, under those circumstances, 
would or might have made a particular choice of law.640 This guidance, however, did 
not prove very helpful as problems of uniform application of Article 3 of the Rome 
Convention arose. As mentioned in the previous chapter,641 the formulation used in the 
636 As was the text of the Rome Convention, art. 3. 
637 DIAMOND, A., 1979. Conflict of Laws in the EEC. Current Legal Problems, 32, 155, at p. 160. 
638 See also: HILL, J., 2004. Choice of Law in Contract under the Rome Convention: The Approach of the 
UK Courts. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly [online], 53, 325 at p. 326. Available via: 
Westlaw. 
639 Guiliano, M. and Lagarde, P., 1980. Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations, OJ C282, 31.10.1980, p. 17.  
640 Fentiman, R., 2010. International Commercial Litigation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 195. 
641 See chapter 6. 
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Convention caused problems in regards to uniform application throughout the EU 
because, depending on the language version, the requirements for an implied choice 
were phrased more or less flexibly. 642  In the English version the term was “with 
reasonable certainty”, in the Dutch version the term was “voldoende duidelijk”, which 
is to be translated as ‘with reasonable certainty” and the German version specified that 
a choice had to be demonstrated “mit heinreichender Sicherheit”, which is also 
translated as “with reasonable certainty”. The French version, on the other hand, used 
the term “de façon certaine”, the literal translation of which results in “with 
certainty”. 643  The Commission said in its Green Paper on the Conversion of the 
Convention into the Regulation that these differences in formulation in the different 
linguistic versions of the Convention carried the inherent risk of different 
interpretations in different countries.644 Moreover, case law showed that there were 
indeed differences in the application of article 3 (2) between the courts of the different 
Member States. Where many continental courts would quite often conclude that there 
had not been a tacit choice, this was the opposite of for example English or German 
courts.645 To some extent this could of course have been a result of the differences in 
wording between the different linguistic versions since it can be argued that it is easier 
to conclude to an implied choice of law “with reasonable certainty” than to conclude to 
it “with (absolute) certainty” 
It is argued by some that the change in wording was not intended in any way to amend 
Article 3 and that it was just intended to bring the different language versions in line 
with each other.646  It is certainly helpful that the discrepancies between the different 
language versions have been tackled. The English language version of the Regulation 
642 Green paper on the Conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations into a Community Instrument and its Modernization, COM (02) 654, final, para. 3.4.2.1 as 
well as footnote 47. 
643 Green paper on the Conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations into a Community Instrument and its Modernization, COM (02) 654, final, para. 3.4.2.1 as well 
as footnote 47. 
644 Green paper on the Conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations into a Community Instrument and its Modernization, COM (02) 654, final, at para 3.2.4.1. 
645 Green paper on the Conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations into a Community Instrument and its Modernization, COM (02) 654, final, at para 3.2.4.2. 
646 Heiss, H., 2009. Party Autonomy. In Ferrari, F. and Leible, S., 2009. Rome I Regulation: The Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations in Europe. Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers. p. 1; 
Plender, R. And Wilderspin, M., 2009. The European Private International Law of Obligations. 3rd ed. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell. p. 144.   
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(as well as the Dutch647 and the German648 version), and its third article in particular, 
now mirrors the French, where it says that the choice must be “clearly demonstrated”.  
However, others contend that there was a more fundamental problem leading to a lack 
of uniform application, namely that it was too easy under the Rome Convention, 
regardless of the language version, to find an implied choice and that the change in 
language addresses this by making the Rome I Regulation stricter than the Rome 
Convention in regards to the possibility for the court to find an implied choice, albeit 
only slightly stricter.649 If this argument is correct then is, the fact that the discrepancies 
between language versions have been resolved becomes, of itself,  almost insignificant.  
Particular analysis is needed of the question in how far a choice of a certain court or a 
choice of an arbitrator in a certain country constitutes a choice of the law of that court’s 
country or of the country where the arbitration is to be held. Amongst English legal 
authors there does not seem to be a complete consensus on this issue. At common law 
a choice for the courts of a country or an arbitration clause is considered to be a very 
strong indication of the parties’ intention to have their contract governed by the law of 
that country.650 After the entry into force of the Rome Convention it was then examined 
by the courts whether this rule was still applicable and it was held that it was. More 
specifically it was said by the courts that the test under the Rome Convention and the 
test under common law were very similar so therefore a choice of jurisdiction was 
highly likely to imply a choice of law.651 
Where some were of the opinion that this approach stemmed from a correct 
interpretation of the Rome Convention,652 others argued that stronger evidence of the 
parties’ intention was required and that a mere choice of jurisdiction could not be 
interpreted as implying a choice of law without further indications of the parties’ 
647 This version now uses the term “duidelijk” (“with certainty/clearly”). 
648 This version now uses the term “eindeutig” (“with certainty/clearly”). 
649 E.g. McClean, D. and Ruiz Abou-Nigm, V., 2012. Morris. The Conflict of Laws. 8th ed. London: 
Sweet & Maxwell. p. 352; Stone, P., 2010. EU Private International Law. 2nd ed. Cheltenham: Elgar 
European Law. p. 306.  
650 Hamlyn and Co. v Talisker Distillery and Others [1894] A.C. 202; Compangnie d’ Armement Maritime 
SA v Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA [1971] A.C. 572; Compania Naviera Micro SA v Shipley 
International Inc. (The “Parouth”) [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 351. 
651 Egon Oldendorff v Libera Corp. [1996] C.L.C. 482. See also: Hellenic Steel Co. and Others v Solamar 
Shipping Co. Ltd. and Others (The “Komninos”) [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 370. 
652 Plender, R. and Wilderspin, M., 2001. The European Contracts Convention. The Rome Convention on 
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. 2nd ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell. p. 93-96. 
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intention. 653  This is in fact the position at common law, as a choice of court is 
considered a very strong indication but insufficient to conclude to a choice of the law 
of that forum.654   
The Rome I proposal, which was not eventually adopted, aimed to bring some clarity 
regarding the impact of a choice of court clause on an implied choice of law. It said 
that, “if the parties had agreed to confer jurisdiction on one or more courts or tribunals 
of a Member State to hear and determine disputes that have arisen or may arise out of 
the contract, they would be presumed to have chosen the law of that Member State.”655 
This provision definitely added to clarity and therefore legal certainty and predictability. 
The question is, however, whether it was desirable in terms of respecting and enhancing 
party autonomy. 
The proposed amendment was widely criticised for several reasons, although some also 
supported the incorporation of the principle qui elegit judicem elegit jus (he who 
chooses the judge chooses the law). 
It was said that this principle was rather outdated and expressly rejected by the courts 
in some jurisdictions.656 This is of course true, as even the English courts who attach 
great weight to a choice of court clause in deciding jurisdiction, do not view such a 
choice as sufficient.657 This criticism must be put into perspective however. EU law, of 
which EU private international law forms part, is an entirely separate legal system with 
its own rules, underlying objectives and principles and ‘there are always dangers in 
attempting to interpret [international conventions] through the prism of domestic law 
doctrines which may not feature in the laws of other contracting states.”658 Furthermore, 
as has become clear from previous discussions in this thesis, EU private international 
law contains other provisions which may seem very alien to the legal systems of some 
653  For example: MORSE, C.J.G., 1982. The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations. Yearbook of European Law, 2, 107 at p. 117. 
654 Compangnie d’ Armement Maritime SA v Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA [1971] A.C. 572, 
at 596. 
655 Art. 3(1) Rome I Proposal. 
656 Boele-Woelki, K. And Lazić, V., 2007. Where Do We Stand on the Rome I Regulation? In Boele-
Woelki, K. And Grosheide, W., eds., 2007. The Future of European Contract Law. Alphen aan de Rijn: 
Kluwer Law International. p. 25. 
657 E.g. Compangnie d’ Armement Maritime SA v Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA [1971] A.C. 
572, at 596. 
658 Hill, J., 2004. Choice of Law in Contract under the Rome Convention: the Approach of the UK Courts. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly [online], 53(2), 325, 328. Available via: Westlaw. 
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Member States. Similarly it does not contain some rules which are very prominent in 
the national laws of certain Member States. 
Another criticism was that the proposed provision presumes that, in the case of a 
jurisdiction agreement, the parties have chosen the law of the country in which the 
chosen court was situated, regardless of a choice of law. Nothing was said, however, 
on how that presumption could be rebutted but it was assumed by commentators that 
further evidence or connections would be required to support a choice of law by the 
parties.659 As such it seemed that the proposed provision would interfere with the 
intention of the parties 660  and would undermine party expectations, 661  thus 
undermining legal certainty as well. After all, it is possible that parties will agree on the 
jurisdiction of the courts of a country which they perceive as neutral, while not wishing 
that country’s law to apply to their contractual relationship.662 
Other commentators argued in favour of the proposal, saying that it would improve the 
quality of the decision because the court can apply its domestic law in which they have 
expertise, as opposed to a foreign in which they do not.663 It was further argued that the 
expectations of the parties would not be undermined when they out of forgetfulness or 
ignorance fail to make an express choice of law and that an agreement on jurisdiction 
in one state and the application of the law of another state is a very rare occasion 
anyway.664 
The proposed amendment eventually did not make it into the Regulation but, as a matter 
of compromise,665 the preamble provides that a jurisdiction agreement should be one 
659 Financial Markets Law Committee, 2006. Legal Assessment of the Conversion of the Rome Convention 
to a Community Instrument and the Provisions of the Proposed Rome I Regulation. Issue 121, at para. 12.5. 
To be consulted at: http://www.fmlc.org/papers/April06Issue121.pdf. 
660 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the council on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), 
COM (2005) 650 final – 2005/0261 (COD), OJ C318, 23.12.2006, 56, at para. 3.2.2.  
661 Crawford, E., 2006. Choice of Law Clauses in Contracts. Scots Law Times [online], 29, 185, 187. 
Available via: Westlaw. 
662 Boele-Woelki, K. And Lazić, V., 2007. Where Do We Stand on the Rome I Regulation? In Boele-
Woelki, K. And Grosheide, W., eds., 2007. The Future of European Contract Law. Alphen aan de Rijn: 
Kluwer Law International. p. 25. 
663 Lando, O. and Nielsen, P.A., 2007. The Rome I Proposal. Journal of Private International Law 
[online], 3(1), 29, 35. Available via: HeinOnline. 
664 Lando, O. and Nielsen, P.A., 2007. The Rome I Proposal. Journal of Private International Law 
[online], 3(1), 29, 35. Available via: HeinOnline. 
665 Cf. Boele-Woelki, K. And Lazić, V., 2007. Where Do We Stand on the Rome I Regulation? In Boele-
Woelki, K. And Grosheide, W., eds., 2007. The Future of European Contract Law. Alphen aan de Rijn: 
Kluwer Law International. p. 26 juncto p. 20.  
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of the factors to be taken into account in determining whether the parties had made a 
tacit choice of law.666 As mentioned at the beginning of this discussion, it is unclear 
what the added value of this recital is. What does it mean when it says that a jurisdiction 
agreement should be taken into account? And, as it is one of the factors to be taken into 
account, which other factors should be taken into account and are those of less 
importance as they are not explicitly mentioned in the preamble or is that irrelevant and 
do they bear equal importance?  
At present, there is only national case law to guide us and there will be no certainty in 
the matter until the CJEU has ruled on it.667 In relation to party autonomy it is submitted 
that an emphasis on a choice of court clause, in determining whether an implied choice 
of law was made and therefore in the absence of such express choice, must be 
defended. 668  The reason for this is one which was mentioned in relation to the 
discussion on the Rome I proposal, namely that very often parties choose the domestic 
law of the chosen forum as the law applicable to their contractual relationship. The fact 
that they sometimes do not, however, means that an implied choice must not be inferred 
merely from a jurisdiction clause. In that respect it must be mentioned that, although 
currently there may be a fixation on questions of jurisdiction, it must not be forgotten 
that choice of law remains the true foundation of the conflict of laws.669  
Such an approach, with emphasis on the choice of court clause would be in line with 
the position at common law, but it is unclear whether it is in line with the position under 
Belgian law as the Belgian Code of Private International law refers to the Rome 
Convention as determining the law applicable to contractual obligations. 670  As 
concluded here, the position as to how much weight should be attached to a choice of 
jurisdiction and which other factors are relevant and to what extent, is as of yet unclear.  
666 (12) Preamble Rome I. 
667  Similarly: Briggs, A., 2008. Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. p. 235. See also: De Meyer, J. and Erauw, J., 2009. Het recht van toepassing op 
verbintenissen uit overeenkomst volgens de nieuwe Rome I-Verordening. In Erauw, J. and Taelman, P., 
eds., 2009. Nieuw international privaatrecht: meer Europees, meer globaal. Mechelen: Kluwer. p. 277-
278. 
668 See also: Response by Professor Peter Stone to the Green Paper COM(2002) 654 final of 14th January 
2003, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/rome_i/contributions/university_essex_en.pdf. 
669  Sim, C., 2013. Choice of Law and Anti-Suit Injunctions Relocating Comity. International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly [online], 62(3), 702, 718. Available via: Westlaw. 
670 Art. 98 Code PIL. 
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As stated above, although it must be applauded that the discrepancies between the 
different language versions have been tackled, so that the English, Dutch and German 
language versions now mirror the French, it is doubtful whether this will be enough. As 
things stand, it may be expected that case law will continue to show that the relevant 
provision is applied in accordance with a different threshold depending on the forum. 
This is not just a problem in terms of legal certainty and predictability but also in terms 
of party autonomy, as, depending on the forum in which the question of implied choice 
arises, the decision of the court as to whether there was a choice or not may be different. 
Yet parties may rely on the belief that their implied choice would be recognised by the 
competent court and not see the need to make an express choice. Unless there is absolute 
certainty as to which court will hear the claim, that is, at least the claim that there is an 
implied choice of law, this is problematic in terms of party autonomy. The previous 
chapter came to the conclusion that absolute certainty is not yet achieved671 and it is 
questionable whether it ever will be because discretion of the courts will inevitably lead 
to an increased risk of different interpretations and applications. To ensure that both 
legal certainty and party autonomy are safeguarded, further guidance on a tacit choice 
of law is therefore required. In that sense the Conversion of the Rome Convention into 
the Rome I Regulation is a missed opportunity. 
 
3.3 Choice of non-state law 
 
As mentioned above, 672  the Rome I Regulation embraces a very liberal attitude 
towards party autonomy. It has been said that the right to choose the applicable law is 
a fundamental right673  which comprises the right of the parties to a contract to choose 
which law will apply to the disputes arising out of their contractual relationship. The 
question must be asked just how liberal the Rome I Regulation is towards party 
autonomy, with particular reference to which law the parties can choose as the 
applicable law. 
671 See conclusion chapter 6. 
672 Section supra. 
673 De Meyer, J. and Erauw, J., 2009. Het recht van toepassing op verbintenissen uit overeenkomst 
volgens de nieuwe Rome I-Verordening. In Erauw, J. and Taelman, P., eds., 2009. Nieuw international 
privaatrecht: meer Europees, meer globaal. Mechelen: Kluwer. p. 294. 
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First it must be noted that the Regulation provides that a choice by the parties of the 
law of a non-Member State is respected just as much as choice of the law of a Member-
State.674 It has been argued that this means that a choice by the parties is absolutely free 
in the sense that no connection is needed between the law chosen on the one hand, and 
the parties or the contract on the other hand.675 This is, in principle, true although it 
must be mentioned that Articles 3(3) and 3(4) contain a minor exception to that. Article 
3(3) provides that, where all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of choice 
are located in a country other than the country whose law has been chosen, the choice 
of the parties shall not prejudice the application of provisions of the law of that other 
country which cannot be derogated from by agreement. This provision aims to prevent 
that parties to an entirely domestic contract can avoid the application of the mandatory 
rules of the domestic law concerned by a simple choice of law. It is submitted however, 
that this provision will apply only very rarely as it does not say that the mandatory rules 
of the country with which the situation has most connections cannot be escaped. Just 
those of the country with which the situation has all connections cannot be escaped.676 
Article 3(4) contains a similar arrangement in regards to EU law, which is a novelty 
compared to its predecessor which did not contain such a provision.  However, as it is 
phrased as restrictively as Article 3(3), it will probably be applied just as rarely. 
Apart from these minor limitations to party autonomy there are limitations which are 
far more significant and which are inspired by other policy objectives of EU private 
international law, notably the objective to protect parties which are regarded as weaker 
parties to a contract. Those rules, and whether and how they limit party autonomy in 
favour of protection of weaker parties, will be the subject of chapter 8. This chapter will 
now focus on another more substantial limitation on party autonomy, namely the fact 
that parties could not, under the Rome Convention, choose as the applicable law a non-
state system of law. Whether this has changed under the Rome I Regulation and to 
which extent, will be assessed against this background, after which a critical analysis 
of the current situation will be conducted.    
674 Art. 2 Rome I. 
675 Solomon, D., 2008. Private International Law of Contracts in Europe: Advances and Retreats. Tulane 
Law Review [online], 82(5), 1724. Available via: HeinOnline; Van Calster, G., 2013. European Private 
International Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing. p. 132. 
676 Symeonides, S., 2010. Party Autonomy in Rome I and II from a Comparative Perspective. In Boele-
Woelki, K., et al., 2010. Convergence and Divergence in Private International Law. Liber Amicorum 
Kurt Siehr. The Hague: Eleven International Publishing. p. 526. 
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Under the Rome Convention, the parties could only choose a state law, i.e. the law of a 
country.677 This was deduced from the fact that Article 1(1) said that the rules of the 
Convention applied to contractual obligations in any situation involving a choice 
between the laws of different countries.678 Thus, other forms of law such as EU law, 
international conventions, divine law (e.g; Sharia law), lex mercatoria etc. could not be 
chosen. This was confirmed by, for example, English case law.679 
The academic discussion as to whether parties should be allowed to choose a non-state 
body of law as the law governing their contractual relationship has existed for and it 
does not seem that the matter has been settled. Several arguments pro and contra such 
a choice will be discussed and analysed here, with reference to the Rome I proposal, as 
this amended the Convention in order to allow a choice of a non-national legal system. 
As the provision in question did not make it into the Regulation, the discussion and 
analysis of the different arguments will inform the assessment of the current rule. 
In order to “further boost the impact of the parties’ will”,680 the proposal  for the Rome 
I Regulation contained a provision (which was not adopted) which expressly allowed a 
choice for a non-state body of law. Its Article 3(1) and (2) provided: 
“1. Without prejudice to Articles 5, 6 and 7, a contract shall be governed by the law 
chosen by the parties. [...] 
2. The Parties may also choose as the applicable law the principles and rules of the 
substantive law of contract recognised internationally or in the community.  
However, questions relating to matters governed by such principles or rules which are 
not expressly settled by them shall be governed by the general principles underlying 
them or, failing such principles, in accordance with the law applicable in the absence 
of choice under this Regulation.” 
677 LANDO, O., 1996-1997. Some Issues relating to the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. 
King’s College Law Journal, 7, 55 at p. 60. 
678 See e.g. Sambugaro, G., 2008. What “law” to choose for international contracts?.The European Legal 
Forum [online], 3(I), 126, 130. Available via:  http://www.simons-law.com/library/pdf/e/887.pdf. 
679 Shamil Bank of Bahrein EC v Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ. 19; Halpern v 
Halpern [2007] EWCA Civ. 291.  
680 Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the 
Council on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), COM (05) 650, final. At p. 5. 
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The proposal therefore explicitly allowed for a choice of the UNIDROIT principles, the 
Principles of European Contract Law or a possible future optional EU instrument. A 
choice of lex mercatoria, however, was not an option - according to the Commission 
because it lacked precision. Private codifications not adequately recognised by the 
international community were not an option either.681 As mentioned this provision was 
deleted and therefore did not make it into the Regulation. The question then arises 
whether it should have and whether, as a result, the conversion of the Convention into 
the Regulation missed an opportunity. 
Those not in favour of an option to choose a non-state law argue that there is little 
demand by practitioners for a provision allowing a choice of non-state law. It would 
therefore be an issue of little importance.682 This argument is not convincing. Even if it 
is true that this is an issue of limited practical importance,683 that does not render it 
unimportant from an academic point of view. Furthermore, just because a certain 
phenomenon is rare, does not mean that there must not be any legal provision for it. 
There is case law in which parties tried to rely on a choice of non-state law in 
litigation,684 which indicates that it cannot be said that the matter is irrelevant. 
It has also been argued that non-state rules are seldom as consistent as state law and 
often lack provisions regarding burden of proof, formal validity, consequences of 
breach of contract and so on.685 A choice of such rules would therefore inevitably create 
uncertainty and ambiguity.686 This must be put into perspective. Firstly, it has been 
pointed out that it has already become a widespread practice in international trade to 
refer to international conventions and the customs of international trade (lex mercatoria) 
681 Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the 
Council on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), COM (05) 650, final. At p. 5. 
682 Garcimartí, Alférez, F., 2008. The Rome I Regulation: Much Ado about Nothing? The European 
Legal Forum [online], 2(I), 61, 67. Available via: http://www.simons-law.com/library/pdf/e/884.pdf.  
683 Generally, see: McLachlan, C., 2004. International Litigation and the Reworking of the Conflict of 
Laws. Law Quarterly Review [online], 120, 580-616. Available via: Westlaw. 
684 E.g. Shamil Bank of Bahrein EC v Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ. 19; Halpern v 
Halpern [2007] EWCA Civ. 291. 
685  Response of the United Kingdom to the Commission’s Rome I Green Paper: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/doc/united_kingdom_en.pdf. 
686 Magnus, U. and Mankowski, P., 2003. Joint response to the Green Paper on the Conversion of the 
Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations into a Community 
Instrument and its Modernization: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/doc/university_hamburg_en.pdf; 
Response by Professor Peter Stone to the Green Paper COM(2002) 654 final of 14th January 2003, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/rome_i/contributions/university_essex_en.pdf.  
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as these are generally much more focused on international transactions than national 
law systems.687 By providing parties with the opportunity to choose non-state law as 
the applicable law EU private international law would therefore be adapted to the needs 
of modern business.688  
Furthermore, the choice of a non-state law as the law applicable to an international 
contractual relationship is already widely accepted in cases before arbitration.689 If 
arbitrators can apply non-state law, while they are very often not judges by profession, 
why would courts not be able to do so? Most states have courts specialised in 
commercial disputes, so that the judges faced with such a choice of non-state law will 
probably have sufficient specialist knowledge and experience to deal with those.690 
Furthermore, although this depends on the forum, there may be rules in the domestic 
legal systems whereby the parties can render some assistance to the court in establishing 
what the chosen foreign law is. Under Belgian law, for example, the judge may require 
the cooperation of the parties if he cannot establish the content of the applicable law.691 
Under English law, expert witnesses will inform the judge of the content of foreign law, 
relevant authority and assistance in making findings.692  
Finally, purely in terms of respecting and enhancing party autonomy, it must be 
regretted that the provision was deleted from the proposal. In relation to party autonomy, 
if anything, it can be argued that the proposal did not go far enough because parties 
could still not rely on a choice of lex mercatoria for example. 
The amendment to Article 3 was deleted by the European Parliament because it was of 
the opinion that it was only appropriate to refer to the use of such bodies of non-state 
687 Boele-Woelki; K., 1996. Principles and Private International Law. The UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Arbitration and the Principles of European Contract Law: How to Apply them 
to International Contracts. Uniform Law Review, 1, 652. 
688 Boele-Woelki, K. And Lazić, V., 2007. Where Do We Stand on the Rome I Regulation? In Boele-
Woelki, K. And Grosheide, W., eds., 2007. The Future of European Contract Law. Alphen aan de Rijn: 
Kluwer Law International. p. 28. 
689 Green paper on the Conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations into a Community Instrument and its Modernization, COM (02) 654, final; Lando, O. and 
Nielsen, P.A., 2007. The Rome I Proposal. Journal of Private International Law [online], 3(1), 29, 31. 
Available via: HeinOnline. 
690 Lando, O. and Nielsen, P.A., 2007. The Rome I Proposal. Journal of Private International Law 
[online], 3(1), 29, 33. Available via: HeinOnline. 
691 Art. 15(2) Code PIL. 
692 MCC Proceeds Inc v Bishopsgate Investment plc [1999], C.L.C. 417. 
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law as UNIDROIT in a recital rather than in the enacting terms.693 As a result recital 
13 of the Regulation now provides: 
“This Regulation does not preclude parties from incorporating by reference into their 
contract a non-state body of law or an international convention.”  
What, then, is the effect of this recital on party autonomy? It is seemingly still 
prohibited to choose non-state law because because rules incorporated by reference are 
contractual terms rather than a choice of law stricto sensu and so, unfortunately, the 
meaningfulness of such incorporation by reference is, from a private international law 
perspective, very limited.  When parties incorporate non-state law by reference into 
their contract, this means that the chosen non-national rules receive the status of 
contract clauses. As a result the effect of the rules will be limited to assisting in the 
interpretation of the contract. Matters affecting the contract as a whole, on the other 
hand, are dealt with by the applicable national law.  An example of this can be found in 
Halpern v Halpern,694 regarding Jewish law, where it can be argued that the parties’ 
choice of Jewish law was not respected since a national law applied to several issues. 
Furthermore, because rules incorporated by reference are contractual terms rather than 
a choice of law they are subject to the mandatory domestic rules of the applicable 
national law. More importantly, even non-mandatory rules of the applicable national 
law may cause the non-application of non-state rules incorporated by reference, such 
as was the case in Shamil Bank of Bahrein EC v Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd,695 
where it was held that a reference to the principles of Sharia’a was too vague. As a 
result, the court granted the claim for interest upon a loan, although the sources upon 
which Sharia’a is based, Qur’an and Sunnah, clearly do not allow for the charging of 
interest upon a loan. It is hard to see how the parties to the contract would have desired 
this outcome when they incorporated the reference to Sharia’a in their contract. 
In brief, it must be said that the Regulation made a very small step in the right direction 
in terms of enhancing party autonomy since it now expressly mentions in its preamble 
that the parties to a contract have more legal systems to choose from if they incorporate 
693  Amendment 14 of the Commission’s Proposal: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A6-2007-
0450&language=EN&mode=XML. 
694 Halpern v Halpern [2007] EWCA Civ. 291. 
695 Shamil Bank of Bahrein EC v Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ. 19. 
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the rules in their contract. There is, on the other hand, no real reason to think they did 
not have this possibility before the insertion of recital 13. The enhancement of party 
autonomy, if any, is therefore of a symbolic rather than a real practical nature. It must 
be regretted, therefore, that the possibility to choose non-state law is not provided for 
in the actual legal instrument but only in its preamble. That means it is not part of the 
binding legal instrument but a tool for its interpretation and application. Furthermore 
the Regulation itself will still determine the applicable law.  
It is also regrettable that the Commission, in regards to the proposal, said that a choice 
for the application of lex mercatoria was invalid because these rules are either not 
precise enough or insufficiently recognised by the international community.696 That 
could indicate we are still a long way from true recognition of absolute party autonomy 
in regards to which law may be chosen by the parties as the applicable law. 
In that sense the transformation of the Convention into the Regulation is a missed 
opportunity, although it must be acknowledged that there is of course clearly no 
consensus yet on whether an option to choose a non-state law as the applicable law is 
desirable. It is submitted that it is for reasons of fully respecting party autonomy as well 
as reflecting commercial reality and present day global business. Parties should have 
an all-inclusive range of legal systems to choose from so that a choice of a non-national 
system would not lead to the application of the rules determining the applicable law in 
the absence of a choice by the parties. The latter result  is not what they intended under 
such circumstance and therefore clearly undermines party autonomy. 
One final note must be made however, in regards to the potential problem, already 
flagged up in this section, that a particular non-state legal system may not contain 
provisions on certain matters such as burden of proof, consequences of a breach etc. 
The solution opted for in the proposal was a sensible one to resolve such problems. The 
Regulation could provide that, where the law chosen by the parties does not address 
certain questions, these should be answered applying the law which would have been 
applicable in the absence of choice under the Regulation. 
 
696 Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the 
Council on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), COM (05) 650, final. 
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 4. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, it must be said that the lis pendens rule in the original Brussels I 
Regulation was very unsatisfactory in terms of respecting jurisdiction agreements and 
therefore party autonomy. Despite a clear and exclusive jurisdiction agreement, parties 
could seize a court in bad faith, rendering the chosen court powerless and left with the 
only option of staying its proceedings. The new rule in the Brussels I recast is a big 
improvement in regards to party autonomy as it reverses the priority in the old rule. As 
such, the chosen court will be the court to rule on its jurisdiction first, while the other 
court seized must stay its proceedings. This means great importance is attached to the 
jurisdiction agreement, which must be applauded. The potential difficulties in relation 
to the new rule, as identified in the previous two chapters, do not apply in the context 
of party autonomy.  
Secondly it has been researched what the concept of an implied choice of law is and 
how the recognition of this concept related to party autonomy. It is submitted that it is 
important to recognise such a choice but some problems regarding its application 
emerged. It appeared that the relevant rule had not been applied uniformly throughout 
the EU under the Rome Convention – you are using past tense so suggests no longer a 
problem. Under the Rome Convention this could, at least in part, be explained by the 
differences in terminology depending on the language version used. The fact that the 
Regulation disposed of these differences was therefore positive. My research 
investigated however, whether more fundamental reasons could be identified for this 
lack of uniform interpretation and application. It became clear that it is as of yet 
uncertain in how far a choice of court is relevant to determine the existence of an 
implied choice of law.  The only guidance available consists of national precedent as 
the conversion of the Rome Convention into the Rome I Regulation did not manage to 
appropriately address the problem. It is expected that interpretations will therefore 
continue to vary depending on the forum, which could be problematic in terms of party 
autonomy as the parties may wrongly assume that an express choice is not needed 
because their choice will be clear from the circumstances of the case or the terms of 
their contract.    
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Finally, it has been investigated how far parties are allowed, under the Rome I 
Regulation, to make a choice of a non-state law. This was clearly not an option under 
the Rome Convention and it was proposed in the context of its conversion into the 
Regulation that such a choice, albeit not for any non-state legal system, should be 
allowed. Because of a lack of consensus on the issue, the proposal did not survive, 
which is regrettable in terms of party autonomy. A true respect for, and enhancement 
of, party autonomy means that parties should be allowed to choose whichever legal 
system they want to choose. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 8. Protection of Weaker Parties 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter emphasised that party autonomy is viewed as one of the 
cornerstones of EU private international law. As a result, both the Brussels I and the 
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Rome Regulation contain by way of key provision that the parties to a contract have 
the freedom to choose which court will have jurisdiction and which law will apply to 
their contractual relationship respectively. It was then researched whether these legal 
instruments fully respect and enhance party autonomy in relation to several of their 
provisions. It was concluded that party autonomy is generally encouraged and respected 
but that some improvements could still be made. 
It must be highlighted here, that the pursuit of other policy objectives may lead to a 
limitation of the parties’ freedom to choose. The most obvious objective which may 
produce such a result is the protection of weaker parties, which is the subject of this 
chapter. 
This objective is pursued by both the Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation. 
The preamble of the Rome I Regulation states: “As regards contracts concluded with 
parties regarded as being weaker, those parties should be protected by conflict-of-law 
rules that are more favourable to their interests than the general rules.” The preamble 
of the Brussels I Regulation provides: “In relation to insurance, consumer contracts 
and employment, the weaker party should be protected by rules of jurisdiction more 
favourable to his interests than the general rules provided for.” The question may be 
asked why parties such as consumers and employees need to be protected, or, why rules 
more favourable to their interests are needed. 
Certain types of contracts are characterised by an inherent imbalance between the 
bargaining strength of the parties to it.697 Consumer contracts, individual employment 
contracts and insurance contracts are such agreements because the consumer, the 
employee and the policy holder or beneficiary are typically in a socio-economically 
weaker position than the professional trader, the employer or the insurer respectively.698 
Generally they have less financial resources and less experience in legal matters than 
their contracting partners.699 
697 E.g. Calliess, G., 2011. Rome Regulations. Commentary on the European Rules of the Conflict of 
Laws. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International. p. 125; Oren, J., 2003. International Jurisdiction 
over Consumer Contracts in E-Europe. International and Comparative Law Quarterly [online], 52(3), 
669. Available via: Westlaw. 
698 E.g. Stone, P., 2010. EU Private International Law. 2nd ed. Cheltenham: Elgar European Law. p. 123; 
Tang, Z.S., 2005. Exclusive Choice of Forum Clauses and Consumer Contracts in E-Commerce. Journal 
of Private International Law [online], 1(2), 237-268. Available via: HeinOnline. 
699 Case C-464/01, Gruber v Bay Wa AG [2005], E.C.R. I-439. Para. 34. 
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In order to reduce the imbalance between the parties in the aforementioned contracts, 
several legal systems, such as for example the Belgian legal system,700 contain rules, 
deviating from the general private international law rules, in order to protect the 
interests of weaker parties. These rules typically have two aspects. First, they seek to 
determine jurisdiction and applicable law in a fashion favourable to the weaker party. 
Second, they limit the enforceability of choice of jurisdiction clauses and choice of law 
clauses because of the risk that they have been forced on the weaker party. 
Different legal systems try to achieve protection of the weaker party in different 
ways.701 For example, the English common law system follows a discretion-based 
approach. Thus although English private international law does not contain rules 
specifically targeting consumer or individual employment contracts, the court has the 
discretion not to apply a choice of court clause or a choice of law clause under certain 
circumstances.702 Civil law systems traditionally and typically employ a rule-based 
approach. As such, Belgian law contains specific detailed rules regarding consumer 
contracts and individual employment contracts. More specifically Belgian law provides 
additional grounds of jurisdiction regarding consumer and employment contracts for 
consumers habitually resident in Belgium and for employees habitually carrying out 
their duties in Belgium.703 The applicable law for consumer and employment contracts 
is determined in accordance with the Rome Convention.704 
Similarly EU private international law contains detailed provisions regarding 
jurisdiction and applicable law for these types of contracts and thus follows a rule-based 
approach. Following the research conducted in the previous chapters, it is submitted 
that, at EU level, a rule-based approach must be preferred. Particularly in relation to 
legal certainty and predictability, and the evaluation in chapter 5, it is submitted that 
discretion for the courts could severely undermine that policy objective. As a result, a 
rule-based approach is the more desirable option.  
700 See chapter 4. 
701 Tang, Z., 2005. Exclusive Choice of Forum Clauses and Consumer Contracts in E-Commerce. 
Journal of Private International Law [online], 1(2), pp. 237-268. Available via: HeinOnline. The author 
discusses this in-depth re. electronic consumer contracts. 
3 E.g. The Hollandia [1983] 1 A.C. 565. 
703 Art. 97 juncto Art 96 Code PIL; see chapter 4. 
704 Art. 98 Code PIL; see chapter 4. 
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This chapter will discuss the rules first, and then critically evaluate whether they 
achieve the protection of the weaker parties they aim for. The chapter focuses on 
consumer contracts as exemplary of contracts in which one of the parties is a weaker 
party. The reason for this focus is twofold. First, some of the provisions regarding 
jurisdiction and applicable law for consumer contracts have undergone changes over 
the years. These changes will inform the evaluation as to whether the rules achieve their 
underlying objectives. Second, it is contended that the EU has been at the forefront 
when it comes to the implementation of consumer protection policies705 and has even 
been called a true pioneer in this area.706 
The question this chapter seeks to answer is whether the rules achieve effective weaker 
party protection and, if so, whether this is to the detriment of other policy objectives. 
As a preliminary point, one argument in regards to consumer protection rules in private 
international law must be addressed. It has been said that these rules are of little 
practical importance because litigation is not an appropriate method to address 
international consumer claims707 as the claims will often be of little monetary value so 
that the cost of litigation, even in the consumer’s home country, exceeds the value of 
the claim.708 Although this may be true, it must be highlighted that this argument takes 
nothing away from the fact that some consumer claims are different in nature so that a 
protective regime in fact does have practical relevance. Furthermore the argument does 
not render insignificant the academic relevance of the rules and what they are trying to 
achieve.  
 
2. Consumer contracts 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
705 Gillies, L., 2007. Choice-of-Law Rules for Electronic Consumer Contracts: Replacement of the Rome 
Convention by the Rome I Regulation. Journal of Private International Law [online], 3(1), 94. Available 
via: HeinOnline. 
706 Tang, Z.S., 2010. Review Article Private International Law in Consumer Contracts: A European 
Perspective. Journal of Private International Law [online], 6(1), 225. Available via: EBSCOHost. 
707 Hill, J., 2008. Cross-Border Consumer Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 9-10 and p 
132. 
708 Tang, Z.S., 2010. Review Article Private International Law in Consumer Contracts: A European 
Perspective. Journal of Private International Law [online], 6(1), 235. Available via: EBSCOHost.  
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The European Union has been concerned with the issue of consumer protection for a 
long time even though the Treaty of Rome 1957709 did not contain a specific legal basis 
for such protection. The introduction of a formal basis happened in the Single European 
Act710 which supplemented the Treaty of Rome by article 100a (3),711 stating that "the 
Commission, in its proposals […] concerning health, safety, environmental protection 
and consumer protection, will take as a base a high level of protection.”  
The Treaty of Maastricht 1992712 inserted a specific article into the EC Treaty under its 
“Title XI Consumer Protection”. Article 129a stated that “The Community shall 
contribute to the attainment of a high level of consumer protection through: (a) 
measures adopted pursuant to article 100a in the context of the completion of the 
internal market; (b) specific action which supports and supplements the policy pursued 
by the Member States to protect the health, safety and economic interests of consumers 
and to provide adequate information to consumers.” 
The Treaty of Amsterdam 1997,713 which also renumbers the EU and EC Treaties, 
alters this provision (now Art. 153 EC).714 The main change consists of the addition of 
a paragraph stating that “consumer protection requirements shall be taken into account 
in defining and implementing other Community policies and activities.”715 
Furthermore, through the Treaty of Lisbon 2007,716 the Charter on Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union717 became legally binding: Article 1(2) TFEU states that “this 
Treaty and the Treaty on European Union constitute the Treaties on which the Union is 
founded”718 and Article 6 TEU in turn states that “the Union recognises the rights, 
freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
709  Treaty of Rome Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), OJ 25 .03.1957 (not 
published). 
710 Single European Act, OJ L169, 29.06.1987. 
711 Now art. 114(3) TFEU. 
712 Treaty on European Union (EU), OJ C191, 29.07.1992. 
713  Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Related Acts, OJ C340, 10.11.1997. 
714 Now art. 12 and 169 TFEU. 
715 Art. 153 (2); now art. 12 TFEU. 
716 OJ C306, 17.12.2007. 
717 OJ C83, 389, 30.03.2010. 
718 Art. 1(2) TFEU. 
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Union, […] which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties”.719 Article 36 of the 
Charter states that “Union policies shall ensure a high level of consumer protection”. 
The original Brussels Convention 1968, 720  which laid down EU-wide rules for 
jurisdiction in cross-border disputes, did not originally contain specific rules regarding 
jurisdiction over consumer contracts. It did specifically protect buyers in instalment 
sales and borrowers in loan contracts as the weaker parties in those two types of 
contracts,721 but it did not mention consumers. However, the Court of Justice decided 
that these provisions did not apply to commercial contracts, which suggests that it 
interpreted these rules as protecting weaker parties.722 
It is therefore not surprising that the 1978 Accession Convention, which enabled those 
Member States which joined the then EC after 1968 to accede to the Brussels 
Convention, inserted a section on jurisdiction over consumer contracts in the Brussels 
Convention.723 This insertion was undoubtedly influenced not just by the CJEU’s case 
law but also by the drafting of the Rome Convention 1980,724 which laid down EU-
wide rules for the applicable law in cross-border disputes involving contracts and which 
contained an article on the law applicable to certain consumer contracts. This 
Convention had been prepared since 1969, a preparation in which the Member States 
who joined the EC in 1973 were involved.725  
The Brussels I and Rome I Regulations, successors of these Conventions, both contain 
specific rules on consumer contracts as well. The conversion of the Brussels 
Convention into a Regulation took place in 2001, while the Rome Convention was 
converted into the Rome I Regulation in 2008.726 It must be noted that one of the aims 
pursued by the conversion of the Rome Convention was to bring the provisions on 
719 Art. 6 TEU. 
720 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, OJ L299, 31.12.1972, 32. 
721 Art. 13-15 1968 Brussels Convention (original). 
722 Case 150/77, Société Bertrand v Paul Ott KG [1978] E.C.R. 1431. 
723 Convention of Accession of 9 October 1978 of the Kingdom of Denmark, of Ireland and of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and to the Protocol on its Interpretation by the Court of 
Justice (78/884/EEC), OJ L304, 30.10.1978, 1. 
724 Collins, L. et al. eds. 2006. Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws. 14th ed. London: Sweet 
& Maxwell. p. 440. 
725 For an in-depth discussion of this process see: Guiliano, M. and Lagarde, P., 1980. Report on the 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, OJ C282, 31.10.1980, p. 1. 
726 See chapter 1. 
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consumer contracts back in line with those in the Brussels regime that had been revised 
seven years prior.727 Because of this aim for synchronism between the two regimes,728 
the case law available on the consumer contract provisions in the Brussels regime is 
also relevant to the Rome regime. First it will be examined what a consumer contract 
is according to the Regulations. 
 
2.2 Definition of a consumer contract 
 
In Brussels I a consumer contract is defined as a contract concluded by a person for a 
purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession, the consumer, 
with a person who pursues commercial or professional activities, the professional.729 
Rome I defines a consumer contract as a contract concluded by a natural person for a 
purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession (the consumer) 
with another person acting in the exercise of his trade or profession (the 
professional).730  
First it must be noted that Brussels I defines the consumer as a person, while Rome I 
defines him as a natural person. This difference exists not only in the English language 
version of the Regulations but also in a number of other language versions.731 It must 
therefore be assumed that this is no erroneous omission of the word natural in the 
English version of Brussels I, especially since the Brussels I Regulation recast732 does 
not contain the word either. The question then arises whether both Regulations seek to 
protect the same category of contract parties. 
The text of Rome I makes it clear that only a natural person can be a consumer. Since 
Brussels I only mentions the word person however, technically, a consumer could be 
727 Calliess, G., 2011. Rome Regulations. Commentary on the European Rules of the Conflict of Laws. 
Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International. p. 131. 
728 See also: (7) Preamble Rome I; Guiliano, M. and Lagarde, P., 1980. Report on the Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, OJ C282, 31.10.1980, 23. 
729 Art. 15 (1) juncto Art. 15 (1) (c) Brussels I. As mentioned the definition remained unchanged in the 
Brussels I recast. 
730 Art. 6 (1) Rome I. 
731 i.e. the Dutch, French and German versions. 
732 Art. 17 Brussels I recast.  
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both a natural person and an artificial (or legal) person.733 It is difficult to see how an 
artificial person could ever be classed as a consumer because it would be nearly 
impossible, if not illegal, for an artificial person to contract for a purpose outside its 
trade or profession. 734  Furthermore Rome I expressly refers to consistency with 
Brussels I.735 It must therefore be assumed that the definition of a consumer and of a 
consumer contract are intended to be identical in both instruments, which seems to be 
the approach taken by the courts. In Shearson Lehmann Hutton736 the ECJ held that the 
provisions in Brussels I regarding jurisdiction over consumer contracts refer only to 
final consumers acting in a private capacity i.e. the end users of a product or service. 
In Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl737 the ECJ specified that a consumer is an individual. 
While it seems to be clear from case law that a consumer is by necessity a natural person 
in Brussels I, as in Rome I, it would have been consistent and more accurate to express 
this in the relevant provision of Brussels I. As mentioned, however, the Brussels I recast 
did not address this inconsistency and thus still refers to “a contract concluded by a 
person” rather than “a contract concluded by a natural person”.   
Second, the definition of a consumer contract as a contract concluded for a purpose 
outside the consumer’s trade or profession needs some further clarification before the 
extent to which weaker party protection is achieved can be discussed. 
Before the term “consumer contract” was even expressly used in the Brussels 
Convention,738 the CJEU had already interpreted the special rules on instalment sales 
and loans as applying only to consumer contracts. The Court held: 
“A restrictive interpretation of the second paragraph of Article 14 , in conformity with 
the objectives pursued by Section 4, entails the restriction of the jurisdictional 
advantage described above to buyers who are in need of protection, their economic 
position being one of weakness in comparison with sellers by reason of the fact that 
733 See the definition of person in e.g.: Garner, B.A. ,ed., 1999. Black’s Law Dictionary. 7th ed. St. Paul: 
West Group; Woodley, M.G., ed. 2009. Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary. 11th ed. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell. 
734 See the discussion of this criterion infra in this chapter. 
735 (7) and, for consumer contracts specifically, (24) preamble Rome I. 
736 Case C-89/91, Shearson Lehmann Hutton Inc. v TVB Treuhandgesellschaft für Vermögensverwaltung 
und Beteiligungen mbH [1993], E.C.R. I-139. Para. 22. 
737 Case C-269/95, Francesco Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl [1997], E.C.R. I-3767. 
738 See section 2.1 of this chapter. 
177 
 
                                                     
they are private final consumers and are not engaged, when buying the product 
acquired on instalment credit terms, in trade or professional activities.”739 
Thus borrowers or buyers who were not private final consumers gained no additional 
protection under the Brussels Convention. 
As mentioned in section 2.1, the changes made to the Brussels Convention by the 1978 
Accession Convention incorporated the notion of consumer contracts and later case law 
clarified the definition of a consumer contract further. 
In Shearson Lehmann Hutton v TVB740 a private individual, a judge by profession and 
domiciled in Germany, contracted with an American company through their German 
subsidiary, following an advertisement in the German press. He later wanted to sue 
them and assigned his right to claim to a German fiduciary company, TVB. TVB 
brought an action against the American company in the German courts. The question 
then arose whether TVB, the assignee of the claim, could also be classed as a consumer, 
as the assignor would have been. 
The CJEU responded in the negative. It was held that: 
“the special arrangements laid down in Article 13 et seq. of the Convention are 
prompted by a concern to protect the consumer as the party to the contract who is 
deemed to be economically weaker and legally less experienced than the other party 
and that, therefore, he should not be discouraged from taking legal proceedings by 
being obliged to bring an action before the courts of the State where the other party is 
domiciled.741 The protective function of these provisions means that the application of 
the special jurisdictional rules laid down for this purpose by the Convention should not 
be extended to persons for whom such protection is not justified.742 It is clear from the 
wording and the function of [article 13 and 14 of the Brussels Convention] that they 
refer only to final consumers acting in a private capacity and not in the course of their 
trade or profession, who are bound by one of the contracts listed in Article 13 and who 
739 Case 150/77, Société Bertrand v Paul Ott KG [1978] E.C.R. 1431, at 21. 
740Case C-89/91, Shearson Lehmann Hutton Inc. v TVB Treuhandgesellschaft für Vermögensverwaltung 
und Beteiligungen mbH [1993], E.C.R. I-139. 
741 Shearson Lehmann Hutton v TVB, at 18. 
742 Shearson Lehmann Hutton v TVB, at 19. 
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are a party to proceedings in conformity with Article 14.743 The Convention protects 
the consumer only if he personally is the plaintiff or defendant in proceedings.”744 
This conclusion seems logical. As was discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the 
protective rules in EU private international law instruments are intended to protect 
parties who are regarded to be in a socio-economically weaker position because they 
have less financial means and less legal experience or expertise. The fiduciary company 
in Shearson Lehmann Hutton is not such a party. It is therefore difficult to see how 
granting them the benefit of the Brussels I protective regime for consumers would add 
to the protection of weaker parties.   
In Benincasa745 an Italian company, Dentalkit, licenced Benincasa to set up and run a 
Dentalkit franchise in Germany. Benincasa set up his shop, paid the initial fee and 
bought some goods from Dentalkit, but then ceased trading. Benincasa started 
proceedings in Germany, claiming, first, that the choice of court agreement favouring 
the Italian courts was void because the whole franchising agreement was void. Second, 
he argued that he was a consumer as he never started trading. He should therefore be 
allowed to sue in Germany, where he was domiciled.746 
The question relevant to this section therefore was whether a person who has concluded 
a contract with a view to pursuing a trade or profession, not at the present time but in 
the future, may be regarded as a consumer. 
 
The ECJ, referring to Shearson Lehmann Hutton, stated: 
“Article 13 [Brussels Convention] [...] affects only a private final consumer, not 
engaged in trade or professional activities. In order to determine whether a person has 
the capacity of a consumer, [...] reference must be made to the position of the person 
concerned in a particular contract, having regard to the nature and aim of that 
contract, and not to the subjective situation of the person concerned. Consequently, 
only contracts concluded for the purpose of satisfying an individual's own needs in 
743 Shearson Lehmann Hutton v TVB, at 22. 
744 Shearson Lehmann Hutton v TVB, at 23. 
745 Case C-269/95, Francesco Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl [1997], E.C.R. I-3767. 
746 Based on Art. 14 of the Brussels Convention. 
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terms of private consumption come under the provisions designed to protect the 
consumer as the party deemed to be the weaker party economically. The specific 
protection sought to be afforded by those provisions is unwarranted in the case of 
contracts for the purpose of trade or professional activity, even if that activity is only 
planned for the future, since the fact that an activity is in the nature of a future activity 
does not divest it in any way of its trade or professional character.”747 
This decision seems consistent with the approach opted for in the Convention (and the 
current Regulation), which is that the defendant must be sued in the courts of the 
Member State where he is domiciled.748 As such, the provisions on consumer contracts 
provide an exception to that general rule. It seems logical that this exception must only 
be allowed in those cases specifically protecting consumers as the weaker party to the 
contract. A person contracting for the purpose of a trade or commercial activity is not 
a consumer and this is what Benincasa was doing. Although his commercial activity 
had not started yet, he was contracting for the purpose of that activity.   
The issue of so called “mixed” contracts, i.e. contracts which relate to activities which 
are partly business and partly private, arose in Gruber v Bay Wa AG749. A farmer in 
Austria bought tiles from a supplier established in Germany to reroof his farmhouse 
which was used partly as a private dwelling and partly for the housing of livestock and 
fodder. Claiming that the tiles were defective, the farmer commenced proceedings in 
Austria, relying on the Brussels Convention rules on jurisdiction over consumer 
contracts. The question therefore was whether a person who concluded a contract 
relating to goods intended for purposes which were in part within and in part outside 
his trade or profession, could rely on these provisions. It was held that the answer to 
this question was in the negative unless the professional usage was negligible.750  
Had the CJEU decided in the positive, that would mean many commercial contracts 
could be made into “consumer” contracts simply by ensuring that a small part of the 
goods or services contracted for was to be used for private purposes. That way parties 
747 Benincasa, at 15-17. 
748 Art. 2 Brussels Convention; now Art. 2 Brussels I Regulation; Art. 4 Brussels I recast. 
749 Case C-464/01, Gruber v Bay Wa AG [2005], E.C.R. I-439. 
750 Gruber v Bay Wa, at 41. 
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who are not really weaker parties could enjoy the same protection, which would not be 
in line with the EU’s objective.  
The CJEU, in Gruber v Bay Wa AG, also found that the burden of establishing that the 
business use is only negligible lies on the person wishing to rely on the special 
jurisdiction rules, and his opponent may produce evidence to the contrary. 751 
Furthermore it was held that: 
“the court seized must also determine whether the other party to the contract could 
reasonably have been unaware of the private purpose of the supply because the 
supposed consumer had in fact, by his own conduct with respect to the other party, 
given the latter the impression that he was acting for business purposes. That would be 
the case, for example, where an individual orders, without giving further information, 
items which could in fact be used for his business, or uses business stationery to do so, 
or has goods delivered to his business address, or mentions the possibility of recovering 
value added tax. In such a case, the special rules of jurisdiction for matters relating to 
consumer contracts enshrined in articles 13–15 are not applicable even if the contract 
does not as such serve a non-negligible business purpose, and the individual must be 
regarded, in view of the impression he has given to the other party acting in good faith, 
as having renounced the protection afforded by those provisions.”752 
In the sections of the judgment cited here, the CJEU refers to the legitimate expectations 
of the other party to the contract. The Guiliano-Lagarde report also mentions this issue 
and refers to the situation where a person acts primarily outside his trade or profession 
but where the other party did not know this and, taking all the circumstances into 
account, should not reasonably have known this. Under such circumstances the good 
faith of the other party is protected so that the alleged consumer cannot rely on the 
protection afforded to consumers in the relevant provisions.753 
It is clear from the law discussed that the concepts of “consumer” and “consumer 
contract” must be strictly construed because they enshrine an exception to the general 
rules. 754  As such, apart from the cases expressly provided for, the attribution of 
751 Gruber v Bay Wa, at 46. 
752 Gruber v Bay Wa, at 51-53. 
753 Guiliano, M. and Lagarde, P., 1980. Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations, OJ C282, 31.10.1980, 1. 
754 See infra. 
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jurisdiction to the courts of the claimant’s domicile should not be favoured.755 Similarly 
it must be argued that the favourable applicable law regime should only be applied in 
the cases expressly provided for. 
It could be argued that, because of the wording of the relevant instruments themselves, 
and a fortiori because of the strict interpretation of these, some parties are not protected 
even though they should be, based on the underlying policy objective,756 because of 
their weaker negotiating and economical position as compared to the professional 
trader.757 For example a hairdresser buying six chairs to put in his salon, compared with 
a couple buying six chairs to put around their dining room table, are arguable in a 
similarly weak position. The couple will be classed as consumers and therefore enjoy 
the protection of the relevant private international law provisions. The hairdresser, 
buying the chairs for a professional purpose, will not be classed as a consumer and can 
therefore not rely on the same provisions. It could be said that the only difference 
between them is that the hairdresser buys the chairs for his customers’ use and the 
couple for their personal use. According to the case law discussed this difference 
between them is enough to render the protective provisions inapplicable to the contract 
concluded by the hairdresser.758 It could be argued, however, that the hairdresser is the 
weaker party in his contract with the company selling the chairs and therefore equally 
deserving of the protection provided for the couple. 
As such it must be assessed whether the definition of a consumer contract should be 
revised for the purposes of protecting weaker parties.759 Recalling the definition of a 
consumer contract – a contract concluded by a person for a purpose which can be 
regarded as being outside his trade or profession with a person who pursues commercial 
755 Case C-220/88, Dumez France v Hessische Landesbank (Helaba) [1990], E.C.R. I-49, at 16 and 19; 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, at 17; Benincasa, at 14; Case C-168/02, Kronhofer v Maier [2004], E.C.R. I-
6009, at 20. 
756 Tang, Z.S., 2009. Electronic Consumer Contracts in the Conflict of Laws. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
p. 32. 
757 Tang, Z.S., 2010. Review Article Private International Law in Consumer Contracts: A European 
Perspective. Journal of Private International Law [online], 6(1), 236. Available via: EBSCOHost. 
758 E.g. Case 150/77, Société Bertrand v Paul Ott KG [1978] E.C.R. 1431, at 21. 
759 See also: Wild, C., Weinstein, S. and Riefa, C., 2005. Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 and Internet 
Consumer Contracts: Some Thoughts on Article 15 and the Futility of Applying ‘In the Box” Conflict of 
Law Rules to the ‘Out of the Box’ Borderless World. International Review of Law Computers & 
Technology, 19(1), 14. Available via: EBSCOHost. 
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of professional activities760 - a deletion of the words “or profession”  or “professional” 
in the relevant provisions could be suggested. 
However, this argument and suggestion are open to criticism. Firstly, a professional 
will often seek advice from people with expertise in legal and business matters, such as 
a lawyer or an accountant, placing them in a more powerful position compared to a 
consumer who contracts for, for example, the purchase of goods for private use. 
Secondly, protective law may encourage them to rely on the law rather than due 
diligence by seeking legal advice, when in fact it is not a substitute for such advice, 
especially when starting up a business, being inexperienced, or when things go wrong 
and litigation is imminent. However, as they will often make similar or identical 
contracts in the future, they will automatically gain personal experience and expertise, 
which puts them, at least after some time, in a more equal position to their counterparty 
than the consumer. 
Thirdly, professionals purchasing goods or services for their business often have 
advantages consumers do not have such as the ability to negotiate discounts because of 
large or repeat purchases and the ability to recover value added tax for professional 
purchases. 
Fourthly, in many cases the monetary value of professional purchases will often be 
higher than that of consumer purchases, lowering the threshold to litigate in a state other 
than their own because more is at stake so it pays to pursue a claim.  
Finally, in view of uniformity, clarity and legal certainty, an EU wide definition of the 
concepts of “consumer” and “consumer contract” is preferable. In this respect reference 
should be made to the Draft Common Frame of Reference. Although an in-depth 
discussion of this subject falls outside the scope of this research, it must be mentioned 
that this Draft Common Frame of Reference forms part of the process on the way to the 
so called Common Frame of Reference. The Draft, which was made by academics and 
informed by decades of legal research,761 will form the basis of and inform the Common 
760 Art. 15 Brussels I; Art. 6 Rome I. 
761 Von Bar, C. Et al., eds., 2009. Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law. 
Draft Common Frame of Reference. Available via: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/european-
private-law_en.pdf, p. 6, para. 2. 
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Frame of Reference,762 first called for by the Commission’s Action Plan on a More 
Coherent European Contract Law.763 According to this Action Plan a common frame 
of reference will establish common principles and terminology in the area of European 
contract law. It will be a publicly accessible document which should help the 
Community institutions in ensuring greater coherence of existing and future acquis in 
the area of European contract law. It should meet the needs and expectations of the 
economic operators in an internal market which envisages becoming the world’s most 
dynamic economy.764  
Because the Draft Frame of Reference will serve as a basis for common principles and 
terminology in the area of European contract law, the definition it proposes of a 
consumer is highly relevant. The Draft defines a consumer as “any natural person who 
is acting primarily for purposes which are not related to his or her trade, business or 
profession”.765 This definition is modelled on common features found in EU directives 
in the field of consumer protection law, EU procedural law and EU private international 
law.766  
Although there is an argument for saying that small businesses are also in need of the 
kind of protection afforded to consumers,767 it would be logical, in order to maintain 
clarity and legal certainty, to maintain the definition enshrined across all areas of EU 
law.768  
 
762 Von Bar, C. Et al., eds., 2009. Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law. 
Draft Common Frame of Reference. Available via: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/european-
private-law_en.pdf, p. 6, para. 1. 
763 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. A More Coherent 
European Contract Law. An Action Plan, COM (2003) 68 final, OJ C63, 15.03.2003, 1.  
764 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. A More Coherent 
European Contract Law. An Action Plan, COM (2003) 68 final, OJ C63, 15.03.2003, 1. At para 4.1.1. 
765 Von Bar, C. Et al., eds., 2009. Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law. 
Draft Common Frame of Reference. Available via: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/european-
private-law_en.pdf, p. 178. 
766 Von Bar, C. Et al., eds., 2009. Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law. 
Draft Common Frame of Reference. Available via: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/european-
private-law_en.pdf, p. 139. 
767 Von Bar, C. Et al., eds., 2009. Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law. 
Draft Common Frame of Reference. Available via: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/european-
private-law_en.pdf, p. 70. 
768 See also: Gillies, L., 2007. Choice-of-Law Rules for Electronic Consumer Contracts: Replacement of 
the Rome Convention by the Rome I Regulation. Journal of Private International Law [online], 3(1), 
103. Available via: HeinOnline. 
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2.3 The Protection Afforded to Consumers 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
It has been assessed which persons are consumers and, by extension, which contracts 
can generally be regarded as consumer contracts, that is, without looking into the 
exceptions and exclusions. It must next be evaluated whether consumers are adequately 
protected, as the weaker parties to the contract, by the rules in both the Brussels I 
Regulation and the Rome I Regulation. It must be assessed, in particular, whether the 
relevant provisions facilitate consumers’ access to justice by removing some of the 
obstacles they may face, being the weaker parties to the contract. 769  The relevant 
provisions will be provided first for reasons of clarity. After that a critical discussion 
and assessment, structured around the themes key to this thesis, will be conducted. 
 
Article 16 Brussels I states: 
“1. A consumer may bring proceedings against the other party to a contract either in 
the courts of the Member State in which that party is domiciled or in the courts for the 
place where the consumer is domiciled. 
2. Proceedings may be brought against a consumer by the other party to the contract 
only in the courts of the Member State in which the consumer is domiciled. 
3. This Article shall not affect the right to bring a counter-claim in the court in which, 
in accordance with this Section, the original claim is pending.” 
Article 17 Brussels I provides: 
“The provisions of this Section may be departed from only by an agreement: 
1. which is entered into after the dispute has arisen; or 
769  Cachia, P., 2009. Consumer Contracts in European Private International Law: The Sphere of 
Operation of the Consumer Contract Rules in the Brussels I and Rome I Regulations. European Law 
Review [online], 34(3), 477. Available via: Westlaw; Case Comment. Jurisdiction Rules for Consumer 
Do Not Require Distance Contract. EU Focus 2012[online], 300, 6. Available via: Westlaw.  
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2. which allows the consumer to bring proceedings in courts other than those indicated 
in this Section; or 
3. which is entered into by the consumer and the other party to the contract, both of 
whom are at the time of the contract domiciled or habitually resident in the same 
Member State, and which confers jurisdiction on the courts of that Member State, 
provided that such an agreement is not contrary to the law of that Member State.”  
 
Article 6 Rome I provides: 
“1. [...] a contract concluded by a natural person for a purpose which can be regarded 
as being outside his trade or profession (the consumer) with another person acting in 
the exercise of his trade or profession (the professional) shall be governed by the law 
of the country where the consumer has his habitual residence, provided that the 
professional: 
(a) pursues his commercial or professional activities in the country where the 
consumer has his habitual residence, or 
(b) by any means, directs such activities to that country or to several countries 
including that country, 
and the contract falls within the scope of such activities. 
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the parties may choose the law applicable to a 
contract which fulfils the requirements of paragraph 1, in accordance with Article 3. 
Such a choice may not, however, have the result of depriving the consumer of the 
protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement 
by virtue of the law which, in the absence of choice, would have been applicable on the 
basis of paragraph 1.” 
 
2.3.2 Jurisdiction in the Absence of Choice 
 
The protective rules for consumers in the Brussels I Regulation depart from the general 
rule, which is that persons shall be sued in the courts of the country in which they are 
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domiciled.770 Consumers may, of course, sue their counterparty in the Member state in 
which that party is domiciled,771 which is in line with the general rule. In addition to 
that however, consumers may sue the other party in the courts of the country where 
they themselves are domiciled. 772  This is a clear departure of the general rule. 
Furthermore the consumer can only be sued in the courts of the Member State in which 
he is domiciled.773 This is a departure from the general regime as well because, although 
the general rule is that a person shall be sued in the courts of the Member State where 
he is domiciled, the Brussels I Regulation provides alternative grounds of jurisdiction 
as well. 774  As a result there are several fora available for claims regarding other 
contracts, while a consumer can only be sued in where he is domiciled. This leads some 
to say that consumers are over-protected.775  
The most significant protection for the consumer here lies in the fact that they can sue 
the other party in their “own” courts i.e. the courts of the place where he is domiciled. 
This possibility is a radical departure of the overall Brussels regime and has been 
criticised even more because it lead to the fear that companies conducting business 
online could be sued anywhere in Europe, deterring them from pursuing online trade.776 
These arguments must be assessed in view of the scope of application of the relevant 
provisions. 
Article 15 Brussels I provides that the jurisdiction rules for consumer contracts apply 
if: 
“1. [...] (a) it is a contract for the sale of goods on instalment credit terms; or 
(b) it is a contract for a loan repayable by instalments, or for any other form of 
credit, made to finance the sale of goods; or 
 
(c) in all other cases, the contract has been concluded with a person who 
pursues commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the 
770 Art. 2 Brussels I. 
771 Art. 16(1) Brussels I. 
772 Art. 16(1) Brussels I.  
773 Art. 16(2) Brussels I. 
774 Art. 5 Brussels I. The first paragraph provides special jurisdiction grounds in relation to contracts. 
775  Hess, B., 2012. The Brussels I Regulation: Recent Case Law of the Court of Justice and the 
Commission’s Proposed Recast. Common Market Law Review, 49(3), 1092. 
776 E.g. Oren, J., 2003. International Jurisdiction over Consumer Contracts in E-Europe. International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly [online], 52(3), 665. Available via: Westlaw.  
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consumer’s domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that 
Member State or to several States including that Member State, and the 
contract falls within the scope of such activities.” 
These rules entail that the protective rules do not apply because of the mere fact that 
the person concerned is a consumer. If these requirements are not met, recourse must 
be had to the general jurisdiction rules in the Regulation.777  
Paragraph (a) and (b) have not been changed compared to the relevant paragraphs in 
the predecessor of the Brussels I Regulation and, as such, are contained in the Brussels 
I recast in the same wording. Paragraph (c) however, was a novelty introduced in the 
Brussels I Regulation. The discussion will therefore centre around this provision, also 
because it remained unchanged in the Brussels I recast so that the present discussion is 
highly relevant for the future. 
First, it must be mentioned that the protective rules for consumer contracts under the 
Brussels Convention applied, as mentioned, for contracts as specified in subparagraphs 
(a) and (b). The third subparagraph however, provided that the protective rules also 
applied for contracts for the supply of goods or services if the conclusion of the contract 
was preceded by a specific invitation addressed to the consumer or by advertising in 
the State of his domicile and provided that the consumer took in that State the steps 
necessary for the conclusion of the contract.778 This provision was widely interpreted 
by the CJEU so that the concepts of “a specific invitation addressed to the consumer” 
and “advertising” covered a very wide range of activities. In Gabriel779 the CJEU held 
that these concepts covered “all forms of advertising carried out in the consumer’s state 
of domicile, whether disseminated generally by the press, radio, television, cinema or 
any other medium, or addressed directly, for example by means of catalogues sent 
specifically to that state, as well as commercial offers made to the consumer in person, 
in particular by an agent or door-to-door salesman.” 
This interpretation, albeit very wide, comes across as slightly old-fashioned. It can 
absolutely be argued that contracts concluded through the internet were covered by this 
777 See also: Cachia, P., 2009. Consumer Contracts in European Private International Law: The Sphere 
of Operation of the Consumer Contract Rules in the Brussels I and Rome I Regulations. European Law 
Review [online], 34(3), 479. 
778 Art, 13(3) Brussels Convention. 
779 Case C-96/00, Rudolf Gabriel [2002], ECR I-036367. 
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provision. The Brussels I Regulation is worded in different terms, aiming to clarify that 
contracts concluded through the internet are covered by Article 15 (1) (c). 780  As 
touched upon briefly above in this section, this provision lead to quite a bit of anxiety 
among commercial enterprises trading via the internet, who now feared an enormous 
increase in costs rising from litigation in any Member State.781 It must therefore be 
investigated whether this anxiety is justified. 
The joined cases of Peter Pammer v Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co. And Hotel 
Alpenhof GesmbH v Oliver Heller782 suggest it is not. The CJEU explained that the 
change, as compared to the Brussels Convention, was made because of the development 
of internet communication. 783  The court further said that the words ‘directs such 
activities’ refers to the intention implicit in certain methods of advertising.784 Those 
words must not be interpreted as relating to a website merely being accessible in 
Member States other than that in which the trader concerned is established.785 Referring 
to the Rome I Regulation’s preamble,786 the court added that, in order for Article 15 (1) 
(c) to be applicable, the trader must have manifested his intention to establish 
commercial relations with consumers from one or more other Member States, including 
that of the consumer’s domicile.787 Clear expressions of such an intention include 
mention that he is offering his services or his goods in one or more Member States 
designated by name. The same is true of the disbursement of expenditure on an internet 
referencing service to the operator of a search engine in order to facilitate access to the 
trader’s site by consumers domiciled in various Member States.788 
780 E.g. Tang, Z.S., 2010. Review Article Private International Law in Consumer Contracts: A European 
Perspective. Journal of Private International Law [online], 6(1), 226. Available via: EBSCOHost; Tellini, 
D.E., 2005. Applicable Law and Electronic Consumer Contracts: A European Perspective. International 
Company and Commercial Law Review [online], 16(1), 4. Available via: Westlaw. 
Vasiljeva, K., 2004. 1968 Brussels Convention and EU Council Regulation No 44/2001: Jurisdiction in 
Consumer Contracts Concluded Online. European Law Journal [online], 10(1), 130. Available via: 
EBSCOHost; Stone, P., 2010. EU Private International Law. 2nd ed. Cheltenham: Elgar European Law. 
p. 136. 
781  McClean, D. and Ruiz Abou-Nigm, V., 2012. Morris. The Conflict of Laws. 8th ed. London: 
Sweet&Maxwell. p. 89.  
782 Joined Cases C-585/08 and C-144/09, Peter Pammer v Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co. And 
Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v Oliver Heller [2010], ECR I-12527. 
783 At para. 62. 
784 At para. 63-65. 
785 At para. 69. 
786 At para 74. 
787 At para. 75. 
788 At para. 81. 
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The CJEU continued by giving more examples of features which could constitute 
evidence of an activity directed to one or more Member States: the international nature 
of the activity at issue, such as certain tourist activities; mention of telephone numbers 
with the international code; use of a top-level domain name other than that of the 
Member State in which the trader is established, for example ‘.de’, or use of neutral 
top-level domain names such as ‘.com’ or ‘.eu’; the description of itineraries from one 
or more other Member States to the place where the service is provided; and mention 
of an international clientele composed of customers domiciled in various Member 
States, in particular by presentation of accounts written by such customers. 789 
Furthermore, if the website permits consumers to use a different language or currency, 
this can constitute evidence that the trader’s activity is directed to other Member 
States.790 
It is clear from this decision that the mere accessibility of a website in a Member State 
will not trigger the applicability of the protective rules for consumers. This seems 
logical as, in the light of protection of weaker parties, access to justice will be improved 
for consumers if they can sue the other party close to home. A balance must be struck, 
however, between consumer protection, on the one hand, and the need for legal 
certainty among business on the other hand, 791 or, the reasonable expectations of the 
professional.792 It is submitted that the current rule, as interpreted by the CJEU, strikes 
a correct balance. 
The discussion and assessment of the relevant rules has focussed on the Brussels I 
Regulation rather than the Rome I Regulation so far. The relevant rules of the Rome I 
Regulation are the subject of the next subsection.  
 
2.3.3 Applicable Law in the Absence of Choice 
 
789 At para. 83. 
790 At para. 84. 
791Vasiljeva, K., 2004. 1968 Brussels Convention and EU Council Regulation No 44/2001: Jurisdiction 
in Consumer Contracts Concluded Online. European Law Journal [online], 10(1), 1328.  
792 Garcimartín, Alférez, F., 2008. The Rome I Regulation: Much Ado about Nothing? The European 
Legal Forum [online], 2(I), 71. Available via: http://www.simons-law.com/library/pdf/e/884.pdf. 
 
190 
 
                                                     
Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation provides: 
“1. [A consumer contract] shall be governed by the law of the country where the 
consumer has his habitual residence, provided that the professional: 
(a) pursues his commercial or professional activities in the country where the 
consumer has his habitual residence, or 
(b) by any means, directs such activities to that country or to several countries 
including that country, 
and the contract falls within the scope of such activities.” 
This provision is very similar to that in the Brussels I Regulation and the preamble to 
the Rome I Regulation refers to that Regulation and the need for consistency with that 
legal instrument in regards to the concept of directed activity as a condition for applying 
the consumer protection rule. Furthermore it states that the concept must be interpreted 
harmoniously as between the two Regulations.793 
As a result, the discussion and evaluation of the rules under the Brussels I Regulation 
is highly relevant to the Rome I Regulation. Similarly to the protective regime under 
Brussels I, the application of the protective rules in Rome I, as a result of which the 
applicable law will be the law of the country in which the consumer is habitually 
resident, will not be triggered by the mere fact that a website is accessible in another 
Member State.794  
As such, the arguments made above. will not be repeated here. It is submitted that the 
conclusion reached in that section applies here as well. 
2.3.4 Jurisdiction and Applicable Law  Following a Choice by the Parties 
 
As mentioned in chapter 7,795 party autonomy is one of the cornerstones in private 
international law regarding contract. The parties to a consumer contract also have the 
793 (24) Preamble Rome I. 
794 (24) Preamble Rome I. 
795 See Introduction chapter 7. 
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option to choose the court which can hear disputes arising out of their contractual 
relationship and the law which will govern it, but this choice is limited.796  
In regards to jurisdiction, Article 17 Brussels I provides: 
“The provisions of this Section may be departed from only by agreement: 
1. which is entered into after the dispute has arisen; or 
2. which allows the consumer to bring proceedings in courts other than those indicated 
in this Section; or 
3. which is entered into by the consumer and the other party to the contract, both of 
whom are at the time of conclusion of the contract domiciled or habitually resident in 
the same Member State, and which confers jurisdiction on the courts of that Member 
State, provided that such an agreement is not contrary to the law of that Member State.”  
This rule clearly limits party autonomy as the parties to a consumer contract have only 
limited options as to which court they can favour in a jurisdiction agreement, compared 
to parties to other contracts.797 The questions must be asked, therefore, whether this 
limitation is desirable in view of party autonomy. 
It is submitted that it is, as it is aimed at first, making the consumer think twice before 
agreeing on a particular choice of forum.798 Second, the options in terms of courts that 
can be chosen are limited in favour of the consumer. As such, it must be concluded that 
the limitations on party autonomy are acceptable because they contribute to weaker 
party protection. 
One remark must be made here in regards to legal certainty and predictability however. 
Article 17 is unclear as to whether jurisdiction agreements where one party is a 
consumer, are subject to the conditions of Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation, which 
imposes certain formal requirements for jurisdiction agreements.799 It can be argued 
796 Garcimartin Alferéz, F., 2009. The Rome I Regulation: Exceptions to the Rule on Consumer Contracts 
and Financial Instruments. Journal of Private International Law [online], 5(1), 85. Available via: 
EBSCOHost. See also: Langer, D., 2000. Arranging and Concluding Contracts on the Internet. Choice 
of Law and Consumer Protection. The European Legal Forum, 2, 117-121. Available via: 
http://www.simons-law.com/library/pdf/e/148.pdf. 
797 See chapter 2. 
798 E.g. Van Calster, G., 2013. European Private International Law.  Oxford: Hart Publishing. p. 73. 
799 See chapter 2. 
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that there is no need for such formal conditions as the agreement can only be entered 
into after the dispute has arisen so that the consumer will be fully aware of what they 
are agreeing to. Furthermore the options are such that they already protect the 
consumer.800 As such, no additional weaker party protection is required in the form of 
formal conditions. It would be conducive to legal certainty, however, if this was made 
clear in the text of Article 17. 
 
Next, the rules on the freedom to choose the applicable law must be assessed. 
Article 6 (2) Rome I provides: 
“[...] the parties may choose the law applicable to a [consumer] contract, in 
accordance with Article 3. Such a choice may not, however, have the result of depriving 
the consumer of the protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated 
from by agreement by virtue of the law which, in the absence of choice, would have 
been applicable [...]”  
This provision has been criticised because it affords consumers a double protection 
when a choice of law is made. In particular they will benefit from the protection of the 
chosen law as well as the protection of the so called mandatory rules of the law which 
would have been applicable in the absence of a choice by the parties.801 
This criticism even led the Commission to propose an abandonment of the option to 
choose the applicable law in consumer contracts.802 It is submitted by the researcher 
that this would have been a step too far. Party autonomy is, as mentioned several times 
throughout this thesis, one of the cornerstones of EU private international law rules. 
Although it is acceptable to limit this autonomy in the pursuit of weaker party 
protection, not allowing the parties to choose the applicable law at all is taking would 
mean that one policy objective is preferred to the absolute detriment of another. 
800 Van Calster, G., 2013. European Private International Law.  Oxford: Hart Publishing. p. 73. 
801 Lando, O. and Nielsen, P.A., 2008. The Rome I Regulation. Common Market Law Review, 45(6), 
1708. 
802 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations (Rome I), COM (2005) 650 final. p. 6. 
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Furthermore, in consumer contracts, it is almost exclusively the trader who decided 
whether there is a choice of law clause and which law will be favoured in such a clause. 
Especially in electronic consumer contracts, where consumer will often simply tick a 
box not realising what they are agreeing to.803 In many cases it is therefore easy for the 
trader to avoid this double protection by simply not inserting a choice of law clause into 
the contract.804 
It must be concluded that the current rule therefore strikes a balance between achieving 
party autonomy, on the one hand, and protecting the weaker party to the contract, on 
the other hand. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
It was investigated in this chapter, first, which contracts are considered consumer 
contracts, or, which persons are considered consumers. It was researched whether the 
relevant provisions needed amending in the light of the policy objective of protection 
of weaker parties. Specifically it was assessed whether persons contracting with 
companies for a purpose related to their profession, should enjoy the protection 
consumers enjoy. It was held that there are several reasons why such persons must be 
distinguished from consumers. Despite these arguments there may still be a valid 
argument that this category of persons need protection as the weaker party to the 
contract. However, in view of legal certainty a definition employed across all EU 
instruments must be preferred so that amendment in Brussels I and Rome I is not 
desirable.  
It was researched, second, in how far the protective jurisdiction rules depart from the 
general jurisdiction rules and whether consumers are over-protected, as argued by 
some. This issue was researched with a particular focus on electronic consumer 
contracts, as part of the argument was that this over-protection would deter businesses 
from pursuing online trade. An assessment and evaluation of the relevant law and case 
803  Tang, Z., 2005. Exclusive Choice of Forum Clauses and Consumer Contracts in E-Commerce. 
Journal of Private International Law [online], 1(2), pp. 239. Available via: HeinOnline. 
804 Lando, O. and Nielsen, P.A., 2008. The Rome I Regulation. Common Market Law Review, 45(6), 
1708. 
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law in which this was applied, led to the conclusion that a balance was struck between 
consumer protection on the one hand, and legal certainty and respect for the reasonable 
expectations of the professional, on the other hand. As the Rome I rules on a choice by 
the parties are almost identical to the Brussels I rules, an in-depth separate investigation 
of those was not needed. 
Next the provisions on a choice by the parties in consumer contracts were evaluated in 
the light, not just of party autonomy, but the other EU private international law policies 
as well. In regards to a choice of jurisdiction, it was argued that the limitations on party 
autonomy were justified in order to achieve weaker party protection. A suggestion for 
the enhancement of legal certainty was made however. 
Finally, the Rome I rules on party autonomy in consumer contracts were researched. 
Although these have been subject to some criticism, the researcher finds that these 
criticisms could be rebutted and therefore concluded that the relevant rules strike a 
balance between the respect of party autonomy and the protection of weaker parties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
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 The first chapter provided an overview of the history of EU private international law 
with reference to wider historical events. In this initial research, it became clear that, 
although the EU private international law project has been underway for many decades, 
it is not yet completed. Particularly relevant in this respect was a recent development 
which took place during the period in which the PhD research was conducted. The 
Brussels I Regulation was revised and resulted in the Brussels I recast. Recent changes 
have been made, therefore, illustrating that EU private international law is not just 
undergoing a mere evolution, but a real change still.  
Chapter 1 also identified four key objectives underlying EU private international law 
rules generally. As the general objective, access to justice was identified. The second 
important policy objective identified was legal certainty and predictability. Thirdly, 
party autonomy was discussed as one of the cornerstones of EU private international 
law rules. Finally, the protection of weaker parties to a contract was identified as one 
of the fundamental aims underlying EU private international law. 
These four policy objectives formed the spine of this thesis, around which the 
discussion and evaluation of the Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation was 
centred.  
In order to be able to identify the most relevant issues to investigate in the light of these 
four policy objectives, and in order to place them into context, chapter 2 provided an 
overview of both the Brussels I and the Rome I Regulation. The chapter identified 
several issues as particularly relevant for the purposes of the thesis and touched upon 
the fact that the rules pertaining to these issues seemed to, prima facie, fail at achieving 
the policy objectives underlying EU private international law. More specifically, the 
issues identified related to the scope of the Brussels I Regulation and external 
defendants, the lis alibi pendens rule, the possibility of an implied choice of applicable 
law, the possibility to choose non-state law as the applicable law, the rules on applicable 
law in the absence of choice by the parties and the rules protecting consumers. 
Having identified these issues, the researcher decided to address them in-depth in 
chapters 4 to 8, with specific attention for the Brussels I recast. This was held to be 
crucial as the initial and basic analysis in chapter 2 suggested that some problems could 
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be identified which seemed not to have been addressed yet, or at least not appropriately 
addressed.   
Chapter 3 outlined national English private international law rules which have now 
largely been replaced by EU private international law instruments in the area of 
contractual obligations. It appeared that traditional English rules could be a source of 
inspiration, however, when it comes to finding creative solutions. That would not 
necessarily be without problems though, as became apparent later on in the research. 
In general it appeared that English private international law focuses on jurisdiction and 
procedural rules more than on applicable law. Another observation was that English 
private international law rules are generally characterized by a large degree of 
flexibility, focusing on the objective to do justice in the individual case rather than legal 
certainty and predictability. As such, many rules provide the courts with a degree of 
discretion, which seems quite different from the EU private international law approach, 
which is generally focused on achieving the highest possible degree of legal certainty 
and predictability and views discretion of the courts as undermining that. EU private 
international law is therefore far more rule-based than English private international law.  
Chapter 4 outlined Belgian private international law and its underlying policy 
objectives. It became clear very quickly that Belgian law is far more rule-based than 
English private international law and, as such, more similar to EU law in its approach. 
It can be argued therefore, that EU law has been largely inspired by civil law systems 
rather than common law systems. For example, Belgian law does not recognise a large 
degree of judicial discretion but contains very detailed rules instead. This seems to be 
the approach taken by EU law as well. 
It is also clear, on the other hand, that Belgian law has been largely influenced by EU 
law in the area of private international law. Of course, EU private international law 
replaced the Belgian provisions to a large extent, equal to what happened with English 
law. Moreover, however, the Belgian legislator decided to declare applicable EU law 
even in those areas where it would not otherwise be applicable.   
Chapter 5, on access to justice, focused on the Brussels I lis pendens rule and how the 
potential for its abuse caused serious concerns in terms of access to justice. The EU 
held it to be particularly problematic in cases where there was a choice of court 
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agreement, and, as such the relevant rules in the Brussels I Regulation were amended 
on the occasion of the recast. It was found that the Regulation is thus a significant 
improvement in terms of access to justice for cases in which there is an exclusive choice 
of court agreement. The researcher found, however, that the same stalling tactics could 
be used in cases in which there was no jurisdiction agreement. Furthermore there are 
drawbacks to the new rule. Especially the risk of the use of more advanced torpedo 
tactics could be problematic in view of access to justice. 
It was therefore assessed whether Belgian or English law could provide a solution. 
These were held to be undesirable for several reasons, but mainly because they could 
undermine legal certainty, another key objective of EU private international law. It was 
submitted that perhaps there was no perfect solution so that parties’ access to justice 
may, in a limited number of cases, still be affected by abusive litigation tactics their 
counterparties. In such cases they may have to rely on the domestic law of the Member 
States for a remedy.  
Chapter 6 focused on legal certainty and predictability and evaluated the lis pendens 
rule from that perspective. It was found, just as in relation to access to justice, that the 
current rule had proven problematic in its application, or rather, the fact that parties had 
relied on it in bad faith to delay proceedings. As was also mentioned before, in relation 
to access to justice, the new rule in the Brussels I recast did not solve all the problems 
as there is now scope for reverse torpedo tactics, or the tactic whereby a party alleges 
there is a jurisdiction agreement when really there is none. Furthermore the original 
rule in the Brussels I Regulation remained untouched. 
Next, attention turned to the possibility for parties to a contract to make a tacit choice 
of law. The differences in linguistic versions that existed under the Rome Convention, 
were removed from the Rome I Regulation, which increased legal certainty and 
predictability. Uncertainty also existed under the Rome Convention on the question in 
how far a choice of a particular court constituted a choice of the law of that court’s 
country. The amendment of the preamble of the Rome I Regulation to the effect that 
such a choice of court should be one of the factors to be taken into account in 
determining whether parties had made an implied choice, was held to be insufficient to 
significantly improve legal certainty. 
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It was also examined whether the parties to a contract had the possibility under the 
Rome I Regulation to make a choice of non-state law, as this was clearly excluded under 
its predecessor. Although the Rome I proposal sought to introduce such an option which 
could have adversely affected legal certainty and predictability, the proposed provision 
was deleted so that it was concluded the Rome I Regulation does not raise particular 
issues in relation to legal certainty in this respect.  
Finally, the rules determining the applicable law in the absence of a choice by the parties 
were researched. It was identified that the concept of characteristic performance was 
problematic in terms of legal certainty as it is appeared very difficult to identify the 
characteristic performance for complex contracts. It was therefore concluded that it 
must be regretted that this concept, adopted under the Rome Convention, was retained 
in the Rome I Regulation. 
In regards to the applicable law in the absence of choice, the Regulation made 
improvements in terms of legal certainty as well however. The much-criticised 
presumptions in the Rome Convention were replaced by fixed rules for eight types of 
contracts, improving foreseeability of the applicable law. It was concluded that it must 
be regretted though, that the exception clause in the Rome Convention, which had 
caused a lack of uniform application of the rules and which had therefore led to division 
for as long as it had existed, remained in the Regulation. As such legal certainty may 
still be undermined. 
Chapter 7 on party autonomy emphasised that, although the original lis pendens rule in 
the Brussels I Regulation was highly undesirable in terms of party autonomy, this 
situation has drastically improved though the Brussels I recast. By reversing the priority 
in the current rule, great importance is now attached to a jurisdiction agreement, which 
is obviously a victory for party autonomy. 
The concept of an implied choice of law was researched next, and it was investigated 
how this concept related to party autonomy. The researcher found that it was important 
to recognise such a choice in law but that the relevant rules had not been applied 
uniformly throughout the EU. It was concluded that the streamlining of the different 
language versions was an improvement made by the Rome I Regulation, as compared 
to its predecessor, but that there were more fundamental reasons for the lack of uniform 
application so that additional clarification in the matter is needed.  
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Finally, it was investigated in how far parties are allowed, under the Rome I Regulation, 
to make a choice of a non-state law. Under the Rome Convention  this was 
unequivocally not an option and it was proposed in the context of its conversion into 
the Regulation that such a choice, albeit not for any non-state legal system, should be 
allowed. Because of a lack of consensus on the issue, the proposal did not survive, 
which is regrettable in terms of party autonomy. It was submitted that a true respect for, 
and enhancement of, party autonomy means that parties should be allowed to choose 
whichever legal system they want to choose. 
The final chapter on weaker party protection first investigated whether the definition of 
a consumer contract needed amending in order to protect parties worthy of protection 
who do not currently fall under the definition. In the light of the other policy objectives 
identified, it was held that the current definition should be preserved in both the 
Brussels I and the Rome I Regulation. 
It was researched, second, in how far the protective jurisdiction rules depart from the 
general jurisdiction rules and whether consumers are over-protected, as argued by 
some. This issue was researched with a particular focus on electronic consumer 
contracts. An assessment and evaluation of the relevant law and case law in which this 
was applied, led to the conclusion that a balance was struck between consumer 
protection on the one hand, and legal certainty and respect for the reasonable 
expectations of the professional, on the other hand.                                                                                                 
Next the provisions on a choice by the parties in consumer contracts were evaluated in 
the light, not just of party autonomy, but the other EU private international law policies 
as well. In regards to a choice of jurisdiction, it was argued that the limitations on party 
autonomy were justified in order to achieve weaker party protection. A suggestion for 
the enhancement of legal certainty was made however. 
Finally, the Rome I rules on party autonomy in consumer contracts were researched. 
Although these have been subject to some criticism, the researcher finds that these 
criticisms could be rebutted and therefore concluded that the relevant rules strike a 
balance between the respect of party autonomy and the protection of weaker parties. 
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This recast Regulation made some significant changes to the law, which were the 
subject of the research. As such, in-depth research was carried out in areas in which 
little or no publications were available.  
Consequently changes may be needed and will hopefully take place in the future. 
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